The Existence of Eritrea’s Authoritarian Regime Depends on Undermining Ethiopia

Eritrea’s regime, under longtime authoritarian leader Isaias Afewerki, has grown increasingly wary as Ethiopia intensifies its efforts to secure access to the sea. Ethiopia’s economic growth demands reliable maritime routes, and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has openly discussed the need for a port, including the possibility of negotiating for Assab through trade agreements rather than conflict. However, Afewerki has devised a long-term strategy to thwart Ethiopia’s ambitions.

This plan took shape following Abiy’s speech outlining Ethiopia’s need for secure sea access, which he proposed could be achieved through bartering stakes in major national assets such as Ethiopian Airlines or the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Eritrea’s response was swift, mobilizing state-controlled media, social media operatives, and diplomatic channels to discredit Ethiopia’s push for maritime access. Egypt, a long-standing rival of Ethiopia over control of the Nile, joined Eritrea in opposing Ethiopia’s aspirations, even attempting to bar Ethiopia from participating in the Red Sea Forum, a regional platform for cooperation among nations bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

A concerted disinformation campaign soon followed, orchestrated to distort Ethiopia’s narrative. The campaign leveraged Ethiopia’s ethnic and religious divisions, particularly by portraying the Oromo people as ruthless expansionists seeking territorial dominance. At the same time, it sought to widen the divide between Ethiopia’s two largest ethnic groups, the Amhara, and Oromo, exacerbating internal tensions that could derail Ethiopia’s strategic goals.

Following the Pretoria Peace Agreement, Eritrea escalated its disruptive measures against Ethiopia. Social Media operatives intensified their propaganda efforts, flooding platforms with misinformation. Meanwhile, Asmara’s autocracy took direct economic actions to weaken Ethiopia, including freezing Ethiopian Airlines’ bank accounts in Eritrea, severing air links between the two nations, and readjusting its support to insurgent groups such as Fano, the TPLF, and the OLA. The objective was clear: to ensure Ethiopia remained embroiled in internal strife. Egypt has openly backed this strategy, with its parliament acknowledging that fueling ethnic discord in Ethiopia could delay GERD’s full operation—set for inauguration in six months, and hinder future dam projects.

For Egypt and its regional ally, Isaias Afewerki, Ethiopia’s expanding influence in the Horn of Africa represents a fundamental threat. As Ethiopia strengthens its economy and broadens its regional impact, neighboring countries in Africa and the Middle East increasingly depend on its resources, undermining Egypt’s strategic leverage while highlighting Eritrea’s stagnation. Afewerki, who has held an unchallenged grip on power in Eritrea for over three decades without fostering significant development or establishing a stable institutional framework, faces growing internal and external pressure. To preserve his control, he aims to perpetuate instability in Ethiopia, preventing its rise as a regional power.

Eritrea’s current maneuvers in the Horn of Africa did not emerge in isolation. While Asmara publicly frames Ethiopia’s quest for sea access as the primary trigger, the dispute has deep historical roots. Ethiopia lost its maritime outlet when Eritrea gained independence in 1993, a shift that Ethiopian historians have labeled the biggest geopolitical loss in the country’s modern history. This loss was exacerbated by the brutal 1998–2000 border war, which deepened mistrust between the two nations. A brief window for cooperation opened in 2018 when Abiy Ahmed and Afewerki signed a peace deal, but negotiations over the development of Assab stalled despite investments from Italy, the UAE, and Ethiopia. The Pretoria Peace Agreement of 2022, which ended Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict, further altered regional dynamics, prompting Eritrea to intensify its subversive tactics.

Asmara’s response has been multifaceted. Beyond economic and diplomatic moves, Eritrea has sought to exploit Ethiopia’s ethnic tensions through psychological warfare. The regime has deliberately framed Prime Minister Abiy’s mixed Oromo and Amhara heritage as evidence of an “Oromo expansionist agenda.” At the same time, violence in the Oromo region has been weaponized in propaganda efforts to paint the Oromo people as orchestrators of ethnic aggression. The once-celebrated concept of “Oromuma,” which signifies Oromo identity and cultural pride, has been repurposed as a derogatory term, portraying Oromos as aggressors against the Amhara. This tactic also mirrors historically rooted derogatory smear campaigns that sought to delegitimize Ethiopian agency, such as the use of “Hadgi” to vilify the Amhara or at times the Haile Selassie. “Agame” to cast TPLF-linked Tigrayans as politically toxic. The ultimate aim is to fragment Ethiopia’s social fabric, fostering deep mistrust among its major ethnic groups.

The Eritrean regime’s repression extends beyond its borders, leveraging transnational cruelty to control Eritreans abroad. The Eritrean diaspora is subject to a mandatory two percent tax on their income, with noncompliance often resulting in threats of imprisonment or torture for family members still in Eritrea. This coercive system ensures continued allegiance to Afewerki’s government while transforming sections of the diaspora into instruments of propaganda. Eritrean exiles who dare to criticize the regime risk not only personal retaliation but also collective punishment against their relatives.

For Eritrea, the endgame is clear: to keep Ethiopia weak, divided, and distracted from reclaiming Assab or securing multiple ports along the Horn of Africa. However, despite relentless propaganda campaigns and the proliferation of disinformation, a growing number of Ethiopians remain resolute in their belief that maritime access will be secured through legal and diplomatic means. As the geopolitical landscape in the Horn of Africa shifts, the question remains, why does Eritrea’s leadership fear diplomacy and negotiation? And why resort to disinformation if the case against Ethiopia’s sea access is truly justified? For now, Ethiopia’s growing economic and political momentum suggests that the battle over the Red Sea is only beginning.