According to Egyptian authorities, the partnership among Cairo, Mogadishu, and Asmara is officially aimed at combating terrorism and securing Red Sea shipping, which has been disrupted by Houthi (Ansarullah) attacks from Yemen. These attacks target ships in “solidarity with Palestinians” amid the ongoing conflict in Gaza, significantly impacting maritime traffic through the Bab El-Mandeb strait.

Beneath the surface, however, the emerging relationship may also involve potential Egyptian mediation to address the longstanding conflict between Eritrea and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Cairo will likely seek to provide support to dissenting factions of the TPLF via Eritrea to pressure the Ethiopian government, which has effectively completed the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)—a project Egypt views as a threat to its vital share of the Nile River’s water.

During the two-year war in the Tigray region, Egypt supplied logistics and weapons to the TPLF via secret flights, one of which was shot down in 2022. Ethiopia has consistently accused Egypt of undermining its stability by supporting anti-government factions for decades. Recently, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed stated that “thousands of rebel groups were given assignments to impede the construction of the GERD.” Whether Asmara will allow itself to be used as a conduit for Cairo remains to be seen.

The potential rapprochement between Eritrea’s long-time ruler, Isaias Afwerki, and the TPLF leadership, once deemed implausible, is contributing to divisions in Tigray and threatening the relative peace in the region as various factions vie for power.

Historically, Egypt has played a crucial role in Eritrea’s political landscape. As early as 1960, Egypt supported the Eritrean independence movement, which eventually led to the rise of the current Eritrean regime. This historical involvement has established a complex relationship, with Eritrea often functioning as a client state of Egypt, seeking to intervene in Ethiopian affairs. The recent visit by Egyptian intelligence chief Gen Kamal Abbas and Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty to Asmara underscores the rekindling of long-standing ties between the two nations.

Egypt’s collaboration with Eritrea is part of a broader strategy to counter Ethiopia’s growing influence in the Horn of Africa. By strengthening ties with Eritrea, Egypt aims to exert pressure on Addis Ababa and influence regional geopolitics. This move aligns with a series of engagements Egypt has pursued with other regional actors, including Djibouti, Sudan, and Somalia.

A recent military cooperation agreement between Egypt and Somalia further highlights this strategy. Under this deal, Egypt has airlifted arms, military hardware, and a limited number of military advisors to Somalia, which has heightened tensions with Ethiopia. The Ethiopian government has expressed strong objections, warning that these actions could destabilize the Horn of Africa, vowing to respond firmly. Arms supplies and other forms of assistance to the dysfunctional government of Somalia have consistently leaked to the Al Qaeda-linked Al Shabab terrorist group.

The historical context adds depth to the current dynamic. Eritrea’s independence from Ethiopia in 1993, following a prolonged civil war, has been marked by ongoing tension despite periods of peace. The 1998-2000 border war between Eritrea and Ethiopia left a legacy of mistrust that continues to influence their interactions today.

The initial brief period of positive relations following Eritrea’s independence in 1993 ultimately gave way to a shooting border war from 1998 to 2000. The 2018 rapprochement, which earned Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed a Nobel Peace Prize, was never formalized and lacked any legal basis. The honeymoon ended with the Pretoria Peace Agreement, which concluded what is now commonly referred to as the “Tigray War,” during which Eritrea backed the federal government of Ethiopia against an armed insurrection in the Tigray region.

Somalia’s ongoing dispute with Ethiopia over Somaliland further complicates the situation. Somalia has condemned Ethiopia’s recent agreement with Somaliland, which involves leasing its coastal territory for a Naval bases in exchange for potential recognition of Somaliland’s independence from Somalia, which views this agreement as a breach of its sovereignty and has threatened military action if Ethiopia and Somaliland proceed with their plans. On September 12, Ahmed Moalim Fiqi, the foreign minister of Somalia told Universal TV that ‘Somalia could choose to engage with armed rebels in Ethiopia if it wishes, noting that this option remains available.’

The heated rhetoric elicited a response from Nebiyu Tedla, Ethiopia’s deputy permanent representative to the African Union and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, who took issue with remarks from Somalia’s foreign minister. On X, he described it as “comical” to see al-Shabab affiliates masquerading as government officials, ineffective beyond the Banaadir region, engaging in empty nationalism fueled by narrow clan interests”.

Amid the ongoing cycle of horse trading and temporary alliances, the Horn of Africa continues to serve as battlefield for external powers. There is no clearer premonition of the potential disaster of proxy violence than the ongoing war in Sudan, which has displaced millions, alongside the persistent threat from militant groups like Al Shabab in Somalia. Egypt’s increasingly aggressive posture aims to contain Ethiopia and prevent it from establishing a naval presence near the strategic Bab El-Mandeb.

For its part, through the construction of the GERD, Addis Ababa has demonstrated resilience in achieving national objectives despite difficult circumstances. It remains troubling, however, that existing regional and international mechanisms for cooperation and dispute resolution have so far failed to address the growing rivalry between Egypt and Ethiopia.

The post Egypt’s Power Play: Using Horn of Africa States to Contain Ethiopia appeared first on Abren.

In addition, sources indicate Sudan’s Sovereign Council Chairman and army chief, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, also sent a high-ranking official to Cairo to invite Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi to Port Sudan. This invitation appears to coincide with the call extended to Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni.

The Sudanese navy welcomed the Eritrean vessels, which arrived on the orders of President Afwerki to show solidarity with the Sudanese people and reinforce the close ties between the two nations. Senior Sudanese naval officers were on hand to greet the Eritrean delegation.

The sudden overture from Asmara appears to be designed to assuage the Sudanese, following Eritrea’s declaration that Sudanese chargé d’affaires Khaled Hassan was persona non grata, giving him three days to leave.

Sudanese Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Hussein al-Amin announced that Sudan is seeking clarification from Asmara about the expulsion decision. Sudan views Eritrea’s dealing with its eastern Beja tribesman with suspicion. Images were recently shared on social media of a meeting between President Isaias Afwerki and Sudanese Beja tribal leader Mohamed Amin Turk.

Dispute recent discrepancies however, the Sudanese army has had good relations with Afwerki, who has been praised by Sudanese officials for his stance against foreign support for the Rapid Support Forces.

The head of the Eritrean naval delegation stated, “We are here to affirm our support for Sudan and its military forces,” expressing hope that Sudan overcomes its crisis and rejecting foreign interference. He highlighted the strategic alliance between Eritrea and Sudan.

Analysts also suggested that Eritrea’s gambit is in response to Ethiopia and other regional players who have recently courted Sudan’s army chief. The subtle diplomatic tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea became more visible recently, as Eritrea sought to suspend Ethiopian Airlines flights into the country. Asmara will seek to dilute Ethiopian influence in Sudan alongside Egypt, which also views Ethiopian initiatives in Sudan with suspicion. This is particularly the case given the fact Egypt and Ethiopia have yet to reach an agreement on the operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which is now for all practical purposes complete.

During his visit to Port Sudan, Ethiopia’s Abiy Ahmed was able to facilitate a call between Al Burhan and UAE monarch Mohammed Bin Zayed, who was up until recently accused by the Sudanese army chief of aiding his opponent, the RSF. There are now plans for the UAE and Sudan’s warring parties to hold an in-person meeting in Addis Ababa. 

Arrival of Eritrean warships followed a visit by Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy to Port Sudan reflect frustration over being sidelined from settlement efforts and a desire to emphasize its alliance with Sudan amidst ongoing international and regional negotiations.

The post Eritrea Signals Overtures to Sudan’s Burhan appeared first on Abren.

On Wednesday, Eritrean authorities gave Abbas 72 hours to leave the country, offering no explanation for the decision. The expulsion comes at a time when Sudan and Ethiopia were improving relations following Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s visit to Port Sudan. Previously, Sudanese military leaders had criticized Ethiopia for allegedly backing the RSF, but signs of reconciliation with Addis Ababa have recently emerged.

Asmara’s decision also coincides with a visit by traditional leaders from eastern Sudan, where Eritrea plays a significant role due to cultural ties. Social media recently showed Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki with these leaders, hinting at efforts to mediate regional tensions.

Political analyst Mohamed Latif noted that the expulsion represents a surprising shift in Eritrean policy. He speculated that Afwerki might be reassessing his stance on political Islam and its role in the ongoing Sudanese conflict. Additionally, Dr. Salah Jalal, an Umma Party leader, suggested that the expulsion could be related to Eritrea’s concerns over espionage and recruitment activities by the Sudanese.

Eritrea’s decision comes amid reports that Sudanese forces have enlisted fighters from the Tigray people’s Liberation Front (TPLF), exacerbating regional instability and affecting relations between Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea.

Jalal, who maintains historical ties with President Afwerki, revealed that Asmara had preceded the expulsion of the Sudanese charge d’affaires by removing the Russian ambassador from Asmara the previous week. He hinted at a connection between the two events, stating that the expulsion of the ambassador might prompt Port Sudan to seek answers. He also suggested that the current shift in Eritrean stance could be an opportunity for the country to realign with civilian forces or the RSF if acted upon promptly.

According to report Asharq Al-Awsat, a London based Arabic news site, ‘this emerging rift between the Eritrean regime and Sudan’s Burhan will likely mean Asmara may be planning to increase support for Eastern Sudan’s Beja tribes who have a historically rocky relationship with Sudan’s central government’. An upcoming planned summit in Addis Ababa between the UAE which has backed the RSF, Burhan and Ethiopian leader Abiy is expected to take place in Addis Ababa.

The complicated nature of relations between Horn of Africa countries has seen an ever-evolving rollercoaster of alliances and rivalries, in addition to continued involvement by gulf states. Mohamed Latif sated, “this is the new normal countries must adapt to, and pivot as needed”.

The post Eritrea has expelled Sudanese Charge d’Affaires Khalid Abbas From Asmara appeared first on Abren.

Mebrahtom Gezaei, the head of peace and security in Tahtay Adiyabo, revealed that these individuals were held in a prison located in Barentu. According to him, they were initially subjected to abduction before enduring detention in Eritrea. Although local news in Tigray depicted these prisoners as abductees, information from the Eritrea suggests a majority were taken during the war from 2020 to 2022, and with a smaller number taken from border areas in the past year.

The release of these prisoners strikes a positive note. Speaking to authorities in Ethiopia, Abren was able to confirm, this latest release of Ethiopian prisoners held in Eritrea was a result of back-channel talks between Addis Ababa and Asmara. Furthermore, talks are underway between the two sides to resolve their long simmering border dispute and perhaps begin final demarcation based on the Algiers agreement. 

Relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia soured following the Pretoria Peace Agreement, ending the two-year war where both sides fought together to subdue a rebellion in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, which borders Eritrea. The regional government in Tigray accuses Eritrea of territorial infringements near Zalambesa, Irob and Gulakmeda. It has asked the federal government to intervene on its behalf. While indicating its desire to see the border demarcated, the federal government has been reluctant to enter another protracted entanglement with its northern neighbor, particularly given its tricky relationship with the TPLF.

Recent efforts to mend ties between the Interim Administration of Tigray, led by Getachew Reda and the authorities in Addis Ababa has been accompanied by little reported shadow wars, whereby TPLF hardliners have sought inflame the current conflict in Amhara. Little attention has been given to attempted incursion of TPLF affiliated militia via Sudan, north of Metema. The TPLF has also been seeking to insert itself as a third party instigator in ongoing clashes in Gambella between the Nuer tribe of South Sudan and the Anuak residing in Ethiopia.

As recently as yesterday, there were reports of militiamen associated with the TPLF from Tigray making an assault on Alamata, a town in the disputed territory of Raya, claimed by Amhara. This latest move appears to be intended at complicating federal plans for a lasting settlement of the issue through referendum, similar to ones that have been taking place in southern Ethiopia.

Such clandestine activities are elevating mistrust on all sides, endangering the viability of the Pretoria Peace Agreement. So far these pinprick provocations have been largely ignored by the federal government, which does not want to get dragged into yet another cycle of violence, but the question remains for how long. 

The post Eritrea releases prisoners from Tigray, as TPLF continues shadow wars in Ethiopia appeared first on Abren.

Cara Anna is the Associated Press reporter who spread, all across the world in numerous respectable newspapers, the fake news that some 800 church-goers in the holiest place of Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity had been cornered, dragged into the central city square, gunned down and eaten by hyena.

This background information is provided just in case you missed the section “Do we know what happened in Axum?” within my 50,000-word piece “Getting Ethiopia Dead Wrong”, soon to come out in book form.

Also rather shockingly, she got away with it without any mea culpa or stain on her reputation that we know of.

Whether she initially believed in her own Axum massacre story, there is no way to tell, but it is clear that, no less than eight days later, she knew that her key witness account, which she had validated in no uncertain terms, was made up.

Instead of eating humble pie, she went on to write many more atrocity stories based on anonymous sources. The Pulitzer Center website presents her thus: “Cara Anna is the East Africa correspondent with The Associated Press. Her team’s Pulitzer Center-funded coverage of Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict was nominated for a Pulitzer Prize, and Ethiopia’s government barred her from the country. The team also won the AP’s top journalism award in 2021.” 

She probably thinks she can continue to escape scrutiny, as long as she avoids nosy journalists like me. It would be a waste of my time to request an interview with her, so I went undercover with nothing but a gmail account and an AI-generated portrait.

From: Fernando Silva
Sent: Thursday, February 15, 2024, 15:53 (Ethiopian time)
To: Anna, Cara
Subject: Film script based on your reporting

Dear Cara Anna.

Thank you so much for your amazing work, which has inspired my dramatized student film project. I am referring to your groundbreaking reporting from Ethiopia for Associated Press on February 18, 2021, when you revealed in shocking detail that some 800 church-goers in Axum, Tigray, Ethiopia, had been cornered, dragged outside, gunned down and eaten by hyenas. My reaction to reading it was: “How come nobody made a movie about this before?”

I have been searching for some original documentary footage of the dead bodies, the burials or the like, but have yet to come across any. Could you perhaps point me the way? Otherwise, given your prestige with many prizes to your name, naming you as my source for this true-story script must be enough, don’t you think?

Thanks once again, and hoping for your reply.

Yours sincerely
Fernando Silva, film student from Chile

From: Anna, Cara 
Sent: February 15, 2024, 16:34 
To:  Fernando Silva
Subject: Re: Film script based on your reporting

Hi Fernando, thank you for asking and for being interested. It was very hard to get any images from a region where telecoms were cut. We often relied on people who physically left Tigray. Have you tried Human Rights Watch or Amnesty International, who also published reports based on their own interviews?

Cara

AP

From: Fernando Silva
Sent: February 15, 2024, 17:41 
To: Anna, Cara
Subject: Re: Film script based on your reporting

Dear Cara Anna.

Thank you very much for your prompt response! I will go carefully through all the documentation of Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, and only come back to you if I have any questions after that.

Yours sincerely
Fernando

From: Fernando Silva
Sent: February 21, 2024, 19:47 
To: Anna, Cara
Subject: Re: Film script based on your reporting

Dear Cara Anna.

I have now carefully studied the Amnesty International and the Human Rights Watch reports on the Axum massacre. Your and the human-rights organizations’ reports coincide on the dates and the perpetrators, but not on the location, also not on the description of what happened, certainly not in any of what I was going to use for my film script, that is, the 800 church-goers getting cornered, dragged out, gunned down and eaten by hyena, as told in your first article on February 18, 2021, and subsequently retold in The New York Post, The Sun, The Independent, The Times, etc. 

Sorry, but can you clear up my confusion? Were there two separate events? Should I give up my script along the lines of your report from February 18, 2021?

Yours sincerely
Fernando Silva.

From: Anna, Cara 
Sent: February 21, 2024, 19:51 
To:  Fernando Silva
Subject: Re: Film script based on your reporting

Hi Fernando, that’s very much up to you, especially since you’re looking for footage from a time when basic communications and other services like electricity were cut in parts of Tigray and many people had difficulty just keeping their phones charged. Having enough for a film sounds challenging, but perhaps contacts in the Tigray diaspora can help now that the war is over and it’s easier to reach people and share information.

Cara

From: Fernando Silva
Sent: February 21, 2024, 20:22 
To: Anna, Cara
Subject: Re: Film script based on your reporting

Hi Cara Anna.

Okay, thanks, but I don’t want it to be up to me, but up to the evidence. If I present it as a true story and it turns out not to be so, I will be accused of slandering an African nation.

You did your report by talking to people in Axum over the phone, and so did the Amnesty researchers. From my own little research, I know that Axum is a fairly big, modern city with tens of thousands of smartphones and also many generators, powerbanks and what not. Yet even the Amnesty and Human Rights Watch reports have no footage revealing anything noteworthy, nor has anybody come up with anything since, at least not online. Moreover, Amnesty says the festival on November 30 was called off, which makes sense if up to ten dead bodies were being stacked on each cart for mass burials on November 30, 2020, as the Amnesty report says. But then I found an Ethiopian television report from the festival , and it is definitely that exact festival from November 30, 2020.

Never mind, it is YOUR story and not Amnesty’s that I care about. And after February 2021, there seems to be nothing about the 800 church-goers any more. Long question short: do you today have any doubt that your dramatic version of the Axum massacre is true or not?

Yours sincerely
Fernando Silva

From: Anna, Cara 
Sent:  February 21, 2024, 20:33 
To:  Fernando Silva
Subject: Re: Film script based on your reporting

Hi, you reached out by looking for original documentary footage of what happened in Axum, and I encourage you to find what might exist. You’ll see that for months, media coverage and humanitarian reports along with some government reports noted a long and wide cutoff of basic services in Tigray that affected communications, utilities and the supply of basic items like food and medicine. Even land lines weren’t working in many cases. I do hope that with such conditions having eased, you’ll have much more success reaching people and accessing any footage captured in Axum.

Cara

From: Fernando Silva
Sent: February 21, 2024, 23:27 
To: Anna, Cara
Subject: Re: Film script based on your reporting

Hi Cara Anna.

Okay, thank you for your prompt reply. But I can only take that as a “YES”, you do have doubts if your shocking report that made it into headlines across the world is actually what happened.

Indeed, none of the factors you mention can explain a complete lack of photographic evidence, but I can and I will look more into it. And shouldn’t you be doing that too? This is a big deal! Your report on February 18, 2021, made a huge impact on public opinion in the West and in Tigray too, stirring fear, hate, all the emotions of war. If those graphic details of insane savagery turn out to be a lie made up to justify revenge killings, and if you lent the trustworthiness of Associated Press to spread such dangerous disinformation, surely, your conscience would want to know and, if necessary, make you issue an apology, am I right? 

Yours sincerely
Fernando Silva

Let me interrupt with some commentary:

Rather than answering the questions, Cara Anna trots out the half-truth about Tigray being cut off, which I have addressed at length in Part 3 of “Getting Ethiopia Dead Wrong”. All her focus is on not incriminating herself. This is why she neither defends the veracity of her story nor admits that it was a lie. Now she is being confronted with the common-sense observation that, surely, having a conscience requires her to care one way or the other.

So this is when she ends the exchange, which must have rattled her. Can anything lure her out of her shell again? Well, two weeks later, she gets this email from someone using the “Tigray genocide” hashtag as his avatar.

From: Gabriel Teklehaymanot
Sent: Mar 6, 2024, 19:23 
To: Anna, Cara
Subject: Can I ask for some advice?

Dear Anna Cara.

I am Gabriel Teklehaymanot, I work in real estate in the UK, where I have also been involved in activism against the Tigray genocide. You know all about that, because you have covered it and your journalistic brilliance and integrity have been widely recognised, including by the Pulitzer people, I just saw online.

I was contacted some days ago by someone interested in informing the world about what our people went through. He said he had been in contact with you a little while ago. He is the one who gave me this email. Is it okay if I ask you for some advice here? Because I know your work, your time is precious to me too.

Regards

Gabriel Teklehaymanot
Mekete Tigray UK

From: Anna, Cara 
Sent: Mar 6, 2024, 19:27 
To:  Gabriel Teklehaymanot
Subject: Re: Can I ask for some advice?

Hi Gabriel, thank you for reaching out. What advice are you looking for?

Cara

AP

From: Gabriel Teklehaymanot
Sent: Mar 6, 2024, 20:25 
To: Anna, Cara
Subject: Re: Can I ask for some advice?

Dear Cara.

Thank you for this opportunity to borrow some of your precious time.

Well, a young man from Chile, Fernando Silva, wrote me and we talked on the phone too, at length and on numerous occasions. He said you had suggested he reach out to someone like me in the diaspora for guidance. He was very confused and frankly a bit annoying, going into tiresome detail that I am not going to bother you with, but it came from a good place, as he cared about the Axum massacre, which he has scripted a whole film project around. This will be a great opportunity to raise conscience about what happened to our people. It may be an amateur production, but he is putting all his savings into it, and he has many volunteer actors lined up for this true-story drama, which might do well on Youtube. He even showed me how he plans to do the hyenas with blurry imagery of Chilean street dogs shot at night and some horrifying sound effects. 

However, now he is having doubts about what actually occurred in Axum. He said you had suggested that we might have some original photographic material, to which I replied: “Hey, we do not always get to film it when we get killed! So YOU film it, Fernando!”

He objected that you had somehow not affirmed the deacon’s story in his email exchange with you. I am sure he has misunderstood something. The testimony of the deacon was accepted by many, many important newspapers and even corroborated by the honourable Lord David Alton speaking in the UK House of Lords as late as November 2022.

I have more arguments on the ready when he calls me, I think tomorrow, for why his script should stick to your first report on the Axum massacre. Yes, the perpetrators and their supporters have denied everything, of course, this is their evil nature and the reason we had to fight them. But nobody independent or important in the media has ever questioned your story.

I hope you can attest that I am in the right here, thank you. And please, let me once more express my utmost admiration for your professionalism and also thank you for your solidarity.

Regards
Gabriel

From: Anna, Cara 
Sent: Mar 6, 2024, 20:30 
To:  Gabriel Teklehaymanot
Subject: Re: Can I ask for some advice?

Hi Gabriel, thank you for explaining. We didn’t discuss the deacon, and I did encourage Fernando to see whether footage might be available now that communications and services in Tigray have resumed.

Cara

AP

From: Gabriel Teklehaymanot
Sent: Mar 6, 2024, 20:50 
To: Anna, Cara
Subject: Re: Can I ask for some advice?

Dear Cara.
Ah, I see, well, with me he discussed the deacon and every little clue like he was Sherlock Holmes!  As for footage, I found some from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, but it is very different from what the deacon said, and none of it would persuade the sceptics that there was any massacre at all. Anyway, the deacon’s testimony was at the heart of your story and it is what we have been telling our children and grandchildren within our community as a reminder to know who we are and who are enemies are. So I can understand he cares about verifying it, even if he is a little bothersome.

Should I advise him to make adjustment to his script? I made another argument, a completely different one, that seemed to work much better with him, but the best option for me would be to insist on there being enough evidence for the deacon’s testimony for him to follow his script, so do you think I can do that?

Regards
Gabriel

From: Anna, Cara
Sent: Mar 6, 2024, 20:59 
To:  Gabriel Teklehaymanot
Subject: Re: Can I ask for some advice?

That’s your conversation with him, and I have no advice to pass along for that.

From: Gabriel Teklehaymanot
Sent: Mar 7, 2024, 14:55 
To: Anna, Cara
Subject: Wonderful news!

Dear Cara.

Thanks for your time, yesterday, and I will not bother you anymore except to tell you this wonderful news:

I talked at length to Fernando Silva this morning, and he agreed to go ahead with his script as it is, except making it clearer that you are the one we can thank for knowing about it. I am going to raise more funds for the production, and I will personally go to Chile for a full week and be on set as his advisor, isn’t that great?

The argument that I had hinted at before is that Western media are free to shine a light on the truth, as you did throughout the war, but also to debunk whatever is found to be inaccurate. We are a society of free speech. And of checks and balances, because anyone can go to libel court, but nobody has done so in this case. What you reported from Axum was not trivia about, say a celebrity sleeping around. It was about, let’s remember, 800 people being ruthlessly mowed down in an affront both to humanity and to our Christian faith. Your revelation of a crime so unforgivable shaped the worldwide perception of the war. I can tell you that in my community, it showed us the evil of our enemy and strengthened our will to fight at whatever the cost. Glory to our martyrs!

So what I said to Fernando which finally convinced him is that, if a news organisation as reputable as Associated Press were to get it that wrong about something that serious, there would be big consequences. But there has been no retraction, and you are still working for Associated Press and considered a highly respectable journalist.

Which means your story stands and is perfectly fit for being dramatised, crediting the original author, you, the incredible Anna Cara, who will be mentioned repeatedly in gratitude for your investigatory work. Your name will live forever in the annals of spreading knowledge of the Axum massacre.

Once the film is out, and provided it is as good as it promises, can we count on your help to promote it? Most of all, we would love to interview you, is that okay? Must we submit a formal request for this to your employer?

I hope this happy news makes your day, like it did mine, and that our interview can be scheduled soon.

Happy regards
Gabriel

Notice how both my fictional undercover personalities put an ordinary, very reasonable-sounding trust in the “respectable” institutions of the liberal world order, from our free-speech society to our human-rights bodies. This was myself until recently, and it would still be me today, had it not been my lot to realize how low they stooped in their insistence on getting Ethiopia dead wrong.

UPDATE on April 10: Two days later, a final message from Cara Anna did arrive, though I only discovered this a month later.

From: Anna, Cara 
Sent: Mar 9, 2024, 16:21 
To:  Gabriel Teklehaymanot
Subject: Re: Wonderful news!

Hi Gabriel, thank you for asking, but there’s no need for me to take part. Now that it’s easier for most people to travel to Tigray, one can go and speak to people there who lived through it.

Cara

AP

Cara Anna seems to believe the authenticity of the undercover personalities to the end!

And yes, as she says, one can go to Axum to ask around and investigate. Plenty of people and institutions have done that. Not a single finding remotely resembles Cara Anna’s story of February 18, 2021. I refer once again to my own work on what we know about what happened in Axum.

I left it here, as I published the exchange on March 30, 2024, having demonstrated sufficiently that Cara Anna is utterly shameless, and that Ethiopians were right to ban her from entering their country. If she had had the slightest conscience, she would have said: “Such a film wouldn’t be a true story, so now I am going to retract my article and apologize in public for the profound harm that I caused. I shall also come clean about my sources throughout the war, and about the extent to which I knew beforehand or only found out later that I was spreading incendiary falsehoods.”

Dream on, she will not say that of her own accord, because she and her employer have proved themselves indifferent to the truth and disdainful of African lives. We cannot expect these people to repent. We must work to hold them to account. And take solace from the fact that history will judge them harshly.

The post Going undercover to interview Cara Anna from Associated Press appeared first on Abren.

On New Year’s Day Ethiopia and Somaliland announced a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). The specifics of the agreement are not fully disclosed, but the key points involve Somaliland obtaining a share in Ethiopian Airlines, Africa’s prized airline. In return, Ethiopia gains entry to the port of Berbera and secures land (with a 20km coastline) near the town of Lughaya for a naval base along the Gulf of Aden. There is a strong possibility that Ethiopia will ultimately acknowledge Somaliland as an independent sovereign state.

Somaliland gained its independence from Britain on June 26, 1960, was then recognized as such by 34 countries, including the U.K. Five days later, amid excitement and nationalist fervor, it proceeded to voluntarily merge with former Italian colony of Somalia on July 1, 1960. It would turn out to be fateful decision. As the smaller of the two in terms of population, Somaliland quickly found itself receiving dictates from Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia. The following 31 year of union were a dark period of tumult, eventually culminating in full blown war, whereby Somalia desperately tried to cling to Somaliland, causing tremendous suffering and scorn.

According to a recent article by Georgetown University Professor Ken Opalo “The unification and subsequent separation of Somaliland with Somalia has some similarity with that of Eritrea, which also peacefully entered union with Ethiopia in 1952. Somaliland also willingly entered union with the rest of Somalia in 1960, only to witness the violation of the terms of union shortly thereafter. Like Eritrea, Somaliland also leveraged a widespread civil war to claim its independence under circumstances that made it too challenging for the war-fatigued capital to resist. The key distinction lies in the fact that while Eritrea had a consenting government in Addis Ababa to facilitate its secession, the neo-founders of Somaliland in the late 1980s lacked a credible counterpart among the various warlords who battled the Siyad Barre regime and subsequently turned against each other after 1991.”

The eventual dissolution Somaliland’s union with Somalia could not be ratified by Mogadishu, which has been marred in a long saga of bad governance, corruption, and terrorism. However, neither was Somaliland’s brief union with Somalia ratified by their respective law makers. In any case given the root causes of the breakup that followed ratification matters less. Somalilanders have long emphasized their separate status from rump state Somalia. Their state is relatively calm, holding regular elections, issues a passport accepted in several countries, including the U.K, South Africa, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, France, Malaysia. Its close tie with neighboring Ethiopia has been a process spanning decades.

Notwithstanding Somaliland’s distinct history, revelation of the MoU ignited a diplomatic uproar by authorities in Somalia, which expressed intense displeasure and withdrew the ambassador from Addis Ababa. So far, a series of statements and declarations out of Mogadishu have not garnered an official response from Addis Ababa, although Somaliland called them “insincere” and “hysterical”.

With a GDP of nearly US$3.5 billion and a population of 5.7 million, Hargeisa stands to benefit significantly from a long-term economic deal centered around ports and logistics. In addition to the prospect of obtaining official recognition from Ethiopia, Somaliland is pursuing the port agreement for economic necessities. Nearly half of the government’s budget relies on revenue from trade taxes and port duties. However, it is expected that there will be opposition within the country to the deal, particularly on the domestic political front.

A Significant Move by Ethiopia

Ethiopia’s decision to eventually recognize Somaliland carries notable significance as it marks the first instance of a UN member state acknowledging Somaliland’s autonomous status since its self-proclaimed independence in May 1991, following the Somalia Civil War.

Despite establishing official contacts after declaring independence, including engagements with Ethiopia in strategic and infrastructural agreements, Somaliland’s international recognition has been constrained. Recognition by Ethiopia’s could enhance Somaliland’s legitimacy, foster economic cooperation, and establish diplomatic ties. Given its strategic location, if Somaliland garners recognition by a UN member state, the ripple effect might encourage other nations to follow suit, contributing to a broader acknowledgment of Somaliland’s sovereignty, albeit the extent of this impact hinges on the nature and scope of Ethiopia’s recognition.

In addition to Ethiopia, Somaliland has consulates services in key countries, including the United States, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Kenya. If Ethiopia proceeds to fully recognize its neighbor as an independent state, then these other nations are likely to follow suite, an outcome that will tip the scale as far as the AU’s decision goes. For instance, the U.S has shown interest in Somaliland for military purposes. While the State Department’s rhetoric has been strategically ambiguous regarding Somaliland, overcrowding of military bases in Djibouti has become an issue for the Pentagon, “raising concerns about “strategic competition and potential risk of confrontation with China in Djibouti” and is exploring the viability of Somaliland as an alternative relocation point.

However, an underlying complexity lies in Somaliland’s lack of Mother State Permission from Somalia. This adds diplomatic controversy surrounding the principle of sovereignty, for the AU, which must contend with numerous claims for statehood across the continent. The AU does not want to be  seen to be encouraging balkanization of Africa, but the legal case for Somaliland is strong, a point discussed below.

President Mussa Bihi Abdi stated, “We functioned independently as Somaliland for three decades, despite the odds, but never got the recognition we deserved—We just needed one country to open that door, and its suiting for Ethiopia to be that nation”. He added, “The first to recognize Somaliland was always going to be the most difficult, after that there will certainly be others that follow”.

On January 6th, Somalia’s president Hassan Sheik Mohamud signed a law nullifying the MoU between the Gov’t of Ethiopia & Somaliland as illegal and void on grounds of protecting sovereignty and territorial integrity. But how Mogadishu intends to enforce this claim is not clear. As mentioned, Somaliland has been its own entity for thirty years and authorities in Somalia have had no say in that time. This power equation is unlikely to change anytime soon.

Ethiopian troops have been crucial to Somalia’s security. As part of The African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) They played a key role in defending against Al Shabab for years. It currently contributes about 5000 troops to the ATMIS.  Before the formation of ATMIS, Ethiopia was the leading country behind The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Outside of this multilateral effort, Ethiopia also commands a significant force combating Al Shabab in Somalia. According to a 2020 Reuters report, “Ethiopia, which shares a long and porous border with Somalia, contributes around 4,000 of the 17,000 troops under the AU, and has around 15,000 additional soldiers in Somalia bilaterally: that is more than any other nation.”

The task of ATMIS slated to end in 2023 was extended at the request of Mogadishu, which needed the protection against increasing attacks by Al Shabab. Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) have overseen the most difficult sectors of Somalia, where Al Shabab has the strongest presence. These areas include sector 3, Bakool and Bay centered on the town of Baidoa. The withdrawal of these forces now scheduled for December 2024 could leave a security vacuum, in which Al Shabab will certainly take advantage of.

Now what?

On January 8, 2024, to shore up support, President Hassan Sheik Mohamud of Somalia traveled to Eritrea, where Somalian soldiers recently trained. He is also slated to travel to Egypt this week. This follows an earlier visit to Somalia by an Egyptian delegation. Furthermore, Somalia is seeking support from Qatar as well as the Arab league, of which it is a member state. Simultaneously military commanders of Somaliland and Ethiopia convened in Addis Ababa this week.

While most Somalilander’s look forward to the day where their country’s independence becomes officially recognized by the international community, there is some pushback to Ethiopia setting up a navy base in their territory, including by some of its officials. This month AP reported, “Somaliland’s defense minister resigns over deal to give Ethiopia access to the region’s coastline. The issue will certainly be hotly debated in the upcoming elections scheduled for November.

As the 2018 rapprochement between Eritrea and Ethiopia continues to fade, a new reality seems to be emerging in the Horn of Africa (HOA), one where Asmara and Addis Ababa become estranged again, Somaliland gains its vaunted recognition, and Sudan fractures into spheres of influence. While Ethiopia continues to grapple with insecurity. Never in recent memory has there been this level of tumult and geopolitical realignment in the strategic HOA.

It remains to be seen if Ethiopia will proceed to lobby AU member states on behalf of Somaliland at the upcoming 37^th regular session. There is a good case to be made based on a 2005 fact finding mission led by former deputy chairperson of the AU, which concluded, “Union between Somalia and Somaliland was never ratified and malfunctioned from 1960 to 1990, making Somaliland’s search for recognition historically unique and self-justified in African Political History.” The report adds by saying, “Objectively viewed, the case should not be linked to the notion of opening a pandora’s box, and as such the AU should find a special method of dealing with this outstanding case.”

As far as Ethiopian authorities are concerned their bid to diversify, and gain control of a seashore is more critical than ever. This fact became crystal clear in the past few years, whereby logistical bottlenecks and sabotage on country’s maritime trade became more frequent. For example, turbines imported for the Grand Ethiopian Renascence Dam were routinely held up throughout the past three years. Sensitive imports such as military equipment was frequency held in Djibouti, which as mentioned is brimming with foreign military bases.

For Somaliland, it is once in a generation opportunity to seal their nation’s fate among nations. It is also a means to economic revival. In that sense, the MoU is a masterstroke in diplomacy.

The delay in achieving full state recognition and UN membership for Somaliland has multifaceted impacts, restricting its diplomatic outreach and hindering its legitimacy on international political and developmental platforms, including within the UN itself. Despite these challenges, Ethiopia’s recognition represents a significant step in Somaliland’s prolonged pursuit of official statehood and a prominent role on the global stage. It could be a harbinger for an international acknowledgment of Somaliland’s de jure independent status.

The post Ethiopia: On Course to Recognizing Somaliland’s Statehood appeared first on Abren.

New reports suggest there is overt opposition to the interim chair’s authority. This in turn risks the fragile peace. Tensions escalated in October, leading to the removal of key officials. The ousted officials belonging to the hardliner camp within the TPLF were accused of neglecting duties and not complying with official policy of the interim government. This highlight increasing governance challenges within the interim structures. There have also been death threats and near misses targeting interim government officials. A prison break in November was linked to sabotage efforts orchestrated by those opposing the the interim government.

In addition, opposition politics has become challenging for the interim government to manage. Opposition parties have also criticized the TPLF leadership for mistakes made during the two-year conflict, and the Pretorial agreement which reads like a surrender document for the TPLF. Unfortunately, the persistent power struggles are hindering Tigray’s recovery efforts.

The humanitarian crisis, exacerbated by international aid cessation, persistent drought, and displacement remains daunting. Despite recent announcements, there is no improvement, with a significant portion of agricultural land affected by drought conditions.

In what appeared to be a drive to curb growing factionalism, the region’s authorities have been clamping down on opposition politics. Opposition leaders emphasized ongoing restrictions on political freedoms, reminiscent of the old TPLF era, with instances of violent suppression of protests. Arrests of opposition figures and denial of protest permits underscore the oppressive environment, challenging the notion of a post-war inclusive political transition.

The confused politics of the region is perhaps a result of the interim administration’s move towards decentralized decision-making. This is all very new for Tigray, which lived under authoritarian governance for decades prior.  The challenge lies in the lack of clarity in power distribution and the lingering influence of the TPLF, fueling internal strife within interim structures.

Despite these uncertainties, an inclusive political transition as per the Pretoria Peace Agreement is something Getachew Reda’s team has been keen on maintaining. However, entrenched political habits hinder genuine representation, posing difficulties for the interim administration in removing the TPLF’s hardliners, who are undermining Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), a key pillar of the Pretoria peace agreement. Many of the same officials were also recently accused by the USAID for stealing humanitarian aid logistics. Interim leader Getachew Reda’s circle has tacitly blamed TPLF hardliners from diverted humanitarian aid, thus highlighting the growing splits within the region.

The post-war conundrum reflects unmet expectations for an inclusive political framework post-conflict. The TPLF’s failure to uphold unity and collaboration during the reconstruction phase adds to the challenges. Nonetheless, returning to the pre-war status quo, whereby the TPLF dominated Tigray seems unlikely. The political chaos in Tigray could see a power struggle in which the TPLF is completely sidelined, or another scenario, where interim leader Getachew and those around him exits the scene. This latter outcome would jeopardize the peace agreement.

A key disappointment has been the interim government’s inability to reclaim what has been referred to as “West Tigray”, although the neighboring Amhara regions would disagree with that characterization. The area in question is currently governed independently and has been relatively calm.  Moreover, the party’s continued complaints of ‘occupation by Eritrean forces’ further complicates Tigray’s political feuds. In the absence of real power to change facts on the ground, neither the TPLF nor the interim government exude confidence in the Public’s mind.

The TPLF’s past aggressions, its continued bellicose attitude and corrupt practices has alienated neighboring regions. Unless the interim government can overwhelm TPLF’s grip by dismantling entrenched single-party systems, the path forward remains uncertain. Opposition parties, often accused of weakness, need better organization and collaboration for effective multi-party governance.

The multifaceted challenges in post-war Tigray region demand comprehensive solutions. Urgent reconciliation and inclusive governance as well as dialogue with neighboring regions is needed to maintain stability and expedite the economic recovery and normalization of the region.

Related Stories……

The post Post-War Tigray region of Ethiopia Struggles with Internal Political Unrest appeared first on Abren.

By Rasmus Sonderriis, from Addis Ababa

Harrowing tales of sadistic rape were recounted in The Washington Post and The Boston Globe by Katharine Houreld on November 26, 2023. This Nairobi-based East Africa correspondent touches every nerve of revulsion and anger in her retelling of tearful interviews with a dozen female rape survivors. These are not mere denunciations of bad apples, such as the three men who were recently sentenced by Ethiopian military courts. The sexual violence against women of the Tigrayan ethnicity is categorized as “sustained and organized”. Particularly the prevalence of gang rape suggests a whole culture of depraved cruelty. Indeed, the article puts the individual horrors into perspective: “More than 100,000 women may have been raped during the two-year civil war in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region, according to the most comprehensive study so far of these attacks in research conducted by the Columbia University biostatistician Kiros Berhane.”

The alleged perpetrators are: “Ethiopian and Eritrean soldiers and […] militiamen from Ethiopia’s Amhara region”. This is the totality of allies who put down the insurgency of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, the TPLF. However, there is no mention of this group at all in The Washington Post article, which is packed with closeups and devoid of zoom-outs. This follows a pattern in Western coverage of African affairs, which is meant to evoke commiseration and indignation, and not to generate insight. Going into the politics is typically seen as a distraction, even considered in bad taste. This lets the clueless reader fill in the context with the stereotypical “single story about Africa”, which the Nigerian author Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie has warned against. It features a continent of gut-wrenching savagery, leaving us primed to believe the worst without question.

I have written in detail about how this particular conflict was essentially a power struggle, challenging the clichés in big media about Africans yet again being in the grip of tribal rage. I refer to my freely available 50,000-word paper “GETTING ETHIOPIA DEAD WRONG”, which will be released in a slightly extended book version in early 2024. It tackles all the issues stressed and ignored by the world press, without shying away from the most delicate subjects. For instance, there is a section titled “Was rape used as a weapon?”

For sure, the focus here is not on Ethiopian politics, but on the rape described in The Washington Post. Yet what we assume about the context influences our standard of proof. By way of example, let us imagine a study concluding that American troops gang-raped a major percentage of women in Afghanistan. How would that be read? Even the most dangerous criminals in US prisons consider rapists to be the scummiest of scum, so we Westerners would need extremely compelling evidence to believe this about our patriotic young men.

It ought not surprise us that Eritreans and Ethiopians feel the same way about their young men, and also about a high number of young women, doing armed service for their country. Again, this is not just a tribal instinct. Their reading of claims about the truth is also influenced by the political context. The difference is that they have firsthand knowledge of it.

We need to talk about the TPLF

So very, very briefly, the TPLF is not just some plucky guerilla force, as one would think from the David-and-Goliath-themed scripts of many an Africa reporter. From 1991 to 2018, this highly disciplined party with Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist roots had a firm grip on the helm of the Ethiopian state. Its characteristic obsession with ethnicity included putting “ethnicity” on ID cards, never mind that millions of citizens are mixed or see themselves simply as Ethiopian. Moreover, the TPLF expanded the Tigray region, renaming the lush territories west of Tigray as “Western Tigray”, which then became a laboratory for extremist Tigrayan ethnonationalism, driving out non-Tigrayans and moving in Tigrayan settlers. TPLF leaders occupied key positions in the monopolistic economy and ran the national army. Still today, the TPLF holds vast wealth in foreign currency, and has an extensive international network of friends in high places. Despite its militaristic ethos, it has, over the years, acquired fluency in the ‘donor-darling’ language that Westerners fall for. Its battalion of Wikipedia-editing activists, for instance, know which rhetorical buttons to push on women’s rights, never mind that the TPLF’s only-ever prominent woman was Azeb Mesfin, wife of the late dictator Meles Zenawi. And she was purged and exiled in 2017.

One world-famous TPLF luminary is Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director-General of the World Health Organization. Today, he talks like a pacifist humanitarian, as he spends Martin Luther King Day “reflecting on the interconnections between love, trust, peace and justice”. But as Ethiopia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2012 to 2016, he took a tough line when it came to jailing pro-democracy protesters. Ultimately, this oppression failed, enabling Abiy Ahmed to become prime minister in 2018, incidentally placing women in powerful positions for the first time in the country’s history. The TPLF retreated to its stronghold as the regional government of Tigray, sheltering its men prosecuted for corruption and torture. It also refused to let go of its control over the military.

War broke out when the TPLF attacked five Ethiopian army bases in Tigray on November 3, 2020, killing thousands of soldiers. One year and many bloody battles later, the rulers-turned-rebels were closing in on the national capital Addis Ababa, being widely hailed as the imminent victors by prominent Western pundits and think tanks. The special US representative, Jeffrey Feltmann, described the fall of the capital as a “bloodbath situation”, yet urged the Ethiopians to do nothing to prevent it. They turned a deaf ear and mobilized in defense. Yet another year and even more bloody battles later, the fighting had returned to Tigray. Staring at defeat, the TPLF leaders agreed to hand over their heavy weapons in exchange for staying in control of regional governance in Tigray, as per the peace agreement entered into on November 2, 2022, in Pretoria, South Africa. Oddly, Katharine Houreld’s article refers in passing to the Pretoria Agreement as a mere “cease-fire”. This happens to be the term preferred by the most extreme TPLF supporters, who refuse to admit defeat.

No need for due diligence on African rape?

Surely, in assessing the credibility of a hypothetical study showing rampant gang-rape of Afghani women by American soldiers, the first step of due diligence would be to google the authors to check for any pro-Taliban bias. Accordingly, a self-proclaimed anti-racist newspaper, such as The Washington Post, should be expected to do the same before publishing a highly incendiary story about mass rape by African soldiers. However, politely probed in an email by Ethiopian-American student, Samuel Kassa, Katharine Houreld volunteers this information: “Regarding the political leanings of Dr. Kiros, I haven’t looked into it.”

She may or may not realize that the Columbia University professor’s first name “Kiros” is typically Tigrayan. Anyway, this is definitely no smoking gun. After all the Ethiopian Minister of Defense since 2021, Abraham Belay, that is, the man in charge of the allegedly rapist army, is also a Tigrayan. And yet, though not every Tigrayan is a TPLF member, every TPLF member is a Tigrayan, so the minimum would be a rudimentary check of his Twitter account. This reveals total dedication to the TPLF’s storyline that the war was a one-way street of violence against the Tigrayans as a people.

It is beyond the scope of the present article to make the case that these accusations were, at least in the bigger picture, a ploy to justify an irregular army waging war against an elected government. My painstaking review of all these narratives in “GETTING ETHIOPIA DEAD WRONG” maps out how the TPLF, assisted by a handful of unscrupulous foreigners, managed to instill into Western minds the essentially false notion that this war was driven by pathological hatred rather than ordinary politics. But even if one shares Kiros Berhane’s view of the conflict, his partiality in conducting such a study should be obvious.

Kiros Berhane has also frequently endorsed and retweeted messages by the aforementioned Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, who spent the war blaming the Ethiopian government for the hardship that the war caused to ordinary Tigrayans, while never uttering a word of sympathy for the victims in Afar and Amhara, the two regions that were ravaged by the TPLF during its march on the capital.

Responding to Ethiopian-American student Samuel Kassa, Katharine Houreld makes this defense of Kiros Berhane’s research paper and its publisher: “I know the BMJ is a very respected peer-reviewed journal and there were multiple scholars involved in the study, which I have sent to you”.

Indeed, 17 other names are listed at the top of the paper, all Tigrayan-sounding. It is stated that most of them live and work in Tigray, where the TPLF exerts control over every aspect of life, and would have a massive stake in a study about rape by enemy soldiers for worldwide publication.

The authoritative ring of the term “peer review” is being increasingly challenged after scandalous retractions by, for instance, The Lancet. And indeed, what could the peers possibly have reviewed for this study to go into the prestigious BMJ Global Health? They must have validated the statistical method, which is Kiros Berhane’s specialty. But did they cross-examine the witnesses? Did they check the translations from Tigrinya into English? Did they look for evidence of whether or not the interviewees were coached or even coerced? Whatever these mysterious peer reviewers did, they failed to point out the fundamentally absurd assumption of a free-speech climate in Tigray. It is inconceivable that this study could have reached any other conclusion, because that would have amounted to TPLF subjects disproving the TPLF’s war propaganda on TPLF soil. The BMJ might as well have published a survey by North Koreans conducted in North Korea documenting North Koreans’ love for their leader. 

The ugliest of crimes

Rape is more taxing on the human heart than murder. There is something uniquely sickening about deriving sexual gratification, or whatever it is, from inflicting horror on a vulnerable person. The dilemma is this: We know that sick bastards take advantage of armed conflict to commit sexual violence, but also that this is the staple of fake atrocity propaganda. Thus, in a scenario where many young Tigrayan men were reluctant to kill and die for the old guard of cruel and corrupt men, the TPLF needed an argument as strong as this: “If you run away from rebel-army conscription, you are failing to protect your mothers and sisters!” In some cases, this appeal to Tigrayan men’s honor also appealed, alas, to their dishonor, as when some TPLF fighters invoked “revenge” as a motive for raping women in Amhara and Afar regions.

Mr. Mulueberhan Haile was one of many Tigrayans who risked their lives by serving as interim administrators during the seven months, from November 28, 2020, to June 28, 2021, when the Ethiopian army tried, but largely failed, to take charge of security in Tigray. Talking to Voice of America a few months into the war, he said: “When we started investigating, we found out there were women instructed to make false claims of rape and to engender a feeling of anger and resentment in the Tigrayan youth.”

In June 2022, a Tigrayan journalist deserting from Radio Dimtse Woyane (‘Voice of the TPLF’) talked on Ethiopian television (incidentally to a famous interviewer who is also Tigrayan) about Tigrayan sex workers being paid to pose as university students and to tell rape stories to foreign NGOs. Nobody in the Western media or human-rights circles would touch his testimony with a bargepole.

There were, however, seven African UN professionals serving in Ethiopia who privately discussed the difficulty of sorting facts from fabrication, feeling under pressure to feed the media sensationalism and thus fuel the war. The audio of their meeting was leaked by a pro-TPLF website, indignant that Letty Chiwara, representative of UN Women to Ethiopia and to the African Union, had used language such as “take it with a pinch of salt”. Though most of the press ignored it, it nevertheless caused a bit of a stir, with an emphasis on shaming the African women on the ground who dared question the TPLF narrative.

This matches the extensive testimony of the Kenyan national, Doctor Steven Were Omamo, who served in Ethiopia during the war as the Country Director for the UN World Food Programme. In his highly recommended book “At the Centre of the World in Ethiopia”, he describes how Ethiopia-based UN staff, mostly Africans, had their life-saving work on the ground sabotaged by senior political UN figures, mostly Westerners, who made little secret of their nearness to the TPLF hierarchy, and who would rather hog the limelight with outright lies than engage with a largely cooperative Ethiopian government.


From accused to accuser: Tony Magaña

Katharine Houreld’s article stops short of using the ubiquitous expression “rape as a weapon of war”, but quotes a nurse from a rape crisis center lamenting the lack of HIV drugs, as “some of these women were deliberately infected with HIV.” Once again, this rhymes with what Westerners think they know about Africa being a hotbed of HIV/AIDS, never mind that Ethiopia has the same HIV prevalence rate as Ukraine, at 1.1%, while Eritrea at only 0.6% does better than some developed countries.

Another voice leveling the charge of rape-mediated “biological warfare” has been neurosurgeon Dr. Tony Magaña, whose American citizenship gives him a shine of neutrality.

Living in the capital of Tigray, Mekelle, when the war broke out, Dr. Tony Magaña was to be frequently rolled out as a truth witness, including to the United Nations Human Rights Commission. Yet it is no secret that his full real name is Ignacio Antonio Magana. In Florida, he was arrested back in 2002 due to a series of sexual-assault accusations from his female patients. He was also hung out to dry in, of all places, The Washington Post, after he was suspended from practicing medicine in order to protect the public. In 2004, he pleaded guilty to battery and was sentenced to one year in the county jail (see image below). In 2005, he went on trial again for no less than ten women saying he forced himself on them across three counties in Florida, though he was cleared of the rape charges.

The backstory of Dr. Magana has long been discussed among Ethiopians on social media. He says he came to Ethiopia in 2012, and was recruited to work at Ayder Hospital in Mekelle “by leaders of the university, who were also members of the TPLF”.  While the war was raging, he said: “I know the leaders of the TPLF.”

So how well did they know him? Given the sophistication of the TPLF intelligence apparatus, it is unthinkable that his googleable sex-offender record could have been overlooked. His TPLF protectors must have decided they could make him grateful, loyal and useful by taking him in. Indeed, Tony Magaña has testified widely about sadistic treatment of Tigrayans in graphic  and horrific detail, hyenas and all, featuring as a medical authority on this subject in a newspaper as prestigious as the Spanish El País. He has also provided input to the Belgian geographer Jan Nyssen’s ‘estimate’ of the death toll in Tigray, which became quoted by countless media as a serious study from the University of Ghent, even though Jan Nyssen gives speeches at TPLF rallies and events, and writes passionately about how “Western Tigray” belongs to Tigray.

And this is just one more example of how the TPLF has covered its propaganda in a veneer of academia, which the media lap up uncritically, because it fits so neatly with the “single story about Africa”.

The fine line between justice-seeking and hate-mongering

In her email reply to Samuel Kassa, Katharine Houreld declines to say who put her in touch with the women testifying for her article, having promised not to reveal anything that might identify them. Thus, the only objective conclusion that can be drawn about the individual horror stories is that they are impossible to prove or disprove. For outsiders wishing to stand up for abused women, yet mindful of sinister agendas, the only way forward is to support Ethiopian civil society and legal practitioners in investigating cases and bringing them to trial.

Katharine Houreld also sent Samuel Kassa a study published in The Lancet in August 2023, authored by the New York-based NGO Physicians for Human Rights (PHR), based on field research conducted by its Ethiopian (and undoubtedly Tigrayan) partner: “Organization for Justice and Accountability in the Horn of Africa” (OJAH). This outfit has been completely anonymized, as its staff “cannot be named for their own safety”. So in this case, there is no way to check for political leanings on Twitter, although a google search reveals that OJAH is exclusively dedicated to denouncing human-rights violations in Tigray, and only by actors other than the TPLF.

The full version of the study in The Lancet refers to the aforementioned BMJ-published quantitative survey by Kiros Berhane. Its own research is more qualitative in nature, looking at 305 medical records from “multiple health facilities in Tigray known to provide clinical services to survivors of sexual violence”.

It is ironic that the authors describe justice-seeking “relying on potentially biased national mechanisms” as “ill-conceived”, yet put their trust in the record-keeping of the TPLF-controlled healthcare system. But at least the 305 files were selected for scrutiny by the research team, and not by the regional government of Tigray. And it is, of course, fully plausible that 305 people and many more were raped in Tigray during three years with widespread lawlessness. Where the study is weak is in the identification of perpetrators. The dubious assumption is that victims, even genuine victims, would face no pressure to blame enemy soldiers given the political climate in the region. And according to the study, the supposed end of the conflict did not lower the rate of conflict-related sexual violence. It even says that “95 percent of conflict-related sexual violence experienced by children and adolescents under 18 years old occurred following the signing of the [Pretoria Peace Agreement]”. No explanation of this is attempted. In this period, the TPLF-controlled Tigray regional government has been in charge of law and order. It has indeed been criticized by other Tigrayans for heavy-handed policing of opposition rallies, and for arresting the victim’s friend rather than seek justice for the recent murder and attempted rape of 32-year-old Zewdu Haftu in Mekelle. Where the TPLF is no longer in charge, however, is in the territory consistently referred to in The Lancet as “Western Tigray” (notice the capital W). This also reveals a Tigrayan ethnonationalist bias.

Thus, The Lancet substitutes medical records for criminal investigations, and concludes that: “What is documented in PHR’s analysis points to the use of sexual violence by the military as a tactic to terrorize civilian populations.” It is hard to make sense of this now when the war is over. Surely, sexual violence against Tigrayans by outsiders is more likely to reignite the insurgency than to cow anyone.

Just a little sympathy with Ms. Houreld

I regret quoting emails in which Katharine Houreld did not know she was on the record. Samuel Kassa is not myself, but nor is he exactly who he pretended to be. This was not an honest method to fish for information. However, the public-interest defense is compelling, given the defamatory and inflammatory nature of her article. If Katharine Houreld has managed to read this thus far, she must be aghast. What looked like slam-dunk virtue-signaling as a champion of African women has come to seem more like reckless incompetence with a stench of racism in cahoots with forces out to sow division and frustrate reconciliation in Ethiopia.

Even so, I do sympathize with how she puts her trust in authority, as her email refers to: “…the Lancet and BMJ (both globally respected peer-reviewed medical journals that have published on the subject), and rights groups such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and UN investigators – all of whom have documented extensive rape during the conflict by all actors”. 

Until recently, I myself would have needed no more convincing than that. Today, however, my faith in such esteemed institutions has been replaced by scrutiny of their fine print and methodological notes. To understand what changed me, read my 50,000-word exposé of how so many of the great and the good of our media, academia, humanitarian work, politics and diplomacy demonized a friendly people and fueled a big war with dire mispredictions and shocking lies.

I never imagined myself writing such a fiery anti-establishment piece. Like Katharine Houreld, I am a run-of-the-mill centrist. However, unlike Katharine Houreld, I had the good fortune to live in Ethiopia, following its affairs closely since 2004. I was able to immerse myself into the society, familiarize myself with the mentality, learn to speak colloquially in the national language, observe day-to-day interethnic relations. Had I been sent to cover the recent war in northern Ethiopia without this background, I might have sullied myself as badly as Katharine Houreld. After all, a year into the war, I still struggled with denial about the scale of so many self-professed do-gooders doing bad, all retold in “GETTING ETHIOPIA DEAD WRONG”.

The post African Rape in The Washington Post appeared first on Abren.

The FCDO spokesperson remarked, “Twenty-three years ago today, Ethiopia and Eritrea, with the support of the international community, concluded the Algiers Agreement to establish peace and demarcate a common border.” Highlighting the historical significance of the 2018 peace agreement, the spokesperson emphasized the joint commitment of both nations to uphold the borders as outlined in the Algiers Agreement and its subsequent Boundary Commission. The UK, reiterating its steadfast support, emphasized the paramount importance of respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity defined by these agreements. The statement further emphasized the UK’s ongoing dedication to collaborating with all Horn of Africa countries towards the shared goal of a peaceful and prosperous region.

Similarly, the United States, in its official statement, reflected on the shared history of Ethiopia and Eritrea in concluding the Algiers Agreement 23 years ago. In 2018, both nations recommitted to respecting the established borders in a historic peace agreement. The U.S. government emphasized the continued importance of upholding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both countries, particularly on this significant anniversary. Encouraging collaboration between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the United States underscored the spirit of peace forged between the two nations, envisioning a more stable and prosperous region.

The timing of these statements is intriguing, considering the Algiers Agreement was initially reached in December 2000. Despite the historic peace agreement of 2018, tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea persisted for nearly two decades, casting a shadow over the official demarcation of the border. In 2018, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s olive branch to Eritrea led to the end of a prolonged no-war-no-peace stalemate, earning him the Nobel Peace Prize.

However, recent events have introduced complexities. Following the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) between Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), relations between Asmara and Addis Ababa have witnessed a visible cool-down. Continued reports of Eritrean combatants in northern Ethiopia and Ethiopia’s vocal aspirations for access to Eritrean ports and the establishment of a Naval force have added a layer of tension to the diplomatic landscape.

The reiteration of support for the Algiers Agreement by both Washington and London at this particular time has prompted varied interpretations. Some view it as a subtle diplomatic nudge, urging restraint and the preservation of territorial integrity. However, others perceive it as a veiled instigation of potential conflict, given the complex geopolitical dynamics in the region. There is no doubt it is peculiar.

As the world reflects on the 23-year journey since the Algiers Agreement, the international community may be side tracked by other more pressing conflicts around the world. Yet it remains one point of tension at the mouth of an already troubled Red Sea region.

The post The Algiers Accord Between Ethiopia and Eritrea at 23 appeared first on Abren.

In his memoirs, Colonel Abraha recounts flying evacuation missions during a period of intense mortar shelling of the airport in Asmara. His former deputy Debela Tsegaye recounts the moment. “We were one of the last batch of airmen and general staff to be evacuated, if we had fallen to the enemy, we would have certainly been tortured and killed”.

Colonel Abraha was the last one out after getting his comrades to safety. He flew across the Red Sea in a MiG aircraft to Jizan, Saudi Arabia, where landed safely. He remained hidden there, avoiding extradition for a few years. The early 1990s were a dangerous period for members of Ethiopia’s armed forces, numbering some 300,000. Newly minted rebel governments in both Addis Ababa and Asmara had many veterans imprisoned, accusing them of serving the Dergue Regime. Suddenly demobilized in mass, many veterans struggled to find work, some becoming homeless and fleeing the country.

At the time both the governments of Eritrea and Ethiopia were on the hunt for veterans in exile. Saudi Arabia helped Colonel Abraha seek asylum in Denmark, where he remained. The Danish government would put him to work, gaining insights on Ethiopia’s Air Force, and particularly its largely Russian-made aircraft. These were early days since the fall of the Berlin Wall, ending the Cold war. NATO countries still retained a high interest in Russian military equipment. “They were interested in how we managed and how we operated antiquated Soviet Aircraft like the F5”, said Colonel Abraha, in one of his letters to his siblings back in Addis Ababa.

Born in the small town of Dabat, Gonder to a large family, Nebiyu strove to be top of his class graduating with full honors before joining the Air Force in 1970. There he excelled, finishing his training, and becoming one of the youngest airmen. In 1982, his aircraft was badly damaged by a surface to air fire. Sustaining a head injury and bleeding, Colonel Nebiyu managed to descend in altitude very quickly, regaining consciousness to fly back to base. His colleagues recall the time and his dedication to save his aircraft and himself, rather than fall into enemy hands.  

Tragically, after a prolonged battle with Parkinson’s Disease, Colonel Nebiyu Abraha passed away on November 20, 2023, leaving behind a legacy of bravery and altruism. He is survived by his brothers and sisters. In the words of Debela Tsegaye, “He was selfless and brave. I couldn’t imagine how we would still be alive today without him.” His body was rested at Holy Trinity Church in Addis Ababa on November 26, 2023.

Colonel Abraha’s life story serves as a testament to the indomitable spirit of those who strive for the greater good, even in the face of adversity. His memory will forever be etched in the annals of Ethiopia’s Air Force history, a beacon of inspiration for generations to come. 

The post Wings of Valor: Colonel Nebiyu Abraha’s Courageous Journey Through War and Exile appeared first on Abren.

Main article text

We were not surprised when we received a first response from a not-so-surprising corner, from Mulugeta Gebrehiwot Berhe and a number of co-authors (Gebrehiwot et al. 2023).¹ What was unexpected was its lack of engagement with our argument and the extent of misquoting and the mischaracterisation. We made some initial observations regarding this piece in a blog that, like Gebrehiwot et al.’s comments, was published on Roape.net (Gebresenbet and Tariku 2023b). We later received a surprising and one-sided response from Jan Abbink (2023).

Gebrehiwot et al. (2023) did not engage with our arguments, but rather constructed a straw man argument which they then criticised, while Abbink seems unhappy to be represented as a ‘mirror image’ of those supporting the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and that we did not base our piece on what he thinks is a more interesting question. After all, the determination of what is interesting rests with every author. As we will show below, what we see is that the responses, being from a position of power, are intended to impose certain perspectives and silence alternatives, rather than having the intention of debating. Before getting to our responses, let us first present our position as students of conflict and security studies, as Ethiopians and Ethiopianists.

The two responses attack our personal character. Gebrehiwot et al. insist that we are insensitive to the suffering of our fellow Tigrayans. We mentioned the extreme suffering of Tigrayans but did not elaborate on it. Criticising us for not being detailed is one thing, accusing us of being insensitive to suffering is an unfortunate mischaracterisation. To Abbink, we were not patriotic enough, because we did not dare to speak when it was risky and because we did not raise questions regarding what he considers to be gaps in the Pretoria and Nairobi Agreements. As we elaborate below, public action can also take place offline and should not necessarily be visible to all. Abbink seems convinced that if it happened, he should know about it.

Gebrehiwot and his co-authors (2023) consider us to be biased towards the Federal Government of Ethiopia (FGE), and criticise us for not undertaking a ‘critical, balanced assessment of the record of [the] decades’ of the TPLF/Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front’s (EPRDF’s) rule, although our central argumentis to investigate the implications of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA), not to undertake a comprehensive conflict analysis. Unlike some of our critics, we have never held public office and political party memberships, nor are we insiders to the FGE or to any rebel movement. The only professional identity we have is as scholars.² Abbink ignores the important caveat we had – i.e., that we make the argument based on the expectation that the CoHA will be buttressed by a negotiated peace agreement – and downplays what he takes as ‘an appropriate question mark in the title’ (Abbink 2023, 234) in arguing that we take the CoHA as a ‘peace agreement’ (237) and that we make ‘confident predictions’ (234) without enough context.

In terms of positionality, the centre of our ethical concern in our professional work is the state and society, not any particular government or particular social group within it. We differentiate between regime and state as much as we differentiate between the TPLF and Tigray.

With the above caveats, let us respond to the two rejoinders in five parts.

First, Gebrehiwot et al. (2023) accuse us of being ‘indifferent’ and of lacking ‘empathy’. The war affected the three regions, yet disproportionately harmed Tigray and Tigrayans. The ongoing violence in other parts of the country, including Oromia and Amhara regions, are everyday realities for us. All sides of the war are accused of atrocities, ranging from executions, sexual violence, ethnic cleansing, destruction and pillaging (Blinken 2023). Abbink makes the dangerous mistake of throwing out the baby with the bathwater when he argues in a one-sided manner that activist human rights groups ‘often went along with an ill-checked TPLF-orchestrated propaganda narrative’ (Abbink 2023, 235). The details he gives illustrate that, despite his misplaced strong criticism that we did not properly support our argument with evidence, he is decidedly biased (like Mulugeta et al.) in his assessment of the war.³ Unlike both critics, we accept the facts as non-debateable. We are against any instrumentalisation, exaggerations, denials or reductions.

Mulugeta and co-authors also state that we reproduce propagandist claims, including that ‘claims of genocide are a TPLF propaganda ploy’ (Gebrehiwot et al. 2023). There is no such statement in our article. What we pointed out was that foreign experts pushed the claim of genocide as part of their partisan and polarising role during the war, with Alex de Waal publishing a special issue in the Journal of Genocide Research. While the timing and theme is telling, the selective reading of Ethiopia’s undeniably atrocious past is unbelievable. Most notably, the authors conveniently skipped, for instance, the well-documented atrocities committed by the TPLF/EPRDF regime in Somali (2007–2008) and Gambella (2003–2004) regions – which human rights organisations reported as amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity (Human Rights Watch 2005, 2008). Clearly, mentioning these atrocities does not serve their intended messaging.

Mulugeta et al.’s assertion that we minimised the ‘massacres and deliberate starvation of civilians’ (Gebrehiwot et al. 2023) in Tigray is simply false. Despite the technical and administrative determinations of famine illustrated by Omamo (2022) and what appear to be flat-out rejections by some, there was extreme suffering. The atrocities committed should be determined by qualified independent investigators, not by the propaganda machinations of the warring sides. Its purpose should be to help Ethiopians overcome the effects of the war and ensure justice, accountability, reconciliation and non-recurrence. Minimising, exaggerating or instrumentalisation will simply breed further division and violence. We sincerely hope to see the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement, with the attendant genuine political process that will settle all outstanding issues, including those mentioned by Abbink.

Second, Mulugeta et al. claim that our article ‘reproduces central narrative threads of FGE propaganda. One of these is that an unprovoked TPLF attack on the Northern Command of the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) was the cause of the war’ (Gebrehiwot et al. 2023). Abbink also implies that we undertook conflict analysis, not least within his title, which highlights ‘the limitations of presentist analysis of conflicts in Ethiopia’ (234). But we did not write about the causesof the war (which we know very well are more complex than the single event of the 3 November 2020 attack), nor did we engage in conflict analysis (which is wider and deeper than the specific issues Abbink covers). We view the attack – which Mulugeta and other pro-TPLF individuals justify as a ‘pre-emptive operation’ (Gebrehiwot 2022) – as a triggering factor that unleashed the war as we know it. Contrary to an attempt to construct a new narrative, we believe that the attack is not inconsequential.

We consider the signing of the CoHA as the outcome of several factors. Mulugeta et al. complain that ‘[t]hose who trumpet the Pretoria Agreement, such as Fana and Yonas, imply that “might is right”’ (Gebrehiwot et al. 2023). They further insist that the TPLF signed the agreement because its central command decided to ‘sue for peace’ after assessing the looming ‘human cost on both sides’ (ibid.). This contradicts the available evidence. Neither the TPLF nor its supporters were keen on an African Union (AU)-led mediation. Mulugeta et al. were effectively supporting TPLF’s position of pushing away the peace process through most of 2022, with Mulugeta himself asserting that an AU-led mediation is a ‘plan that failed before it even began to roll’ (Gebrehiwot 2021).

So, why would the TPLF ‘sue for peace’ through a process that had already failed? The TPLF dropped all its preconditions and changed its stance vis-à-vis the AU through a public statement made on 11 September 2022 (AFP 2022), less than three weeks into the third round of war. If one carefully analyses these dynamics along with the advances made by the ENDF and its allies on the ground, there is little reason to doubt our initial assessment that changes in the ground forced the TPLF to come to the negotiation table.

Abbink, on the other side, appears convinced that the conclusion of the war should not have let the TPLF survive as an organised political group and should have culminated in the discarding of what he takes as the primary cause, the constitutional order. Our position is that as long as the TPLF or any political group is not in a position to seriously contest the state militarily, it should be tolerated for the sake of sustainable peace, and that the war is not about the constitutional order. We will not delve into that here, as it merits a proper conflict analysis.

Third, Mulugeta et al. ignored the entire section of our debate piece on the state and national security by simply dismissing our central argument that the CoHA is a turning point, marking the beginning of the end of ethno-nationalism’s hegemonic centrality to national politics. Their reason is that the incumbent regime is simply ‘shape-shifting’ and ‘embracing the multinational nature of Ethiopia’ (Gebrehiwot et al. 2023). We do not equate ‘embracing the multinational nature of Ethiopia’ with ethno-nationalism’s hegemonic centrality in Ethiopian politics. The two are conceptually and practically different. We are surprised how a team of six authors misses this fundamental distinction. We embrace and celebrate the multinational and multireligious nature of Ethiopia without necessarily subscribing to ethno-nationalism. The likelihood of imagining a future multinational federal Ethiopia with a delicate balance between ethno-nationalism and other ideologies promoting citizenship-based politics is not necessarily far-fetched.

Mirroring Mulugeta et al.’s response, Abbink misrepresented our central argument as if we had claimed that the CoHA marked ‘the demise of ethno-nationalist challenges’ to the Ethiopian state (Abbink 2023, 235). He rejected our argument because ‘the political system that generated the conflict is still in place’ (ibid.). We concede that our argument is contestable. Yet, our claim is based on changes in the pre-war official discourse regarding ethno-nationalist-centred politics which partly precipitated the TPLF’s antagonism toward the federal government, and the former’s loss of the war to the latter. One major policy decision taken by the federal government after the CoHA is the dissolution of the ethnic-based regional Special Forces, also known as Liyu Hayil. This decision is consequential, and it faced resistance only in the Amhara region. Moreover, although Abbink’s assessment of the current situation is mostly valid, we are baffled why he expects radical changes within a year of signing the CoHA. As stated in our article, ‘it is too early to declare the triumph of the Ethiopian state in terms of its security and survival. This, in part, depends on the successful implementation of the CoHA and the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement’ (Gebresenbet and Tariku 2023a, 98).

It is important to note that Ethiopia cannot be stable without embracing the diversity of its people, not just in terms of ethnicity but also other markers of identity and plurality. As such, our view of the Ethiopian state and society is that it will be more secure if it is geared toward building a cohesive, accommodative and just state – with societal relationships based on democratic principles by which Ethiopians live in peace and dignity. Unlike de Waal (2021), who wrote amid the raging war – perhaps prompted by the ENDF’s military loss in June 2021 – that it is ‘valid to see Ethiopia as an empire, its dissolution long overdue’, we view the survivalist instinct of Ethiopian state and society as valid.

Ethiopians will benefit from building a viable, effective and democratic state, not from its dissolution. If the Ethiopian state collapses, it collapses on the Ethiopian people. As seen elsewhere, it is the people who would suffer – not those who are insensitive to the disastrous consequences of their anti-state positions. As admitted from the outset, this is our fundamental position which we do not feel in the slightest bit ashamed to plainly state as Ethiopian scholars.

Fourth, Mulugeta et al. denied that our claim that ‘named critics of the [FGE] are supporters of the [TPLF] is ‘neither substantiated nor correct’, while Abbink rejected our characterisation of his and the rest’s role as pro-government. In so doing, Abbink resorted to sensationalist arguments. He overstepped his bounds by questioning our commitment (while praising his own role) to our own country, which we are serving and to which we pay taxes, and asserted that we ‘emitted not a sound on the conflict … . No commitment to [our] country was expressed, … not a sign of concern about the tens of thousands of civilians displaced, robbed, or killed’ (Abbink 2023, 238). We did not consider ourselves duty-bound to report what we have done over the past years as Ethiopian scholars to help our own country and people. Nor do we think that he is entitled to question our public role from the comfort of his desk in a well-guarded European city. We have never regretted avoiding both the polarised social media and the unhelpful mainstream media. As Ethiopians and scholars, we have been engaged in local public forums including the Ethiopian Academy of Sciences and grassroots-level training platforms which endeavour to find solutions not only to the war in the north but also the violence in other parts of the country. What Abbink has missed is that while his link to Ethiopia is primarily professional, ours is literally everything, and what has happened over the past three years has directly affected us.

We believe we have presented sufficient evidence – within the scope of a debate article – to show how the named foreign experts were not impartial ‘critics’ or fact-checkers. The tweets and articles of some were frequently echo chambers of the propaganda machinations of the respective sides. In playing this role, the authors have helped to polarise the narratives that accompanied the war. We would like to invite readers to look at, for example, the partisan pieces produced by Alex de Waal and Ann Fitz-Gerald on various platforms. We also invite readers to critically examine what Abbink’s rejoinder contributes to calming already polarised positions.

Moreover, Mulugeta et al. misquoted us by saying that ‘new Ethiopian voices have somehow “reframed” a debate distorted by foreigners’ (Gebrehiwot et al. 2023). They also falsely quoted us when stating that our ‘dismissal of foreign scholars is consistent with an anti-colonial, “African solutions”, political stance’. Here, they not only misread our argument but also confuse two separate issues – decoloniality and the AU’s ‘African solutions’. Abbink also viewed our critique of foreign experts as denigration of their contribution to Ethiopian studies (Abbink 2023, 238). We view both responses as a somewhat sensationalist distortion. First, nowhere did we link our critique of the role of foreign experts with anti-colonialism or African solutions. Second, Abbink’s selective quotation of our work to insist that we delegitimise foreign experts as ‘mere activists’ is inaccurate (ibid., 237). Our exact words were ‘reduced to mere activists’ (p. 101). Rather than denigrating them, we recognise and respect their (including Abbink’s) contribution. Our argument is that, in the context of the mis/disinformation, Ethiopians on both sides have wrested the power of framing the situation in their country from foreign experts thanks to social media platforms (ibid.). We consider this challenge to foreign experts’ framing power as a new and exciting development rarely seen, if at all, in Ethiopia’s past. It is a decolonial moment of knowledge production which could help give birth to new paradigms of thinking and research. Yet, as we work and collaborate with several foreign scholars, we did not and will not advance anti-foreign-expert sentiment. It is just an observation that foreign experts in general, and the named partisan experts in particular, have been seriously challenged by Ethiopians themselves. This should be welcomed by everyone, and if the moment is not here yet then we should encourage it.

Fifth, our use of ‘African solutions’ is in reference to the CoHA and the AU’s role. We stated that the agreement is a success for the AU ‘in terms of … giving meaning to the principle’ (Gebresenbet and Tariku 2023a, 96). As Mulugeta et al. note, African agency is one of the crucial components of the African solutions theme (Ani 2019). African agency in the Pretoria Agreement could be discerned by noting the extent of references made to AU norms and principles in the CoHA and the extent of involvement of the AU. As Mukondeleli Mpeiwa (2023) stresses, despite functioning ‘within a context of scarce-to-none budget, staffing and even more limited operational support’, the commitment of the parties to peace and the support of partners enabled the AU to deliver.

Despite the contested nature of the AU’s leadership, it is inaccurate to reduce its role to ‘last minute brokering of peace’ or to limit it to only AU officials ‘holding tight control of the process’ or labelling the agreement as ‘non-African’.⁴ Examinations of the AU’s involvement should consider the early appointment of envoys and, later in August 2021, the appointment and shuttle diplomacy of former president Olusegun Obasanjo. This again should not be interpreted as romanticisation or simplistic understanding of African solutions (Yohannes and Gebresenbet 2021).

To debate, not foreclose: who speaks?

In conclusion, we had hoped that through the debate we were helping to initiate critical questions and contribute to creating new ideas, but not foreclosing the possibility of critical engagement. It appears that Mulugeta et al. aimed to silence us completely and that Abbink is bent on pushing the argument out of academic circles. This is a display of power and privilege, not an attempt to productively engage with the arguments and messages, both in academic terms and for peace and stability in Ethiopia.

Responses to our intervention have tried to control the terms of the debate in their favour. Mulugeta et al. have a degree of political and media power, while Abbink is a senior academic with power to influence. While the former label and sensationalise in order to expose us to unnecessary social media attacks, Abbink tries to define what the right academic questions are. This is unhelpful in trying to develop an engaged and analytically rigorous debate that has tried to initiate a discussion about alternative forms of political engagement in Ethiopia. Decoloniality should aim to speak out against such attempts at the silencing and prioritising of research questions.

The new era is only beginning after the end of the war: the TPLF’s eclipse is ascertained now, while the Prosperity Party and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed are consolidating their power. We are not making a value judgement on the nature of the emerging new era, we are only stating its imminent birth. Much as the post-1991 period was applauded by some and denigrated by others, the post-CoHA period will see a similar fate in the years and decades to come. We will be willing participants in this critical debate.

Notes

1 

While in the Ethiopian tradition first names would be used here and in the journal references, the journal’s European system of listing by second name has been used for citations and references in this piece. The text therefore often refers to Mulugeta and co-authors, while their piece under discussion is listed under Gebrehiwot et al. 2023 in the reference list, as indicated in the citations.

2 

Two of our critics are clearly politically partisan and have skin in the game: Mulugeta (as a TPLF veteran and still an insider) and Mohammed Hassan (an Oromo Liberation Army [OLA] negotiator).

3 

Abbink gives the number of internally displaced persons and victims of massacres as if they are uncontested facts (see Abadir 2023) and ignores some confirmed atrocities that occurred in Tigray.

4 

Disclosure statement

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

References

1. M. I. Abadir 2023. “The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission: A Champion of Transitional Justice?” Harvard Human Rights Reflections, August 4. Harvard Law School Human Rights Program. https://hrp.law.harvard.edu/the-ethiopian-human-rights-commission-a-champion-of-transitional-justice/?s=03.
2. J. Abbink 2023. “Evaluating the Pretoria Agreement: The Limitations of Presentist Analysis of Conflicts in Ethiopia.” Review of African Political Economy 50 (176): 234–242.
3. AFP (Agence France-Presse). 2022. “Ethiopia’s Tigray Rebels Say Ready for AU-led Peace Talks.” Al Jazeera, September 11. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/11/ethiopias-tigray-rebels-say-ready-for-au-led-peace-talks.
4. N. C. Ani 2019. “Three Schools of Thought on ‘African Solutions to African Problems’.” Journal of Black Studies 50 (2): 135–155. doi: [Cross Ref].
5. A. Blinken 2023. “War Crimes, Crimes against Humanity, and Ethnic Cleansing in Ethiopia.” Press statement by Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, March 20. Washington, DC: US Department of State. https://www.state.gov/war-crimes-crimes-against-humanity-and-ethnic-cleansing-in-ethiopia/.
6. A. de Waal 2021. “Five Scenarios of State Collapse in Ethiopia.” World Peace Foundation, July 26. https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2021/07/26/five-scenarios-of-state-collapse-in-ethiopia/.
7. M. Gebrehiwot 2021. “Not Impartial, Not Principled, Non-Starter: African Union Mediation in Ethiopia.” World Peace Foundation, October 1. https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2021/10/01/not-impartial-not-principled-non-starter-african-union-mediation-in-ethiopia/.
8. M. Gebrehiwot 2022. Mulugeta Gebrehiwot on the Narrative of the War and the Future of Tigray.” Tghat, Opinion, April 4. https://www.tghat.com/2022/04/04/6376/.
9. M. Gebrehiwot, A. de Waal, M. Plaut, J. Nyssen, M. Hassen, and G. Gebreselassie. 2023. “A Response to ‘The Pretoria Agreement: Mere Cessation of Hostilities or Heralding a New Era in Ethiopia?” Blog, Roape.net, June 15. https://roape.net/2023/06/15/a-response-to-the-pretoria-agreement-mere-cessation-of-hostilities-or-heralding-a-new-era-in-ethiopia/.
10. F. Gebresenbet, and Y. Tariku. 2023a. “The Pretoria Agreement: Mere Cessation of Hostilities or Heralding a New Era in Ethiopia?” Review of African Political Economy 50 (175): 96–106.
11. F. Gebresenbet, and Y. Tariku. 2023b. “Neither a Response nor a Debate: Five Ways to Misread our Article on Ethiopia.” Blog, Roape.net, June 23. https://roape.net/2023/06/23/neither-a-response-nor-a-debate-five-ways-to-misread-our-article-on-ethiopia/.
12. Human Rights Watch. 2005. “Ethiopia: Crimes against Humanity in Gambella Region: Army Impunity and Official Inaction Fuel Abuses.” Report, March 23. https://www.hrw.org/news/2005/03/23/ethiopia-crimes-against-humanity-gambella-region.
13. Human Rights Watch. 2008. “Collective Punishment: War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity in the Ogaden Area of Ethiopia’s Somali Region. Report, June 12. https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/06/13/collective-punishment/war-crimes-and-crimes-against-humanity-ogaden-area.
14. Mukondeleli Mpeiwa. 2023. “The African Union’s Mediation Efforts in Ethiopia … .” LinkedIn. https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7014923000181317632/.
15. S. W. Omamo 2022. At the Center of the World in Ethiopia . Richardson-Omamo Books.
16. D. Yohannes, and F. Gebresenbet. 2021. “Exploring ‘African Solutions to African Problems’ as an Emergent APSA [African Peace and Security Architecture] Norm.” In Researching the Life of the African Peace and Security Architecture , edited by K. P. W. Döring, U. Engel, L. Gelot, and J. Herpolsheimer, 55–77. Leiden: Brill.

The post Debating the implications of the Pretoria Agreement for Ethiopia: countering attempts to silence alternative voices appeared first on Abren.

Ethiopia’s controversial constitution, with its system of ethnic federalism has been a boon for demagogues and conflict merchants seeking power using identity-based propaganda. Even outside powers with interest in Ethiopia have long figured out how to exploit Ethiopia’s ethnic divisions, exacerbated by this system of governance. For instance, the State Department regularly confers with diaspora groups and organizations carefully selected by their ethnic affiliation, while regularly shunning or avoiding multi-cultural and multi-ethnic Ethiopian national organizations. Historically the collective West has promoted destructive identity politics in Africa. Leveraging the growing African diaspora in the West for this purpose is thus a natural extension of this policy. Regional powers in the Middle East have used a similar approach. In a bid to slow the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Egypt has long supported ethnic based insurgencies in Ethiopia.

It was hoped Ethiopia’s constitution adopted in 1994, would bring equity to its many nations and nationalities, whose culture and language was suppressed by successive regimes seeking centralism for fear of losing power to ungovernable separate entities. Ethiopia had been a more centralized state for a century before. Proponents argued the new constitution would bring unity and stability to a nation beset with separatist liberation movements. In hindsight, after three decades, fundamental questions of nationhood, culture, language, identity, boundaries, and equity remain unanswered, and arguably worst off. In practice, federalism in Ethiopia has led to fragmentation, not equality or democratization.

Many had argued freeing up political and civil liberties too quickly would be unsustainable, given the country’s divisive identity politics, as well as its underdeveloped economy. In light of this argument, democracy was not compatible with Ethiopia’s socio-political circumstance. In retrospect this argument seems to have been vindicated by the insurrections that followed. The way to keep a lid on Ethiopia’s discordant ethnic political discourse, encouraged by the country’s constitution seems to have been by repression. But that only buys more time, without resolving the underlying issue. Sooner or later, Ethiopia will need structural political reform, one that can accommodate and nurture unity, democracy and civility.

This trend towards ethnic balkanization in Ethiopia enshrined in the constitution has become particularly stark ever since 2018, when Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s new administration introduced a relatively more open political discourse in this country of 120 million. Previously, Ethiopia had been a security state, whereby free speech and political organization was heavily curtailed, but the country enjoyed relative peace, stability and economic development. During this period, the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) espoused a “developmental statist” approach akin to East Asia, whereby fast economic growth was given priority, as human rights deteriorated.

In the early months of Abiy Ahmed’s administration Ethiopians aspired for a truly reformist new regime. At the time, it was hoped keeping the pressure valve slightly open, while making significant reforms to the system of governance could prove to be a successful strategy. Nonetheless, political reforms were delayed by conflict, particularly by the crisis in northern Ethiopia, and the war with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), an entity that had every intention of maintaining the existing status quo. A precipitous loss of grace for its leaders does not seem to have changed minds so far, but increasing numbers of people in Ethiopia are realizing the futility of a perpetually divided nation.

TPLF is not alone is trying to derail the reform agenda in Ethiopia. Support for maintaining the current constitution and governance can also be found among members of the ruling party, although it is difficult to determine the exact extent of this support. A generation of ethnic elites have emerged in Ethiopia. These heirs of the system have a tangible interest in forestalling change. Although small in number, they provide the inertia for keeping things as they are, thanks to their key positions within the establishment as either political cadres or business persons in regular collision with them. Ethiopia has been on a path dependency towards more fragmentation, one that is beset with strife and even wars. Only a determined and unashamedly reformist political leadership can reverse course on this trend.

Most people inherently understood the challenges. Despite the setbacks and delays, the public largely wanted to see the reformists succeed, and even voted overwhelmingly in favor of the ruling Prosperity Party on that base. The Pretoria Peace Agreement, which effectively ended the conflict in northern Ethiopia, as well as relative calm in other parts of the country offered renewed belief. Yet, notwithstanding what the New York Times called “a full military victory” by the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF), Addis Ababa was unable, or as some have argued unwilling to implement a key clause of the peace deal, namely the “full disarmament of the TPLF rebels in 30 days” after its signing.

A bid to avoid another war, outstanding financial and budgetary strains, and an attempt to carry favor with the United States, a key donor with leverage on international financial institutions has come at significant political costs for the GoE. All of this is made worst by a glaring public relations and communications failure. The ruling party has waned in popularity. The prime minister has eroded his mass base of support. Key allies in Amhara, Afar, and in the diaspora, who fought alongside the national army to repel the TPLF insurgency as recently as October 2022 feel betrayed, particularly by the GoE’s failure to fully disarm the TPLF in the allotted time period, as called for by the peace agreement.

However, after months of slow moving progress, the African Union monitoring team responsible for Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration(DDR) recently stated, “85 to 90 percent of heavy weapons used by the rebels has been handed over to their team”. The statement further noted, the next phase will encompass demobilization and re-integration of forces, whose exact size is not exactly known, given many had already deserted their post. Yet the AU’s Major General Ridan remained hopeful in the process.

Costly political blunders of the ruling party go beyond recent attempted disarmament in Amhara region. They include its mismanagement of the crisis in the Ethiopian Orthodox Church in February 2023. Parishioners were incensed by the government’s response not to immediately denounce the breakaway synod, which they correctly viewed as breaking with thousands of years of church cannon. Having sensed the political fallout, the Prime Minister quickly reversed course, and admonished the breakaway synod on television. This did not instill public confidence. On the contrary it was viewed as political expediency.

Nonetheless, its noteworthy, that amidst conflict, mishaps and unforced errors, the Abiy government has made some structural changes. This was particularly the case in its early days. These changes include reforming the loosely organized EPRDF coalition, to the more inclusive and united Prosperity Party, encompassing hitherto underrepresented regions such as Somali, Afar, Gumuz, and Gambella. This was a step towards a more united and less ethnically fragmented organization. In addition, law was passed for a new digitally integrated national ID system, whereby ethnicity or place of birth is not featured.

On the economy, GoE has started some key reforms. They include the rollback of outdated fuel subsidies that were a drain on reserve currency, and encouraged a black-market export of refined fuel to neighboring countries, where prices are higher. Banks which had previously been instructed to direct their lending towards state owned enterprises have since shifted gear towards the private sector. State-owned Commercial Bank of Ethiopia recently quadrupled its share of loans to the private sector. Digital of payments is also something that is being implemented quickly, as Ethiopia tries to catch up. Digital payments will make financial transparency easier, reduce friction, as well as help by broadening Ethiopia’s tax base.

An important step has been recent policy studies and discussions looking at systemic challenges. The House of People’s Representatives will soon review a research document by the Policy Studies Institute of Ethiopia that explores possible ways of amending the constitution. The question remains whether the GoE’s reformist camp can still muster the political capital needed to embark on an ambitious plan to make structural changes to a country at war with itself. In parallel with the National Dialogue, it could be the only offramp for a government that will likely struggle to win enough support in the coming remedial elections set for 2024. These elections will take place where the 2021 general election was not conducted due to conflict.

In light of the recent past, there is no question reformists have lost the political momentum they once had. A confluence of foreign pressure, political mishaps, and a lack of clear and consistent directional leadership, as well as a reactionary war has taken a toll on ambitious plans. Nonetheless, changes to the country’s basic political structure and the constitution is an idea that still garners significant public support, one that is likely to grow.

The post Can Ethiopia still make structural political reforms? appeared first on Abren.