Speaking at a mass gathering in Aksum during the Hidar Zion celebrations, General Tadesse Worede, the current head for the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) said the federal government had ‘withheld two months of budget support, leaving the administration unable to pay civil servants, maintain services, or ensure adequate cash flow in local banks. The measures, he argued, threaten to undermine the fragile post-Pretoria peace.
Yet the TIA’s narrative is discredited by mounting evidence that the central problem is not the absence of federal transfers, but the region’s handling of the funds it has already received. Civil servants, aid workers, and local administrators describe a pattern of systematic budget diversion, with a substantial share of federal subsidies rerouted toward the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the dominant political force in the region and still outlawed under federal law.
A Budget Meant for Services, Redirected Toward Soldiers
Federal budget allocations to Tigray have resumed since the Pretoria Agreement, intended to revive schools, health services and local administration. But multiple sources inside the region report that nearly half of these funds have been absorbed by the salaries and logistical needs of TPLF’s sizable armed forces, rather than civilian institutions.
Teachers in several zones say they have gone unpaid for months. Scores of schools across Maiknetal, Hawzen, Ofla and Tembein have suspended operations entirely. Health facilities, despite receiving designated federal support, report funding shortages so severe that basic services have been disrupted.
By contrast, TPLF fighters—estimated to number in the tens of thousands—continue to be paid regularly, according to budget officers in several woredas.
Fuel, Food, and a New Alignment
The misuse of material support extends beyond cash. Fuel consignments shipped from Addis Ababa for essential services, including ambulance and transport operations, have been siphoned off for the TPLF’s security structures, according to local officials. Humanitarian agencies operating in the region have privately complained that food assistance has been diverted to TPLF units or loyalist networks.
Local authorities in the region report that portions of these supplies—or the proceeds from their resale—have even been transferred to Eritrea, now serving as the TPLF’s tactical partner after years of enmity. The regime in Eritrea is lobbying its newly found TPLF hardliner allies to wage another deadly war in northern Ethiopia.
Signs of a Military Posture, Not a Peace Dividend
The TIA’s claim that it is making “every effort to prevent a slide back into war” is further contradicted by recent military activity. Within the past month, TPLF units have made a short-lived incursion into Afar. Senior TPLF officials continue to call for the recovery of “Western Tigray,” describing it as unfinished business. Civil servants across the region report being compelled to contribute part of their salaries to fund “the next phase” of struggle—an initiative that has triggered walkouts in several districts. These developments have added weight to federal concerns that budget transfers are subsidizing a renewed military buildup, not post-war reconstruction.
Why the Federal Freeze Was Imposed
Under Ethiopian fiscal law, federal authorities are empowered to suspend subsidies when regions fail to demonstrate transparent, lawful use of public funds. Officials in Addis Ababa say the freeze is a temporary corrective measure triggered by large-scale diversion of budgetary allocations.
falsified or incomplete expenditure documentation the use of civilian funds to maintain security or military structures outside federal oversight. The Ministry of Finance has signaled that transfers may resume once the TIA provides verifiable accounting—something it has so far struggled to do.
Shifting the Burden of Blame
President Tadesse’s warnings about an impending crisis reflect genuine suffering among civil servants and ordinary residents. But the TIA’s messaging places the entire burden on federal authorities, while avoiding the harder question of where previous allocations have gone.
For now, public frustration inside Tigray appears to be growing. Teachers have marched in several towns. Civil servants have refused to participate in mandatory “war contribution” schemes. And residents increasingly point to decisions made inside the regional administration, not in Addis Ababa, as the root of the service collapse.
The TIA’s narrative—of a region starved by federal neglect—remains politically powerful. But as more evidence emerges of misappropriation, militarization, and quiet preparations for renewed conflict, it is becoming harder to sustain.
