Eritrea: The Country That Lives to Oppose Everything Ethiopia

Abstract

Eritrea’s emergence from Italian colonial rule and its subsequent detachment from Ethiopia produced one of Africa’s most militarized and least economically viable states. The country’s hermit nature contradicts its dependence on external patronage, and its use of militarization as a tool of governance reflects the unfinished legacy of partition and state formation in the Horn of Africa. This article traces Eritrea’s evolution from the Italian occupation to the authoritarian consolidation under Isaias Afwerki, examining the historical, economic, and geopolitical conditions that have rendered the state unsustainable. It concludes that a pragmatic confederation between Ethiopia and Eritrea—anchored in shared sovereignty, port access, and economic cooperation—offers the only durable solution to end the long saga of conflict between the two.

Pre-Colonial Patchwork and the Italian Project

Before the late nineteenth century, the territory that became Eritrea was a mosaic of highland Christian and lowland Muslim communities that shifted allegiance among local rulers, imperial forces, and external powers. The highlands were dominated by Tigrinya-speaking Orthodox Christians tied to the Ethiopian Empire, while the lowlands were inhabited by Muslim Afar, Saho, Tigre, etc. Groups whose networks extended into Sudan, Ottoman and Egyptian realms. Authority fluctuated continually, with figures such as Ras Alula defending Ethiopia’s northern frontier.

Italy’s arrival in 1885 through the seizure of Massawa marked the start of a radical transformation. Over the next decade, Italian administrators extended inland, imposing European territoriality where none had existed and proclaiming the colony of Eritrea in 1890. As Ruth Iyob and Gaim Kibreab observe, colonial rule created the institutions of a modern state but severed its organic connection to the Ethiopian highlands, replacing networks of faith and trade with bureaucratic hierarchy and racial hierarchy.

Federation, Annexation, and the Long War

After World War II, Britain administered Eritrea until the United Nations adopted Resolution 390(V) in 1950, federating Eritrea with Ethiopia under Emperor Haile Selassie. The Unionist Party—largely Tigrinya—saw this as a restoration of historic unity; Muslim and coastal communities feared absorption. Encouraged by Eritrea’s considerable Christian highlanders, Emperor Haile Selassie eventually centralized his rule over the region, culminating in annexation in 1962. This was not merely and imperial ambition but an attempt at postcolonial consolidation typical of African states defending inherited borders. Yet the loss of autonomy ignited a sense of betrayal that sparked the thirty-year Eritrean War of Independence, the formative struggle of modern Eritrean nationalism (Connell 2019).

Arab Patronage and Cold War Alignments

During the 1960s and 1970s the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and later the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) received considerable support from Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. Cairo, anxious over Ethiopia’s control of the Nile headwaters, sought to weaken Addis Ababa’s influence. As Jeffrey Lefebvre and Biruk Yihun show, Arab geopolitics and African nationalism intersected across the Horn. When the Derg aligned with the Soviet Union, the United States and its Arab allies covertly backed Eritrean factions. The conflict became a proxy theatre of the Cold War, embedding external patronage and militarization deep within Eritrea’s political culture.

Alliance, Estrangement, and the 1998–2000 War

By the late 1970s, the EPLF under Isaias Afwerki eclipsed the ELF and allied with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) led by Meles Zenawi. They shared routes, intelligence, and a common narrative of resisting what they often referred to as “Amhara centralism.” When the Derg collapsed in 1991, their cooperation gave way to rivalry over trade, currency, and borders. Disputes around Badme erupted into the Eritrean–Ethiopian War (1998–2000).

As The Guardian reported, Meles Zenawi and Isaias Afwerki were “rumoured to be cousins,” and other biographical accounts claimed they once lived together in Mogadishu under Somali passports—symbolic of how intimacy turned into enmity. The war killed tens of thousands and left Eritrea isolated, while Ethiopia emerged economically battered but regionally central.

The Referendum and the Marginalization of the Afar

The UN-supervised referendum of 1993 delivered a near-unanimous vote for independence, yet large segments of the Afar and Kunama populations were effectively excluded. Subsequent UNHCR recordsnote intimidation and displacement in Afar areas around Assab. For many Afars, whose kin live on both sides of the border, colonial demarcation severed economic lifelines. Their leaders today argue that genuine autonomy and cultural survival require reintegration with Ethiopia—a stance rooted in the region’s pre-colonial ties to the Ethiopian state.

Eritrea’s Economic Non-Viability

Independence brought political pride but economic fragility. Less than six percent of Eritrean land is arable; recurrent droughts and militarized labor policies suppress output. The regime’s system of indefinite national service, condemned by Amnesty International, immobilizes the workforce in low-productivity military projects. Remittances from the diaspora contribute nearly a third of GDP (CIA World Factbook), while private enterprise remains strangled by state control.

The government compensates by renting strategic assets—most notably leasing Assab to the UAE for its Yemen operations (UNSC 2016 Report)—substituting rent for reform.

War as Economy and Proxy Networks

Deprived of resources, Eritrea has monetized instability. UN investigations cite its sponsorship of the Patriotic Ginbot 7, Tigray People’s Democratic Movement, Oromo Liberation Front, Ogaden National Liberation Front, Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front, FRUD-Armé (Djibouti), Benishangul People’s Liberation Movement, and elements of the Amhara Fano militia (Rift Valley Institute 2024).

Beyond proxy support, Asmara has fought directly in multiple conflicts: the Eritrea–Yemen War (1995), the Eritrea–Ethiopia War (1998–2000), Djibouti clashes (2008), participation in the Tigray War (2020–2022), and Yemen’s civil war since 2015 via the UAE base at Assab. These wars substitute for a peacetime economy; militarization itself has become the state’s principal export.

Sanctions, Defections, and Isolation

Eritrea’s interference provoked UN sanctions Res. 1907 (2009) and Res. 2023 (2011), later lifted in 2018 but leaving reputational damage intact.

Isolation fuels human flight: ministers, diplomats, and entire sports teams defect. The BBC and Guardian record repeated episodes of athletes seeking asylum abroad; even ambassadors have vanished into exile. This hemorrhage of talent testifies to a system unable to sustain its own citizens.

Assab, the Afar, and Ethiopia’s Maritime Logic

Ethiopia’s loss of coastline after 1993 was a geopolitical shock, yet historically the Afar coast—including Assab—lay within its sphere. As Richard Pankhurst documents, nineteenth-century treaties recognized Ethiopian influence before Italy’s 1869 purchase of the port under dubious contracts. For the Afar communities spanning both sides, the border remains an artificial wound. They advocate a return to Ethiopian association, citing exclusion from the 1993 referendum and repression under Asmara.

Former U.S. diplomat Herman J. Cohen has argued for economic union rather than conquest—allowing Ethiopia guaranteed port access while preserving Eritrean sovereignty.

Toward Confederation and Shared Prosperity

A confederation would transform rivalry into interdependence. Joint administration of Assab and Massawa, shared customs and energy corridors, and open labor mobility could revive both economies. Integration within the African Continental Free Trade Area would anchor the Horn in continental commerce rather than external patronage.

For Eritrea, such a framework offers rehabilitation. Per capita, its smal population would benefit greatly from open access to trade. It would also relieve it from perpetual war-footing, currently draining the life out of its economy. For Ethiopia, unhindered maritime access would mean increase its GDP by at least 20% according to UN estimates. For the region, a sustainable peace architecture built on cooperation instead of coercion

Conclusion

Eritrea stands as a state born of empire, sustained by militarism, and impoverished by isolation. Its war-based economy, demographic flight, and over dependence on external rents mark it as structurally unsustainable. Ethiopia’s turn toward diplomacy—symbolized by the 2018 peace agreement—demonstrates that strategic partnership, not rivalry, can secure the Red Sea.

The Horn’s future stability will hinge not on who commands Assab but on whether its peoples can transcend colonial frontiers. Confederation, not confrontation, is the path to completing the Horn’s unfinished state.

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