Ethiopians can observe that Egypt’s efforts in eastern Libya, Sudan, and especially Gaza have been ineffective despite an over-the-top posturing. Formal meetings further highlight that Egypt’s so-called “intervention” in Somalia was little more than grandstanding, because after all, no other nation is better suited to understand and navigate Somalia’s complex clan politics than Ethiopia, which has entrenched itself in the country for over twenty years. Already several powerful clans in regions, including Baykol, Hiraan, and Jubaland have denounced Mogadishu’s Hawiye clan for making a military pact with Egypt, thus increasing the chances for Somalia becoming a proxy battle ground.

Authorities in Mogadishu, grappling with territorial mismanagement, the Al-Shabaab insurgency, and regional pressures, might find some benefit in Egypt’s renewed engagement. However, people are aware that Egypt’s recent efforts in eastern Libya and Sudan indicate its primary aim is to apply pressure on Ethiopia vis-à-vis GERD, rather than genuinely expanding its influence to include Somalia. Furthermore, a hot war between Egypt and Ethiopia in Somalia is not in the cards, otherwise Egypt would need significantly more than just the ten thousand troops it plans to deploy, not to mention the logistical nightmare that presents.

Rather than deterring the MoU, the presence of Egyptian troops in the Horn of Africa seems to be accelerating Ethiopia’s increasingly revisionist stance vis-à-vis access to and from the sea. Djibouti’s recent willingness to provide Ethiopia with an expanded alternative trade outlet to the sea has had no bearing on Addis Ababa’s decision to take advantage of the opportunity for escalation. It just graduated thousands of Somaliland soldiers, appointed an ambassador to Hargeisa, while deploying more forces on the border with Somalia, and warning Mogadishu against seeking support from external powers. But it has also said through its foreign minister that the door for negotiations is always open. 

Somalia, despite its ongoing internal strife and geographical significance, remains distant from Egypt’s core interests compared to Ethiopia’s pressing regional ambitions. Ethiopia’s strategic move to secure access to the Gulf of Aden through Somaliland has notably increased its regional clout. This development, alongside its successful dam project, amplifies Ethiopia’s negotiating strength, especially in relation to Egypt’s attempts to exert regional influence.

Despite its own internal conflicts, Ethiopia’s enhanced diplomatic and military positioning allows it to challenge Egypt’s regional maneuvers more effectively now than at any time in recent history. While Egypt’s actions in Somalia might seem impressive on the surface, they are overshadowed by Ethiopia’s growing assertiveness and strategic advantages, including its control over the Nile’s flow and its military presence in Somalia. As such, Ethiopia is adeptly using the situation to strengthen its position by counterbalance Egypt’s efforts. Nevertheless, Egypt will continue to leverage Ethiopia’s internal rifts as well as hostile neighbors to exert more pressure on Addis Ababa.

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The gradual withdrawal of ATMIS troops, which has been underway for nearly a year, has raised fears that an uncoordinated exit could lead to a dangerous power vacuum. This, in turn, could allow Al-Shabaab to establish an ISIS-like caliphate in Somalia, exacerbating instability in an already volatile Horn of Africa region. Moreover, Al-Shabaab’s affiliations with Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and increasingly the Houthis of Yemen present a broader threat to regional security, especially impacting maritime routes in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

In response, the African Union (AU) has proposed a new peacekeeping initiative, the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), scheduled to replace ATMIS in January 2025. This new mission was proposed after extensive consultations involving the AU, UN, EU, and other stakeholders, including Turkey and the UAE. The AU dispatched a team of experts to Somalia to assess the security situation and help formulate AUSSOM’s mandate, which will focus on protecting strategic population centers, UN facilities, and key government installations.

ATMIS troops are slated to withdraw entirely by December 2024. The AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) is currently reviewing the successes and failures of previous missions to inform AUSSOM’s planning. Egypt and Djibouti have already pledged to contribute troops, and additional support from other AU member states is expected. However, Ethiopia’s participation remains uncertain due to recent diplomatic tensions with Somalia, which has requested Addis Ababa to withdraw its MoU with Somaliland, a region that has governed itself independently since 1991, and now seeks recognition for its vaunted independence, something Ethiopia is keen to do. 

It’s not exactly clear how AUSSOM would be effective without Ethiopia’s participation, which not only shares the longest border with Somalia, but also has contributed a bulk of the fighting capability in previous AU-led peace keeping missions. It also deploys an additional 15,000 troops bilaterally to secure some of the most difficult sectors of Somalia and has done so since 2007. 

Following its recent fallout with Addis Ababa, Mogadishu has threatened to expel Ethiopian troops and invite Egyptian forces to replace them. This or course could further complicate regional dynamics and impact Ethiopia’s strategic security interests. In reaction, Ethiopia may accelerate MoU with Somaliland. Having spent decades engraining itself in Somalia and with the ongoing threat of terrorism, Addis Ababa will be unlikely to withdraw its army completely either. These may include parts of Bakool, Gedo, and Baidoa where reportedly Ethiopian forces retain good will among the public.

The failures of AMISOM and ATMIS highlight deep-rooted issues that may undermine the new mission’s effectiveness. Central to this uncertainty is Somalia’s enduring governance crisis. For over three decades, Somalia has struggled to establish a stable and effective government, and expectations that a new mission will resolve these long-entrenched issues are overly optimistic. Somalia risks further balkanization and even occupation with the arrival of more and more foreign forces, all of whom have diverging interests, and are determined to take advantage of a weak state for their own benefit. 

Previous peacekeeping missions faced numerous challenges, including inadequate resources, political infighting, and corruption within institutions, but now there appears to be international exhaustion at Somalia’s endless internal clan wars. In addition, other more pressing regional and global conflicts are carting away more resources from the international community.

The financial sustainability of AUSSOM also poses a concern. Previous missions were heavily reliant on external funding, and recent global financial strains and other priority global security challenges have made obtaining such support more challenging. While a new UN resolution aims to alleviate this burden by redistributing funding responsibilities between the UN and the AU, the effectiveness of this approach remains uncertain.

The AU’s new mission, AUSSOM is yet another effort to address Somalia’s deteriorating security needs, but three decades of governance failures, and persistent instability in the country present formidable challenges. The potential for AUSSOM to succeed where AMISOM and ATMIS fell short is highly questionable.

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Somalia’s national security adviser, Hussein Sheikh-Ali, cautioned, “unless Ethiopia revoked its dealings with Somaliland by the end of June or the mission’s new mandate is decided, all Ethiopian troops, including those under bilateral arrangements, will be ousted”. This ultimatum comes amid the already scheduled full withdrawal of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) by 2024’s end.

Ethiopian troops first entered Somalia to combat al-Shabaab in December 2006, as part of Operation Restore Hope, a joint effort with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia aimed at stabilizing the country and combating militant groups. Soon after, AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia) was established in January 2007 by the African Union and the UN Security Council to support the transitional government of Somalia in its efforts to restore stability and fight against militant groups. AMISOM has since been replaced by yet another international security commitment ATMIS (African Union Transition Mission in Somalia).

Currently around 3,000 Ethiopian soldiers remain in Somalia in support the African Union peacekeeping mission. Outside of this multilateral commitment, the country has an additional 9,000 troops stationed under a bilateral agreement. Security experts agree Ethiopia provided the core of the international effort to help secure Somalia over the years.

The task of ATMIS slated to end in 2023 was extended at the request of Mogadishu, which needed the protection against increasing attacks by Al Shabab. Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) have overseen the most difficult sectors of Somalia, where Al Shabab has the strongest presence. These areas include sector 3, Bakool and Bay centered on the town of Baidoa. The withdrawal of these forces, which is set for December 2024 was a decision made back in 2022. It could leave a security vacuum, which Al Shabab will certainly take advantage of.

At the beginning of 2024, relations between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa soured due to Ethiopia’s pact to recognize Somaliland as an independent country in exchange for a naval plus commercial port, a move that was quickly opposed by Mogadishu, which claims sovereignty over Somaliland. Despite this, Somalilanders vehemently oppose association with Somalia, preferring to make their own foreign policy.

But there remain divisions about the viability of this ultimatum. The Ministry of Internal Security for Southwest Somalia, a region that has been a hotbed of Al Shabab activity stated, Ethiopian troops are working hard, and we will be grateful for their continued contribution”. The region fears an Al Shabab takeover, as has happened numerous times before when ENDF troop drawdown was enacted. 

Facing battlefield setbacks, Somalia is now seeking a slower troop withdrawal, comprising forces from Burundi, Djibouti, Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia. Plans for a new, smaller peacekeeping mission and one that excludes Ethiopia, reflecting current political tensions, will be difficult to manage. 

Withdrawing troops from Somalia has popular support in Ethiopia, where people have grown weary of a seemingly endless military commitment, but the threat of Al Shabab terrorist encroachment is a concern that Addis Ababa cannot completely discount. 

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Despite Somaliland’s successful establishment as an independent democracy since 1991, the G7’s strong stance supporting Somalia’s claims over Somaliland in the MoU has dealt a significant blow to the former British protectorate. This setback follows earlier indications from British officials hinting at the UK’s potential recognition of Somaliland, given its strategic significance at the entrance to the Red Sea, with the major port of Berbera.

The G7 communique, issued during a meeting of foreign ministers in Naples struck a softer tone, but raised concerns among officials, tying the UK to the contentious issue. The statement urges dialogue between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Somaliland to prevent further escalation, but critics argue it interferes with sovereign decisions.

This diplomatic tension highlights broader geopolitical complexities, including military efforts against Houthi insurgents in the Red Sea. Some attribute the US’s stance to past support for Somalia’s claims during Barack Obama’s presidency, while others suggest influence from US Congresswoman Ilhan Omar’s advocacy against Somaliland recognition.

Meanwhile, British MPs’ recent visit to Somaliland garnered support for the unrecognized state, praised as a beacon of democracy in the region. Conservative MP Alexander Stafford condemned the G7’s intervention, emphasizing the need for respect for sovereign decisions.

Former UK Defense Secretary Gavin Williamson, a key advocate for Somaliland recognition, criticized the G7’s stance, calling for a departure from failed policies and a recognition of Somaliland’s democratic achievements.

Amidst these diplomatic tensions, the contrast between Somalia’s instability and Somaliland’s democratic progress is starkly evident. While Somaliland prepares for upcoming elections, Somalia continues to grapple with governance challenges, emphasizing the divergent paths of the two entities.

Despite the mixed reactions in Somaliland, the government of Somalia has welcomed the G7 communique, further exacerbating tensions between the two entities.

The roots of this international dispute trace back to Somaliland’s quest for independence in 1991, following years of persecution and ethnic tensions within the union with Somalia. With its strategic location and vital port facilities, Somaliland’s recognition holds significance in addressing regional security challenges, including Houthi threats to shipping lanes.

However, Ethiopia’s possible recognition of Somaliland, driven by its need for port access, has sparked diplomatic tensions with Somalia. While Western countries await African leadership on Somaliland recognition, Ethiopia’s decision was expected to catalyze a shift in attitudes.

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Somalia, which still maintains Somaliland as part of its territory, strongly opposes the agreement. This has raised concerns about potential instability in the already fragile Horn of Africa region.

Kenya’s proposed treaty, developed in collaboration with Djibouti and the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), aims to establish a clear framework for landlocked countries to access ports commercially within the region. This could potentially offer Ethiopia the port access they seek without infringing upon Somalia’s territorial claims. The Kenya plan aims to diffuse tensions.

The deal comes after a recent trip by Somalia’s President to the Kenyan capital of Nairobi. It offers Somalia an offramp, but no doubt the proposal will be a hard sell in Addis Ababa and Hargeisa, where both parties would feel they have more to offer each other than what they could gain by the Kenyan proposal.

The complex set of relations between the nations of the Horn and the larger Middle East make a comprehensive regional maritime access for landlocked countries difficult, something Ethiopia would find cumbersome, given its economic ambitions and security needs.

Nonetheless, Ethiopia rarely if ever ignores regional diplomatic efforts. It is expected both Somalia and Ethiopia will be considering the proposal. Kenyan officials are encouraging leaders from both nations to meet and discuss a path forward. Time is seen as a critical factor, as the militant group al-Shabaab could exploit the disagreement to further destabilize Somalia’s government.

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As fears grip the city, uncertainty looms over whether these airlines will resume services to Mogadishu on Wednesday. Turkish Airlines and Fly Dubai, known for their direct routes, halted operations, while Qatar Airways diverted a flight from Djibouti midway upon receiving the ominous alert.

The cancellation of Turkish Airlines flight TK647, a routine morning service to Mogadishu, further underscores the gravity of the security threat. Other airliners were rerouted midair. Although no official reason was provided, the move aligns with the alarming intelligence furnished by U.S. officials. The advisory highlighted the potential for terrorist plots involving vehicle-borne explosives, mortar attacks, suicide bombings, and direct assaults by al-Shabaab militants on government-held areas.

The airport in Mogadishu has been a recurrent target for al-Shabab infiltration over the years. In March 2022, gunmen affiliated with the group breached a section of the airport, resulting in casualties, including foreign nationals.

In a separate incident in February 2016, an al-Shabab operative carrying a laptop bomb boarded a flight with the intent of causing destruction. The explosion occurred mid-flight, ejecting the perpetrator from the aircraft and resulting in his death.

The U.S. warning amplifies the tension already palpable in Mogadishu, heightened by Monday night’s mortar strikes near the presidential palace. Despite the anxiety gripping the capital, Somalia’s Federal Government has yet to issue a public statement addressing the high-level terror alert.

Coinciding with the heightened security concerns, the planned handover of Mahad Salad, recently ousted as director of Somalia’s National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), adds to the unease gripping the region.

The al-Qaeda-linked al-Shabaab insurgency has unleashed a wave of deadly attacks aimed at toppling Somalia’s government and imposing its draconian interpretation of Islamic law. With control over vast swathes of rural territories in southern and central Somalia, the militant group poses a grave and imminent threat to stability and security in the region.

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This action follows heightened discord over a contentious memorandum of understanding (MoU), which essentially set Ethiopia on course to recognizing Somaliland’s statehood, a move that has raised concerns about further destabilization in the Horn of Africa.

The focal point of the port agreement revolves around Ethiopia leasing a stretch of coastline measuring 20 kilometers in Somaliland, a territory that Somalia lays claim to, despite protestation from Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland, which declared itself independent in 1991, and has been striving for international recognition as an independent nation ever since. Despite this, Somalia vehemently opposes such recognition and maintains that Somaliland falls under its sovereignty.

Ethiopia, the world’s largest landlocked nation by population, says it needs a reliable seaport and a navy that serve its ambitious economic and strategic interests. The MoU, inked on January 1st with Somaliland, would grant Ethiopia permission to establish a naval base in a 20 kilometer stretch of coastal territory north of the port of Berbera. In return, Ethiopia has proposed the potential recognition of Somaliland, and or granting Somaliland shares in key state-owned assets, such as Ethiopian Airlines and Ethio-Telecom.

This latest move by Mogadishu appears to be triggered by Ethiopia’s receiving of Mohammed Farah Mohammed, Finance Minister of Puntland, another semiautonomous region on the verge of breaking away from Somalia. According to the Ethiopia’s Ministry of Foreign affairs, “The two delegations explored collaborative opportunities in trade, investment, energy cooperation, and joint infrastructure projects to bolster and broaden the ties between the two sides”. 

Somalia’s response has been characterized by defiance, with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud warning in February that his nation would “stand its ground” should Ethiopia proceed with the agreement. Given Somalia’s anarchic domestic politics, President Hassan risks appearing weak, especially since Ethiopian peace keeping troops secure significant swaths of territory in Somalia, which faces increasing threats from Al Shabab terrorists. This stance has precipitated a diplomatic standoff, as Somalia vehemently opposes both the port arrangement and Ethiopia’s broader strategic objectives in the area.

Distrust of President Hassan among Ethiopian authorities reached an all-time high after his recent visit to Cairo, in an apparent closing of ranks with Egypt, a country considered to be a strategic rival by most Ethiopians. The atmosphere remains charged, raising concerns about the need for international intervention to mitigate the dispute and prevent further escalation in the region. Given the Horn of Africa’s existing array of conflicts and humanitarian challenges, the port agreement has the potential to aggravate an already fragile situation.

The trajectory of the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU remains largely hidden from public, and the overall Somalia-Ethiopia relationship is uncertain. Their history is marked by a mix of conflict and collaboration, leaving the resolution of this particular issue uncertain. As events unfold, the ramifications for regional stability could be substantial.

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In a statement, the council of ministers in Puntland declared: “The Puntland administration has withdrawn its acknowledgment and trust in federal government institutions until a comprehensive constitutional process that is mutually agreed upon is achieved.”

Detractors argue that the modifications, such as the implementation of direct presidential elections and granting the president authority to appoint a prime minister sans parliamentary consent, centralize power within the executive branch.

In a statement, the council of ministers in Puntland asserted, “Puntland will assert its autonomy until a federal government is established, complete with a constitution ratified through a referendum in which Puntland actively participates.”

The division poses yet another challenge for President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, who grapples with quelling an al Qaeda-affiliated insurgency, suppressing a resurgence in piracy, and asserting federal control over Somaliland, particularly following its agreement to lease a port to Ethiopia.

After decades of conflict, Somalia still contends with a violent insurgency led by al-Shabab militants, highly divisive political wranglings, natural calamities, notably a severe drought exacerbating hunger for millions.

The discord with Puntland compounds the challenges faced by President Mohamud, who is concurrently tackling a resurgence in piracy and striving to assert federal dominance over the autonomous region of Somaliland, particularly following its latest Memorandum of Understanding with Ethiopia.

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On New Year’s Day Ethiopia and Somaliland announced a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). The specifics of the agreement are not fully disclosed, but the key points involve Somaliland obtaining a share in Ethiopian Airlines, Africa’s prized airline. In return, Ethiopia gains entry to the port of Berbera and secures land (with a 20km coastline) near the town of Lughaya for a naval base along the Gulf of Aden. There is a strong possibility that Ethiopia will ultimately acknowledge Somaliland as an independent sovereign state.

Somaliland gained its independence from Britain on June 26, 1960, was then recognized as such by 34 countries, including the U.K. Five days later, amid excitement and nationalist fervor, it proceeded to voluntarily merge with former Italian colony of Somalia on July 1, 1960. It would turn out to be fateful decision. As the smaller of the two in terms of population, Somaliland quickly found itself receiving dictates from Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia. The following 31 year of union were a dark period of tumult, eventually culminating in full blown war, whereby Somalia desperately tried to cling to Somaliland, causing tremendous suffering and scorn.

According to a recent article by Georgetown University Professor Ken Opalo “The unification and subsequent separation of Somaliland with Somalia has some similarity with that of Eritrea, which also peacefully entered union with Ethiopia in 1952. Somaliland also willingly entered union with the rest of Somalia in 1960, only to witness the violation of the terms of union shortly thereafter. Like Eritrea, Somaliland also leveraged a widespread civil war to claim its independence under circumstances that made it too challenging for the war-fatigued capital to resist. The key distinction lies in the fact that while Eritrea had a consenting government in Addis Ababa to facilitate its secession, the neo-founders of Somaliland in the late 1980s lacked a credible counterpart among the various warlords who battled the Siyad Barre regime and subsequently turned against each other after 1991.”

The eventual dissolution Somaliland’s union with Somalia could not be ratified by Mogadishu, which has been marred in a long saga of bad governance, corruption, and terrorism. However, neither was Somaliland’s brief union with Somalia ratified by their respective law makers. In any case given the root causes of the breakup that followed ratification matters less. Somalilanders have long emphasized their separate status from rump state Somalia. Their state is relatively calm, holding regular elections, issues a passport accepted in several countries, including the U.K, South Africa, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, France, Malaysia. Its close tie with neighboring Ethiopia has been a process spanning decades.

Notwithstanding Somaliland’s distinct history, revelation of the MoU ignited a diplomatic uproar by authorities in Somalia, which expressed intense displeasure and withdrew the ambassador from Addis Ababa. So far, a series of statements and declarations out of Mogadishu have not garnered an official response from Addis Ababa, although Somaliland called them “insincere” and “hysterical”.

With a GDP of nearly US$3.5 billion and a population of 5.7 million, Hargeisa stands to benefit significantly from a long-term economic deal centered around ports and logistics. In addition to the prospect of obtaining official recognition from Ethiopia, Somaliland is pursuing the port agreement for economic necessities. Nearly half of the government’s budget relies on revenue from trade taxes and port duties. However, it is expected that there will be opposition within the country to the deal, particularly on the domestic political front.

A Significant Move by Ethiopia

Ethiopia’s decision to eventually recognize Somaliland carries notable significance as it marks the first instance of a UN member state acknowledging Somaliland’s autonomous status since its self-proclaimed independence in May 1991, following the Somalia Civil War.

Despite establishing official contacts after declaring independence, including engagements with Ethiopia in strategic and infrastructural agreements, Somaliland’s international recognition has been constrained. Recognition by Ethiopia’s could enhance Somaliland’s legitimacy, foster economic cooperation, and establish diplomatic ties. Given its strategic location, if Somaliland garners recognition by a UN member state, the ripple effect might encourage other nations to follow suit, contributing to a broader acknowledgment of Somaliland’s sovereignty, albeit the extent of this impact hinges on the nature and scope of Ethiopia’s recognition.

In addition to Ethiopia, Somaliland has consulates services in key countries, including the United States, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Kenya. If Ethiopia proceeds to fully recognize its neighbor as an independent state, then these other nations are likely to follow suite, an outcome that will tip the scale as far as the AU’s decision goes. For instance, the U.S has shown interest in Somaliland for military purposes. While the State Department’s rhetoric has been strategically ambiguous regarding Somaliland, overcrowding of military bases in Djibouti has become an issue for the Pentagon, “raising concerns about “strategic competition and potential risk of confrontation with China in Djibouti” and is exploring the viability of Somaliland as an alternative relocation point.

However, an underlying complexity lies in Somaliland’s lack of Mother State Permission from Somalia. This adds diplomatic controversy surrounding the principle of sovereignty, for the AU, which must contend with numerous claims for statehood across the continent. The AU does not want to be  seen to be encouraging balkanization of Africa, but the legal case for Somaliland is strong, a point discussed below.

President Mussa Bihi Abdi stated, “We functioned independently as Somaliland for three decades, despite the odds, but never got the recognition we deserved—We just needed one country to open that door, and its suiting for Ethiopia to be that nation”. He added, “The first to recognize Somaliland was always going to be the most difficult, after that there will certainly be others that follow”.

On January 6th, Somalia’s president Hassan Sheik Mohamud signed a law nullifying the MoU between the Gov’t of Ethiopia & Somaliland as illegal and void on grounds of protecting sovereignty and territorial integrity. But how Mogadishu intends to enforce this claim is not clear. As mentioned, Somaliland has been its own entity for thirty years and authorities in Somalia have had no say in that time. This power equation is unlikely to change anytime soon.

Ethiopian troops have been crucial to Somalia’s security. As part of The African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) They played a key role in defending against Al Shabab for years. It currently contributes about 5000 troops to the ATMIS.  Before the formation of ATMIS, Ethiopia was the leading country behind The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Outside of this multilateral effort, Ethiopia also commands a significant force combating Al Shabab in Somalia. According to a 2020 Reuters report, “Ethiopia, which shares a long and porous border with Somalia, contributes around 4,000 of the 17,000 troops under the AU, and has around 15,000 additional soldiers in Somalia bilaterally: that is more than any other nation.”

The task of ATMIS slated to end in 2023 was extended at the request of Mogadishu, which needed the protection against increasing attacks by Al Shabab. Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) have overseen the most difficult sectors of Somalia, where Al Shabab has the strongest presence. These areas include sector 3, Bakool and Bay centered on the town of Baidoa. The withdrawal of these forces now scheduled for December 2024 could leave a security vacuum, in which Al Shabab will certainly take advantage of.

Now what?

On January 8, 2024, to shore up support, President Hassan Sheik Mohamud of Somalia traveled to Eritrea, where Somalian soldiers recently trained. He is also slated to travel to Egypt this week. This follows an earlier visit to Somalia by an Egyptian delegation. Furthermore, Somalia is seeking support from Qatar as well as the Arab league, of which it is a member state. Simultaneously military commanders of Somaliland and Ethiopia convened in Addis Ababa this week.

While most Somalilander’s look forward to the day where their country’s independence becomes officially recognized by the international community, there is some pushback to Ethiopia setting up a navy base in their territory, including by some of its officials. This month AP reported, “Somaliland’s defense minister resigns over deal to give Ethiopia access to the region’s coastline. The issue will certainly be hotly debated in the upcoming elections scheduled for November.

As the 2018 rapprochement between Eritrea and Ethiopia continues to fade, a new reality seems to be emerging in the Horn of Africa (HOA), one where Asmara and Addis Ababa become estranged again, Somaliland gains its vaunted recognition, and Sudan fractures into spheres of influence. While Ethiopia continues to grapple with insecurity. Never in recent memory has there been this level of tumult and geopolitical realignment in the strategic HOA.

It remains to be seen if Ethiopia will proceed to lobby AU member states on behalf of Somaliland at the upcoming 37^th regular session. There is a good case to be made based on a 2005 fact finding mission led by former deputy chairperson of the AU, which concluded, “Union between Somalia and Somaliland was never ratified and malfunctioned from 1960 to 1990, making Somaliland’s search for recognition historically unique and self-justified in African Political History.” The report adds by saying, “Objectively viewed, the case should not be linked to the notion of opening a pandora’s box, and as such the AU should find a special method of dealing with this outstanding case.”

As far as Ethiopian authorities are concerned their bid to diversify, and gain control of a seashore is more critical than ever. This fact became crystal clear in the past few years, whereby logistical bottlenecks and sabotage on country’s maritime trade became more frequent. For example, turbines imported for the Grand Ethiopian Renascence Dam were routinely held up throughout the past three years. Sensitive imports such as military equipment was frequency held in Djibouti, which as mentioned is brimming with foreign military bases.

For Somaliland, it is once in a generation opportunity to seal their nation’s fate among nations. It is also a means to economic revival. In that sense, the MoU is a masterstroke in diplomacy.

The delay in achieving full state recognition and UN membership for Somaliland has multifaceted impacts, restricting its diplomatic outreach and hindering its legitimacy on international political and developmental platforms, including within the UN itself. Despite these challenges, Ethiopia’s recognition represents a significant step in Somaliland’s prolonged pursuit of official statehood and a prominent role on the global stage. It could be a harbinger for an international acknowledgment of Somaliland’s de jure independent status.

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Centered on the Berbera port in Somaliland, the deal follows Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed breaking the silence on Red Sea access for his nation in October of 2023. At the time his statements had raised concerns in the region. Berbera, situated on the southern coast of the Gulf of Aden, serves as an African gateway to the Red Sea and the entrance to the Suez Canal. It is also the site where Ethiopia’s rich cattle and animal livestock resources are exported to the Middle East, albeit mostly in illegal trade. Getting control of its own ports will allow Ethiopia to better manage this trade.

Presently, Ethiopia heavily depends on Djibouti, its neighboring country, for most of its maritime trade. “We have now reached an agreement with our Somaliland counterparts, and a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was formally signed today,” stated Abiy during the signing ceremony held in Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, alongside Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi.

President Abdi announced that, as a component of the accord, Ethiopia is set to become the inaugural nation to officially acknowledge Somaliland as an independent state soon. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) facilitates Ethiopia’s entry into commercial maritime activities at the port of Berbera. It also paves the way in granting access to a naval base on the Red Sea through a leasing arrangement, revealed Redwan Hussien, Abiy’s National Security Adviser. Additionally, Somaliland is slated to acquire a share in the state-owned Ethiopian Airlines Group, although specific details were not disclosed, as stated by Hussien.

Despite declaring autonomy from Somalia in 1991, Somaliland has yet to achieve broad international recognition. For Its part The Republic of Somalia maintains that Somaliland is part of its territory. Last week, Somalia’s SONNA state media agency announced that, with Djibouti taking the lead in mediation, Somalia and Somaliland had agreed to restart discussions aimed at resolving their long-standing disagreements.

Ethiopia, the most populous landlocked country in the world, lost direct access to the sea in 1993 after Eritrea declared independence, leading to three-decades of fraught relations. Since then, Ethiopia has primarily relied on Djibouti for its trade activities. However, in 2018 a peace agreement with Eritrea promised to rekindle ties, but relations between Asmara and Addis Ababa cooled visible in 2023.

Given the circumstance, Somaliland is an attractive option for Ethiopia’s port ambitions. It is geographically accessible to Ethiopia’s mainland, but more importantly, this de facto autonomous region, which declared “the restoration of its independence from Somalia” in May 1991 could be amenable to Ethiopia in return for security assistance and recognition of its vaunted statehood. So far Somaliland has only received recognition by Taiwan, itself a semi-autonomous region of The People’s Republic of China. It maintains diplomatic missions in seven countries, most notably Ethiopia. Somaliland has been relatively successful and most importantly peaceful. It has managed all its affairs independently since about 1993 and has become self-reliant in many ways. It holds elections, has its own currency, and by regional standards, its telecom and banking sectors are notable.

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This significant financial assistance is the result of a collaborative effort, involving not only the IMF and the World Bank but also the African Development Fund, along with various other multilateral, bilateral, and commercial creditors. The coordinated debt service relief efforts were highlighted in a joint statement issued by the IMF and the World Bank.

IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva lauded Somalia’s unwavering commitment to economic reforms, stating, “This is a testament to Somalia’s steadfast commitment to economic reforms. The IMF will continue to build on our strong partnership with Somalia.”

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of Somalia expressed gratitude for the debt relief, acknowledging the comprehensive governmental efforts spanning nearly a decade. He remarked, “Somalia’s debt relief process has been nearly a decade of cross-governmental efforts spanning three political administrations. This is a testament to our national commitment and prioritization of this crucial and enabling agenda.”

The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, established to provide a framework for all creditors, including multilateral creditors, aims to offer debt relief to the world’s poorest and most heavily indebted countries. The overarching goal is to ensure debt sustainability, reduce constraints on economic growth, and alleviate poverty by mitigating unsustainable debt service burdens.

Somalia’s achievement of reaching the Completion Point under the HIPC Initiative marks a significant milestone, making it the 37th country to do so. The debt relief has resulted in a remarkable reduction of Somalia’s external debt, plunging from 64% of GDP in 2018 to less than 6% of GDP by the end of 2023.

Anticipated to provide Somalia with a crucial economic boost, this debt relief will enable the nation to focus on sustainable development and poverty reduction, marking a pivotal moment in Somalia’s economic trajectory.

Many African countries currently find themselves struggling with debt sustainability compounded by recent global crises and rising interest rates. A wave of defaults threatens countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia. The country of Ghana recently defaulted on its international debt obligations.

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While the decision aims to enhance the Somali government’s capacity to combat the Islamist insurgency, restore stability, and address security concerns in a country plagued by civil war and chaos since 1991, the UNSC expressed worry about inadequate safe ammunition storage in Somalia, urging other nations to assist the Somali government in constructing, renovating, and utilizing secure ammunition depots across the country.

Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud welcomed the move, emphasizing its potential to modernize the country’s armed forces and equip them to counter threats from Al Shabaab and other adversaries. The Somalian government sees the lifting of the arms embargo as a testament to international collaboration for lasting peace, highlighting its commitment to working with the global community for a safer future.

Despite ongoing challenges, Somalia has relied on the support of African Union forces, the United States, Turkey, and other Western powers to address security threats posed by Al Shabaab and other militant groups. The recent lifting of the arms embargo reflects confidence in the Somali government’s progress and commitment to restoring peace and stability. Additionally, Somalia has taken steps toward self-reliance in security, with soldiers undergoing training in allied countries, including Turkey, the United States, and the United Kingdom.

However, some analysts caution that challenges remain in ensuring proper arms management and accountability, suggesting that the lifting of the embargo could contribute to weapon proliferation in the region. They also underscore the need for improvements in governance, human rights, and reconciliation efforts by the Somali government, emphasizing ongoing international support for the country’s political and security transition.

The Republic of Turkey has played a significant role in reconstituting the Somali National Army (SNA) by providing training, equipment, and military capabilities. The establishment of the “TURKSOM” training facility in Mogadishu and the delivery of Turkish-made weapons, including the MPT-76 battle rifle and Kirpi armored vehicles, signify Turkey’s commitment to strengthening the SNA and supporting Somalia’s security efforts.

Lifting of the arms embargo is a vote of confidence in the government of Somalia, which struggled for decades to maintain peace and security. It also comes a head of a planned drawdown and a scheduled withdrawal of African Union-led security forces which have been present in Somalia since 2007. This drawdown is supposed to be completed by December 2024.

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