ADDIS ABABA— As headlines warn of a fresh interstate war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a quieter reality is already reshaping the Horn: an entrenched, low-visibility conflict marked by cross-border meddling, proxy alignments, and the lingering presence of Eritrean troops on Ethiopian soil nearly three years after a formal peace deal ended the conflict in the northern Tigray region.
Despite the Pretoria Peace Agreement, Eritrean forces that fought alongside Ethiopia’s army in the Tigray region from 2020–2022 “never fully withdrew,” according to researchers and diplomats, and were still implicated in abuses inside Ethiopia through 2024. Independent monitors say their presence has displaced civilians and fueled fresh violations along the border, including abductions and forced conscription.
Those facts help explain why talk of a “coming” Ethiopia-Eritrea war rings hollow to many in this part of Ethiopia. For residents living with occupation, abductions, and constrained aid access, the conflict never ended—only its form did.
From the beginning, Eritrea’s longtime ruler, Isais Afeworki was opposed to the 2022 Pretoria Peace Agreement between Federal Government of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. He saw it as betrayal by the Ethiopian authorities—one reason analysts say Asmara never felt bound to withdraw its forces from bordering towns in Ethiopia. Human Rights Watch and an investigative report by The Sentry group have since documented continued Eritrean deployments and abuses inside Ethiopia’s Tigray region.
Ethiopian officials have toughened their language this year. In July 2025, Ethiopia accused Eritrea at the U.N. Human Rights Council of “occupation and abuses” in Tigray; meanwhile Reuters and others noted Eritrea’s mobilization, Ethiopian troop deployments, and a sharp breakdown in once-warm ties—including the halt of commercial flights in 2024 after Eritrea suspended Ethiopian Airlines service and the carrier said its Asmara bank account was frozen, according to CEO Mesfin Tasew, who bemoaned confiscation of the Airline’s bank assets in Eritrea.
A proxy chessboard, not a single front line
This shadow conflict is increasingly about influence via non-state actors. ACLED’s Ethiopia Peace Observatory notes that many observers believe Eritrea has long cultivated ties with armed actors inside Ethiopia—including elements of the Amhara Fano militia, The Oromo Liberation Army, and now hardline factions within the TPLF—in ways that could pressure the federal government in Addis Ababa. Eritrea predictably denies such alliances, but the pattern is not new. In 2009 the UN sanctioned Eritrea for its support of Al Shabab terrorists in Somalia. Although those sanctions were subsequently lifted in 2018, Eritrea’s long practice of subversion has not stopped. As tit-for-tat, the Ethiopian government is now hosting Eritrean opposition groups seeking to overthrow the authoritarian regime in Asmara.
Regionally, alignments have been hardening. Egypt deepened security coordination with Eritrea and Somalia in 2024 and began shipping arms to Mogadishu—moves that unsettled Addis Ababa amid its port dispute with Somalia and its decade-long standoff with Cairo over the Nile. Analysts say these steps aim to isolate Ethiopia.
On October 2nd of this year, Ethiopia’s foreign minister, Gideon Timothewos sent a letter to the UN denouncing Eritrea’s campaign to destabilize the nation by arming insurgents, and colluding with TPLF hardliners to undermine the Pretoria Peace Agreement. He wrote, “Ethiopia’s profound patience has limits. While reaffirming its commitment to peace, Addis Ababa declares its “restraint is not indefinite.”
The Red Sea question is a backdrop—not the starting gun
Ethiopia’s recent push to secure sea access—including a January 2024 memorandum with Somaliland—inflamed tensions with Somalia and rattled Eritrea. But the Eritrea’s shadow war inside Ethiopia and allegations of cross-border interference, predate the sea-access dispute. In March 2025, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed publicly ruled out war with Eritrea over Red Sea access even as both sides exchanged accusations. Fact-checkers have also debunked viral claims that Ethiopian forces are planning a raid on the port of Assab. Nonetheless unhindered access to the sea remains, not just an economic interest, but a key pillar of Ethiopia’s national security. During the fighting in the Tigray region, this became abundantly clear, as Ethiopians weapons imports were delayed from entering via Djibouti.
This experience has left a mark on the psychic of PM Abiy and many in the security and diplomatic circles in Addis Ababa. Access to the Sea is of vital national security interest. Next week, Parliament is expected to enact a ruling that codifies Ethiopia’s maritime aspirations. There continues to be ongoing efforts to entrench the idea within the bureaucracy, academia and media as well. Notably, Egypt has come out vocally to denounce Ethiopia’s Red Sea claims.
The cost borne by civilians
For civilians across northern Ethiopia—and in neighboring Eritrea—the most harrowing legacy of repeated conflicts is not geopolitical, but intimate. A growing body of documentation finds that people in Tigray, Amhara, and Afar, as well as Eritrean border communities endured widespread, often systematic violence targeting them, during the fighting from 2020 to 2022, with some abuses persisting after the cease-fire. A relapse into another regionwide configuration will surely bring back the evils of war again. Restraint is thus in in everyone’s interest. In keeping with this, “Ethiopia has taken a more defensive posture in fighting militant groups”, according to the Foreign Minister’s letter to the UN. But there are growing calls for it to take the gloves off from within the ruling party of Prime Minister Abiy.
What “war” looks like now
The emerging picture is less a countdown to a conventional invasion and more a hybrid conflict: Eritrean forces remain entrenched in small pockets of Ethiopian territory; rival patronage networks vie for influence over armed groups; and pressure is applied through diplomatic channels, trade routes, and neighboring states. Periodic troop movements add volatility, heightening the risk of miscalculation. Analysts at Crisis Group, ACLED, and elsewhere warn that open war is unlikely to begin with a deliberate offensive but could instead erupt from a chain reaction of local clashes, internal power shifts in Tigray, or border incidents. Eritrea’s regime lacks the capacity to sustain a direct confrontation and therefore benefits from stoking low-intensity unrest inside Ethiopia—keeping Addis Ababa occupied with internal instability rather than contemplating a strike on Asmara. Yet, Ethiopia’s leadership may be tempted to overturn this calculus.
