The peace openings of twenty eighteen brought rare optimism to the Horn of Africa. Eritrea and Ethiopia announced the formal end of two decades of hostility, and for a brief period families walked across long sealed borders with an emotional intensity that defined the moment. Yet the structural requirements of lasting peace were never fulfilled. Ethiopia moved forward with administrative, diplomatic and infrastructural preparations, while Eritrea remained cautious, selective and ultimately resistant to the deeper implementation that both the Asmara and Jeddah Agreements required. The result is a peace process that appeared promising on the surface but lacked the institutional foundations needed for durability.

This article reviews the agreements in detail, examines patterns of under implementation, considers Eritreas regional posture and explores the digital influence campaigns that Ethiopian researchers associate with Eritrean aligned networks. It concludes with an assessment of why Eritreas continued avoidance of institutionalized peace represents not only a regional challenge but a form of self sabotage with deep internal consequences.

The Asmara and Jeddah Agreements in Detail

The first breakthrough occurred with the Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship signed in Asmara in July twenty eighteen. The declaration formally ended the state of war and committed the two countries to restoring diplomatic and consular relations. It also promised the re establishment of transport links, trade, telecommunications and the free movement of people and goods. The most significant pledge was the implementation of the border ruling issued years earlier by the Eritrea Ethiopia Boundary Commission, which both governments reaffirmed publicly through research.

Two months later the Jeddah Agreement expanded the agenda. It called for joint economic development, cooperation on regional security and concrete steps to counter trafficking and terrorism. It reinforced earlier commitments to reopen borders, normalize cross border movement and begin the practical work of implementing the Boundary Commission decision through demarcation on the ground, as noted in international analysis.

Together, the two agreements established a clear sequence that would shift the two states from rivalry to integration. Diplomatic missions were to be reopened, border crossings restored, and communication links normalized. Regulatory systems for trade and movement were to be prepared on both sides. These steps would create the conditions for deeper economic cooperation including port access and jointly managed investment initiatives.

In practice only a small portion of this vision materialized. Embassies reopened but Eritrea later reduced the operational scope of its consular services. Border crossings were reopened in September twenty eighteen and people moved freely across points like Zalambessa and Bure. Thousands of Eritreans entered Ethiopia seeking opportunity beyond the constraints of national service, yet within months Eritrea closed all border points without issuing a clear description of its reasoning. This abrupt reversal was documented in regional monitoring research.

Ethiopia continued drafting customs and immigration regulations in anticipation of stable cross border commerce. Eritrea did not produce parallel frameworks. Ethiopian Airlines resumed flights but suspended them again when no long term aviation agreement was formalized. Telecommunications discussions generated public interest but did not produce sustained connectivity.

The most crucial gap was the absence of a clearly defined border. Despite the explicit commitment to implement the Boundary Commission ruling there was no evidence of jointly conducted field study after twenty eighteen. Ethiopian and international analysts point out that no joint maps were published, no technical delegations were dispatched and no timeline for these actions was released. This left communities on both sides of border uncertain about the legal status of their land and their long term future, as highlighted in expert research.

Economic cooperation also remained symbolic. Announcements about port access and special economic zones generated optimism but never evolved into transparent agreements or published contracts.

For Ethiopia these setbacks were damaging but not existential. For Eritrea the opportunity cost was profound. The government could have used the peace opening to reduce militarization, encourage investment and begin reintegrating with regional economies. Instead it maintained strategic ambiguity and preserved its long standing model of controlled isolation.

Eritreas Regional Position and External Alignment

Eritreas cautious implementation has contributed to a regional posture that aligns with the strategic interests of Egypt. Egyptian leaders publicly welcomed the Jeddah Agreement and have repeatedly expressed support for Eritrean sovereignty during moments of tension over Red Sea access and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Their position is documented in recent regional research.

Commentary within the Horn of Africa notes that Egyptian Eritrean cooperation has expanded in recent years and often aligns with efforts to limit Ethiopian influence in the region. These dynamics are discussed in both policy circles and academic research.

Eritreas selective engagement therefore appears to provide diplomatic leverage while preserving its internal political model. Yet the price of this strategic posture is borne primarily by Eritrean society.

Digital Information Campaigns and the Escalation of Ethiopian Polarization

Digital discourse in Ethiopia since the Pretoria Agreement has been deeply polarized. Online debates about federalism, ethnicity and security have been amplified by coordinated misinformation. The European Institute of Peace documents widespread misinformation and hate speech in Ethiopian online spaces in its detailed research.

Insecurity Insight similarly reports coordinated digital activity targeting humanitarian organizations, revealing patterns of deliberate distortion in shared digital environments through its monitoring research.

Within this wider digital landscape Ethiopian analysts identify clusters of accounts whose tone, language and narrative structure match Eritrean political communication. These accounts activate during moments of national stress and push narratives that frame Ethiopia as a country collapsing under ethnic division.

A common pattern involves rapid swarming behavior. When a political speech or controversial statement is made, dozens of accounts emerge within minutes posting nearly identical phrases. They tag prominent voices from both Oromo and Amhara communities with emotionally loaded messages about betrayal, conquest or existential threat. These accounts recycle older images of violence, presenting them as contemporary events to inflame anger.

Another pattern involves cultural impersonation. Some accounts present themselves as defenders of Amhara identity, using classical imperial imagery and linguistic cues. After gaining trust they inject derogatory language toward Oromo communities and promote narratives of Oromo domination. These same accounts often attack Amhara users who reject ethnic hostility.

A parallel cluster impersonates Oromo identity while amplifying Eritrean aligned rhetoric. These accounts praise Eritrean leaders as uncompromising strategists and portray Oromo politicians who seek compromise as collaborators.

Ethiopian researchers also note a group of accounts that openly mimic the tone and communication style of Eritrean officials. Their rhetoric uses insider phrasing common in Eritrean political speeches. They present themselves as authority linked voices and engage in public tagging campaigns against Oromo activists, journalists and civic leaders. Some use photographs of unrelated women while claiming familial ties to Ethiopian public figures to appear credible. Analysts argue that the open display of official style communication increases their persuasive power and contributes to rising suspicion across communities.

The experience of the writer Andrew Korybko is often used by Ethiopian commentators as an example of concentrated online pressure. He publicly described sustained harassment that he attributed to an Eritrean aligned network after he published critiques of Eritreas regional posture. His description is widely cited in Ethiopian political research.

Targeting the largest ethnic group as a Strategic Pattern

The targeting of the Oromo in Eritrean aligned digital messaging is interpreted by researchers as strategic rather than cultural. The pattern is not new. When the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front held dominant influence, Eritrean aligned narratives framed the Tigray as the embodiment of the federal state, using derogatory terms such as Agame. During earlier periods the Amhara were similarly framed as a ruling class, using historical labels such as Neftegna.

Today the Oromo are framed as the symbolic holders of power even though Ethiopias political system remains complex and multi layered. This framing encourages non Oromo communities to view Oromo citizens with suspicion and pushes Oromo audiences to feel unfairly targeted. It is a deliberate simplification of political dynamics that benefits narratives portraying Ethiopia as permanently unstable.

Analysts link this pattern to Eritreas longstanding need to sustain a siege mentality. By presenting Ethiopia as chaotic and threatening Eritrean officials justify the continuation of indefinite national service and sustained militarization, a pattern widely documented in human rights research.

Internal Costs and the Risk of Self Sabotage

Human Rights Watch describes Eritreas national service as indefinite in practice and profoundly damaging to the futures of young Eritreans. This is documented in detailed research. The European Union Agency for Asylum similarly reports limited pathways for demobilization and high levels of flight among youth who see no civilian opportunities ahead of them, as shown in its comprehensive research.

The result is a diminishing educated middle generation and a youth population that associates the state with coercion rather than opportunity. These dynamics mean that Eritreas refusal to fully implement the peace agreements represents not only a missed diplomatic opportunity but a form of self sabotage. Peace with Ethiopia could have reduced the need for militarization, attracted investment and encouraged Eritrean youth to stay. Instead the government preserved its existing model, accelerating youth flight whenever movement is possible.

Asymmetric Risks of Renewed War

War would damage both countries but the consequences would be significantly asymmetric. Ethiopia would suffer severe losses but has a larger population, more diversified institutions and a broader economic base.

Eritrea however faces existential risks. Analysts warn that if borders opened during conflict a large portion of Eritrean youth might flee rather than fight. This pattern occurred when borders opened briefly in twenty eighteen and twenty nineteen, as shown in border monitoring research.

Eritreas system depends on conscript labor and an aging leadership. A major conflict could strain this model beyond its breaking point.

Pathways to Reviving the Agreements and Preventing Escalation

Ethiopia and Eritrea can still revive the spirit of the twenty eighteen agreements if they take structured steps.

Rebuild institutional mechanisms

Regular meetings of joint commissions on trade, movement, security and diplomatic coordination should be reinstated.

Reduce online hostility

Both countries and influential actors can commit to rejecting ethnic incitement and distancing themselves from digital campaigns that intensify mistrust.

Reform national service in Eritrea

Introducing clear time limits and expanding civilian alternatives would improve internal stability and reduce youth flight, a recommendation echoed in human rights research.

Create incentive based regional partnerships

International partners can tie assistance to verifiable progress on demarcation, communication links and the reopening of consulates.

Conclusion

The Asmara and Jeddah Agreements offered a historic chance to transform hostility into long term partnership. Ethiopia made multiple attempts to institutionalize the peace, while Eritrea preserved ambiguity and avoided the obligations that would have locked in cooperation. Digital networks aligned with Eritrean rhetoric have taken advantage of Ethiopias internal divisions, fueling suspicion through impersonation, swarm messaging and targeted hostility.

Eritreas strategy may produce short term leverage, but it creates long term fragility. A renewed conflict could destabilize the Eritrean political model more dramatically than any event in its recent history. A durable peace requires transparent diplomacy, reduced polarization and genuine reform. Without that, the opportunity that emerged in twenty eighteen will remain unfinished and the region will continue to face unnecessary risks.