This is an excerpt from the latest extended version of “Getting Ethiopia Dead Wrong” a book by veteran Horn of Africa correspondent Rasmus Sonderris

A quick Google search finds that “Meaza Mohammed is an Ethiopian journalist and human rights activist”. Countless newspaper articles depict her as an advocate for raped women. International organizations dedicated to press freedom portray her as persecuted for speaking truth to power. The website of the US State Department, no less, pays homage to her in this manner:

This honorable mention is because the State Department bestowed upon her the International Women of Courage Award on March 8, 2023, at a ceremony with First Lady Jill Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Following up on this event, a Voice of America video opens with the words: “Meaza Mohamed was arrested three times within the span of one year, all for doing her job.”

Meaza Mohammed is not only the founder, but also the chief editor and voiceover woman of Roha TV, one of the more successful of a plethora of ethnic-based Youtube channels produced by Ethiopians in the West. These can be watched freely in Ethiopia too (although until July 2023, a VPN was required). Most of the worldwide sympathy with Meaza Mohammed predates the Fano insurgency in the Amhara Region, which broke out in April 2023, but she was known in Ethiopia as an ethnonationalist firebrand before that. Certainly, Roha TV today is wholly dedicated to propagandizing for Fano, which is, as of 2024, just like the TPLF was until late 2022, an irregular army with the ambition of toppling the elected federal government. However, in this case, the first obstacle on its warpath is the local Amhara regional government, which also has a democratic mandate dating from 2021. We shall return to how Fano both resembles and differs from the two other major ethnonationalist militias in Ethiopia, the TPLF and OLA.

Roha TV serves up a fare of ethnicity-obsessed hate-, fear- and war-mongering. One claim is that the capital Addis Ababa, whose population is majority Amhara, is now in the hands of Oromo extremists who hate all things Amhara.

Roha TV is not all doom, however, as a triumphalist tone is important for recruitment. Just like the TPLF’s propagandists, Fano’s Meaza Mohammed plays a tune about human rights in English, but beats the drums of war in her own language. For instance, at the Amhara Grand Convention, held by the Confederation of Amharas in North America in Atlanta, USA, on March 9-10, 2024, she delivered a fiery speech in Amharic.^[4] Dressed in a T-shirt with three raised fists in the Ethiopian colors, she denounced the realists within the movement who seek a negotiated settlement: “We’re not talking about politics, in which we engage in compromise,”^[5] she thundered, and ended on this note: “We’re saying that if we don’t achieve victory, the outcome will be our destruction as a people. If this does not bother you, those of us who do care will struggle and we will win, and you better get out of our way!”^[6]

The last part is a thinly veiled threat to fellow Amharas who disagree with her. Many of them have been killed. Apart from attacks on federal soldiers and officers, basically anyone in constitutional authority in the Amhara Region, such as mayors, policemen, journalists for government media, and elected members of the regional parliament live with the risk of assassination. In some cases, bounties have been placed on their heads on social media.

In May 2024, I travelled to Bahir Dar, the beautiful capital of Amhara Region by the shores of Lake Tana. Despite a curfew in force after 8pm, life goes on. Amhara Region is suffering an insurgency, but not, as Tigray during the war with the TPLF, an all-encompassing insurgency regime. Banks and businesses continue to function. The mobile-phone network is up, but not for data. Those who can afford a coffee at a major hotel can get a wifi password for internet access. In general, the mood is depressed. People complain of disinvestment, economic sabotage, absence of tourists and rich people fleeing the city: “If they don’t pay Fano, Fano kills them, and if they do pay, the government arrests them,” the locals explained to me. In the parts of the countryside where Fano is in control, either schools have been closed or parents are afraid of sending their children.

There are no two ways about it. Meaza Mohammed campaigns and raises funds for Ethiopians killing Ethiopians, and particularly for Amharas killing Amharas. Of course, she and her backers genuinely believe that this is for a noble cause. To convince themselves and others that Fano’s killings are just, rather than extremist, they play up how the State Department as well as do-gooders around the world celebrate Meaza Mohammed as a champion of human rights. The international community’s failure to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate violence is depressingly déjà vu from the war with the TPLF.

“Getting Ethiopia Dead Wrong” is now available on Amazon Kindle, paperback, or hardcover

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Ethiopia, with a population of 130 million, has experienced remarkable economic expansion over the past two decades, positioning itself as one of the world’s fastest-growing economies. As a landlocked country, Ethiopia’s access to reliable and efficient ports is crucial for its trade, imports, and exports. Given this, port services in the Horn of Africa are highly coveted. Historically, Ethiopia relied heavily on Djibouti for access to the sea after losing the ports of Massawa and Assab in 1993, following the secession of Eritrea. Djibouti has since served as Ethiopia’s primary gateway to international trade, with the port of Djibouti handling the majority of Ethiopian cargo.

However, Ethiopia’s dependence on Djibouti has long been a point of strategic concern for Addis Ababa. In recent years, the Ethiopian government has sought to diversify its access to maritime routes to reduce its reliance on a single port. The government has explored several alternatives, including the newly developed port of Lamu in Kenya. However, the progress of infrastructure projects, including vital road and rail connections between Lamu and Ethiopia, has been slow. Political and security challenges have also hindered Ethiopia’s efforts to secure alternative routes through Sudan and Eritrea, limiting the impact of these ports.

As a result, Ethiopia has increasingly turned its attention to other regional ports, particularly in the semi-autonomous regions of Somaliland and Puntland. Both territories—Berbera in Somaliland and Bosaso in Puntland—have been seeking to attract foreign investment, but their status remains contentious. While Somaliland and Puntland both claim independence, the Somali government in Mogadishu regards them as part of its territory, complicating the legal and political landscape for international investors.

The rivalry intensified after Dubai-based DP World, a global port operator, became a key player in the region. After losing the concession to operate the Doraleh Container Terminal in Djibouti in 2018, DP World shifted its focus to the ports of Berbera and Bosaso. It has secured long-term contracts in both locations, promising to invest heavily in their development and significantly improve their infrastructure. This strategy puts DP World in direct competition with Djibouti, which has traditionally been Ethiopia’s main port partner.

In January of this year, Ethiopia and Somaliland reached an agreement allowing Ethiopia to develop port facilities on 20 kilometers of Somaliland’s coastline for a period of 50 years. This agreement gives Ethiopia a foothold in Berbera, positioning it as a key alternative to Djibouti for Ethiopian trade. The move is part of Ethiopia’s broader strategy to diversify its port access and reduce its vulnerability to political and economic changes in Djibouti.

However, Djibouti’s latest strategic move—offering Ethiopia the opportunity to operate the Tadjoura port—appears to be a direct attempt to undermine Ethiopia’s growing involvement in rival ports. Tadjoura, located on the opposite side of the Gulf of Tadjoura from Djibouti’s main port, was completed in 2017. Despite its potential, the port is still relatively small and lacks significant capacity compared to other regional ports. Built at a cost of $90 million, it has just two berths, a short Roll-on/Roll-off (RoRo) quay, and a depth of 12 meters, which limits its ability to handle larger vessels. Nonetheless, Djibouti’s offer to let Ethiopia operate Tadjoura represents an effort to create a new avenue for Ethiopian trade, while also attempting to solidify Djibouti’s role as Ethiopia’s primary port partner.

Djibouti’s decision to involve Ethiopia in the operation of Tadjoura is likely motivated by several factors. First, it may be an attempt to secure Ethiopia’s continued reliance on Djibouti for access to the sea, even as Ethiopia seeks alternatives. By offering Ethiopia the chance to develop Tadjoura, Djibouti may be trying to ensure that Ethiopia does not fully commit to the rival ports in Somaliland and Puntland. Second, it reflects the growing importance of port infrastructure in the region, where access to seaports is not just an economic matter, but also a strategic one.

While Tadjoura’s infrastructure may still be modest, its potential role in Ethiopia’s broader trade strategy should not be underestimated. With ongoing regional competition for access to Ethiopia’s booming economy, the outcome of this port rivalry will likely have far-reaching implications for the Horn of Africa’s geopolitical and economic landscape. As Ethiopia continues to explore alternative port options, including its growing involvement in Somaliland, Djibouti will need to carefully balance its offers with the broader regional competition to maintain its position as Ethiopia’s primary maritime gateway.

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Even in the event of peace, Ethiopia is not going to achieve a democratic political culture overnight. It may even get worse before it gets better. However, it is wrong and reckless to conclude that violence is now a last resort. During the darkest years of the TPLF/EPRDF, when armed resistance was in every way legitimate, I personally disagreed with that path, not out of pacifism, but from a strategic perspective. Because violence begets violence. Conversely, making the most of a small democratic space can expand democracy. There are plenty of political parties in Ethiopia that have taken this path. Some examples are the National Movement of Amhara (NaMA), Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice, EZEMA, the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), the Enat Party, and the Tigray Democratic Party (TDP). Some of them complain of all manners of harassment. In the name of national unity, others have joined the government and been awarded with places in the cabinet, but they too will be running against the ruling Prosperity Party in the next election in 2026.

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has often promised a peaceful transition of power, if he loses at the polls. It is admittedly hard to find Ethiopians who envisage that, if push comes to shove, he and the powerful people around him will just admit defeat and gracefully swap places with the opposition. But this needs to be tested rather than dismissed out of hand in a call to arms by actors whose democratic credentials are actually more dubious than the government’s.

Many have accused me of “shilling for the regime”, even of being a paid mouthpiece and what not. Of course, I would never take money from a party to a conflict that I am covering as an independent. Apart from giving interviews to Ethiopian state media, I have never even met anyone from the Ethiopian government, which has committed and will undoubtedly continue to commit acts that I disagree with, even condemn. Most international classifications use the term “hybrid regime” about the current system, that is, a mix of authoritarianism and democracy. This is probably fair.

But it is the legitimate government. It may sometimes commit illegitimate acts, but none of the armed alternatives today has a shred of legitimacy, let alone any prospect of making things better. Even if the government sometimes categorizes fair criticism as “incitement” and misuses the judiciary as in the bad old days, constructive opposition is the only way to go. Ethiopians demand solutions to everyday problems like long lines for public transport, bribe-demanding traffic police, power cuts, red tape, pollution, unaffordable healthcare, homelessness, low-quality schools, etc. Fundamentally, ethnic rivalry is not the root cause of war, but ethnic rivalry is an effective mobilizer for war. Unresolved bread-and-butter problems can make people vote for the opposition, but do not usually make them pick up a gun. If the most urgent issue of security gets under control, peaceful political competition should be able to focus on the second- most urgent issues, like growing the economy and fighting corruption. Conversely, if security continues to be the overriding concern, democracy, human rights and even good governance will look increasingly like unaffordable luxuries.

When I first got involved in opining on war in Ethiopia around November 2021, I set myself the goal of getting through it without regret. Notwithstanding some quick- tempered tweets,390 the only thing I would change, if I could go back, would be the headline of my speech for the Danish Society of Engineers in March 2022, in which I characterized Ethiopia as “a fellow democracy”. This was overselling a point in the heat of the propaganda battles. Building an Ethiopian democracy, let alone a democratic culture, remains a daunting project with no guarantee of completion. As we have seen, it backslides under pressure and polarization. Tensions lurk and can erupt into the next big war, in which the security state takes over and rolls back the reforms.

And yet, there is hope. The vast majority of Ethiopians both preach and practice multiethnic cooperation. Although ethnically-exclusive rebel outfits brandishing genocide hashtags still have too much manpower and firepower, their popularity seems to be in decline.

Meanwhile, outside of Ethiopia, despite the endurance of a narrative about a “Tigray genocide”, the Pretoria Peace Agreement has become unanimously endorsed. The TPLF has not been properly disarmed or stopped being a threat, but nearly everyone agrees that it should. The TPLF is unlikely to get much international support for another round of aggression under the cover of resisting a genocide. A retired Western diplomat told me that one lesson had been learned after all: “We should have listened less to the media and more to the African Union.” Indeed, and the African Union issticking firmly to the Pretoria Agreement.

However, there has been no reckoning over the tragic cost of achieving the Pretoria Agreement. Those who got Ethiopia dead wrong are not wondering aloud why the TPLF sent young Tigrayans to kill and die for peace terms that could have been easily obtained without firing a shot. Having learned so little, the world is perfectly capable of getting Ethiopia and other countries dead wrong yet again.

With this in mind, the final word goes to Dr. Steven Were Omamo, the results-oriented humanitarian sabotaged by self-serving, glory-seeking cowboy humanitarians during the war ‘At the Centre of the World in Ethiopia’:

“I also lament how the politics of major powers was allowed to infiltrate and corrupt a fragile but promising science-based process, destroying hard-earned credibility, along with the trust that went with that. Nobody has admitted that ‘the people are dying of hunger in Tigray’ narrative was total fabrication. There were no consequences. There are never any consequences as the ‘international community’ recycles itself from crisis to crisis. Incompetent and unethical people who lie, distort, and mess up can just walk away and do the same thing somewhere else. To me, that is annoying. For the world, it should be unacceptable.”

“Getting Ethiopia Dead Wrong” is now available on Amazon Kindle, paperback, or hardcover

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On November 3, around one thousand senior Ethiopian commanders stationed in Tigray went for a dinner party with regional government officials. The invitation, however, was a ruse to take them prisoner.

That same night, while the world was focused on vote-counting in the US presidential election, a total of five federal military bases in Tigray came under fire. Defenders were killed or captured, though those in the Sero Base, near the border with Eritrea, held out for a grueling ten days. Tigrayan soldiers turned on their comrades of other ethnicities, many of whom had lived in Tigray for decades, working alongside the local communities. Reports about soldiers killed in their pyjamas and arbitrary cruelty shocked the Ethiopian public.

Thankfully, Michael Pompeo, Secretary of State under the outgoing Trump administration, condemned it immediately.

Wisely, Secretary Pompeo left it open to interpretation how to “de-escalate tensions”, but surely “immediate action to restore the peace” meant arresting those responsible for such a ferocious assault on the constitutional order.

For the first year or so, the world press downplayed or omitted this manifest casus bellialtogether, even in longreads on the war, which focused obsessively on the prime minister’s personality and on how the Nobel Peace Prize had gone to his head.

The Economist, for instance, as late as October 2021, while TPLF troops were marching on Addis Ababa, published a shockingly defamatory and inflammatory leader, to which we shall return in Part 3, attributing the cause of the conflict to an “increasingly paranoid and erratic” Abiy Ahmed deciding to attack the regional government of Tigray, “which he accused of rebellion”. This shallow phrasing amounts to speculating that the attack on the Northern Command was made up.

In fact, only ten days into the war, the high-ranking TPLF leader, Sekoture Getachew, speaking on Tigrayan television, confirmed that an elaborate plan had been executed, using soldiers from inside and outside the bases, with the aim of taking over the firepower of the Ethiopian army. Some two weeks later, this was admitted by Getachew Reda, with the excuse that “whatever we did, we did in self-defense”. In January 2021, Kjetil Tronvoll mentioned it in an article, as did, in March 2021, the diehard pro-TPLF magazine Tghat, albeit portraying it as a preemptive strike justifiedby an enemy plan to commit genocide. Accordingly, the world press eventually began to incorporate this event into its timeline.

From the first day of the war, Declan Walsh and co-author Simon Marks, writing in The New York Times, put the war down to the notion that “Mr. Abiy presented a radically different face”, from his Nobel-Peace-Prize face that was. They studiously ignored the crucial dispute over the control of the army, except for stating that “Mr. Abiy said his hand had been forced by Tigrayan leaders who brazenly defied his authority”. Of course, there is no quotation mark around the prime minister saying: they brazenly defied my authority. But this is how The New York Times interprets his denunciation of the attack on the Northern Command, which it does not even bother to mention. What the New York Times would take for granted at home in the US, namely state monopoly on violence under democratic rule of law, is reduced for Ethiopia to the big man exercising “his authority”.

Eleven days into the war, Mr. Walsh and Mr. Marks did report “a purported Tigrayan attack on an Ethiopian army base in Tigray early this month”. This is when Kjetil Tronvoll is introduced in the New York Times as a “a scholar of Ethiopian politics”. Conversations with him might have colored Mr. Walsh’s views, as he continued to overlook not only the foregoing two and a half years of political developments as the source of the tension, but also the attack on the Northern Command as the point of no return. The New York Times explanation would continue to focus on the “messianic” prime minister, who had “plunged Ethiopia into a war”. Finally, by December 2021, Declan Walsh must have felt challenged, as the attack on the five federal bases had become acknowledged as fact and was getting more mention in the media. This accounts for the timing of the “new evidence” that the prime minister “had been planning a military campaign in the northern Tigray region for months before the war (…)”. Mr. Walsh was rationalizing his early choice of virtually ignoring the attack on the Northern Command.

That this is how the war began is no longer controversial. Yet even as of 2023, The Guardian’s official view frames it as a mere accusation: “Fighting broke out in November 2020 when Ethiopia’s prime minister Abiy Ahmed deployed the army to arrest Tigrayan leaders who had been challenging his authority for months and whom he accused of attacking federal military bases.”

Once again, legitimacy to rule Ethiopia is reduced to the big man exercising “his authority”. And “challenging his authority” is a hell of a euphemism for raiding national armories and usurping the command of the national army.

“Getting Ethiopia Dead Wrong” is now available on Amazon Kindle, paperback, or hardcover

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During the event, Governor Mamo addressed concerns from the Ethiopian diaspora regarding the floating exchange rate of the Birr and the significant regulatory changes underway. He noted real progress towards convergence between the parallel exchange rate and the newly established market-based bank exchange rate over the past two months, a natural result of the free exchange rate system.

Concerns about rampant inflation and a drastic depreciation of the Birr have diminished, with the governor asserting, “such a scenario was highly unlikely due to a monetary policy that’s periodically reviewed and adjusted according to market conditions.” He emphasized that measures have been taken to mitigate inflationary pressures and currency depreciation.

The shift to a free-floating currency has bolstered the export sector and increased remittances, with Dashen Bank reporting a staggering 300% year-over-year rise in dollar remittances in its third-quarter report. Despite the increased availability of foreign exchange in the banking sector however, bankers contend that importers have shied away, relying on their customary and informal means to access hard currency. “This could be a case of old habits die hard, but I believe it is more likely to be a problem of being misinformed about recent changes—we as banker certainly need to do more to clear up the confusion, said Abe Sano, CEO of state owned, Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, the country’s largest. 

Historically, many people in Ethiopia depended on traditional savings and loans schemes, mostly based on small knit circles of friends and family. Modern banking, although more than 120-year-old in the country, only started to make inroads just in the last few decades. For this reason, many remained unbanked up until very recently. This traditional way of thinking about money and credit is baked into the culture. This means relationships, be they familial or communal are still strong in business. These are not as easy to reform of to modernize. For this reason, a parallel market for foreign currency exchange will likely remain. But the price gap will converge as institutional trust grows. Combined with other incentives provided by licensed financial entities, the legal route for exchanging foreign currency should become more attractive. NBE Governor Mamo reiterated, “our ultimate goal is to instill trust in our banking institutions by building the right incentive mechanism for a healthy financial architecture, one that centers economic development and growth”. 

In a bid to enhance transparency and competitiveness, the NBE recently implemented a 2% cap on bank fees for foreign exchange transactions. However, questions linger about potential collusion among major banks in setting similar pricing for dollars and euros, as the price gap between buying and selling rates remains substantial. To further diversify the market, the NBE has licensed five new Independent Foreign Exchange Bureaus, including Dugda Fidelity Investment PLC and Global Independent Foreign Exchange Bureau.

While the Ethiopian banking sector shows signs of recovery, with restructured debt and improved capital adequacy, loan portfolios remain constrained, primarily serving a limited clientele. Governor Mamo pointed to the success of microfinance as a model for broader lending, suggesting that larger banks need to adopt similar strategies to reach a wider public. New fintech players, such as Ethio-Telecom’s TeleBirr, are poised to outpace traditional banks in attracting borrowers.

Ethiopia is also considering the entry of foreign retail banks into its previously closed market, a move that could disrupt the landscape for domestic banks that have historically faced little competition due to stringent regulations. “The layers of strict regulation meant there was little incentive to innovate for banks,” Governor Mamo noted. Dashen Bank’s CEO Asfaw Alemu said “Stringent regulation meant there was little you can do to fail as a bank in Ethiopia—you were always parented by the state”. Indeed, bank failure is very rare in Ethiopia, not because the banks are good, but rather because of moral hazard. The recent reforms aim to reduce bureaucratic obstacles and enhance the overall banking environment, though many local banks may struggle to compete against foreign entrants without adequate capitalization.

Legislation is on the horizon to encourage bank mergers, aiming to centralize capital and strengthen the sector in anticipation of increased competition. Pooling resources will be a matter of survival even for the biggest of the current institutions. As Ethiopia navigates these transformative changes, the future of its banks is poised for historic evolution, one that is long overdue. 

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According to Egyptian authorities, the partnership among Cairo, Mogadishu, and Asmara is officially aimed at combating terrorism and securing Red Sea shipping, which has been disrupted by Houthi (Ansarullah) attacks from Yemen. These attacks target ships in “solidarity with Palestinians” amid the ongoing conflict in Gaza, significantly impacting maritime traffic through the Bab El-Mandeb strait.

Beneath the surface, however, the emerging relationship may also involve potential Egyptian mediation to address the longstanding conflict between Eritrea and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Cairo will likely seek to provide support to dissenting factions of the TPLF via Eritrea to pressure the Ethiopian government, which has effectively completed the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)—a project Egypt views as a threat to its vital share of the Nile River’s water.

During the two-year war in the Tigray region, Egypt supplied logistics and weapons to the TPLF via secret flights, one of which was shot down in 2022. Ethiopia has consistently accused Egypt of undermining its stability by supporting anti-government factions for decades. Recently, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed stated that “thousands of rebel groups were given assignments to impede the construction of the GERD.” Whether Asmara will allow itself to be used as a conduit for Cairo remains to be seen.

The potential rapprochement between Eritrea’s long-time ruler, Isaias Afwerki, and the TPLF leadership, once deemed implausible, is contributing to divisions in Tigray and threatening the relative peace in the region as various factions vie for power.

Historically, Egypt has played a crucial role in Eritrea’s political landscape. As early as 1960, Egypt supported the Eritrean independence movement, which eventually led to the rise of the current Eritrean regime. This historical involvement has established a complex relationship, with Eritrea often functioning as a client state of Egypt, seeking to intervene in Ethiopian affairs. The recent visit by Egyptian intelligence chief Gen Kamal Abbas and Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty to Asmara underscores the rekindling of long-standing ties between the two nations.

Egypt’s collaboration with Eritrea is part of a broader strategy to counter Ethiopia’s growing influence in the Horn of Africa. By strengthening ties with Eritrea, Egypt aims to exert pressure on Addis Ababa and influence regional geopolitics. This move aligns with a series of engagements Egypt has pursued with other regional actors, including Djibouti, Sudan, and Somalia.

A recent military cooperation agreement between Egypt and Somalia further highlights this strategy. Under this deal, Egypt has airlifted arms, military hardware, and a limited number of military advisors to Somalia, which has heightened tensions with Ethiopia. The Ethiopian government has expressed strong objections, warning that these actions could destabilize the Horn of Africa, vowing to respond firmly. Arms supplies and other forms of assistance to the dysfunctional government of Somalia have consistently leaked to the Al Qaeda-linked Al Shabab terrorist group.

The historical context adds depth to the current dynamic. Eritrea’s independence from Ethiopia in 1993, following a prolonged civil war, has been marked by ongoing tension despite periods of peace. The 1998-2000 border war between Eritrea and Ethiopia left a legacy of mistrust that continues to influence their interactions today.

The initial brief period of positive relations following Eritrea’s independence in 1993 ultimately gave way to a shooting border war from 1998 to 2000. The 2018 rapprochement, which earned Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed a Nobel Peace Prize, was never formalized and lacked any legal basis. The honeymoon ended with the Pretoria Peace Agreement, which concluded what is now commonly referred to as the “Tigray War,” during which Eritrea backed the federal government of Ethiopia against an armed insurrection in the Tigray region.

Somalia’s ongoing dispute with Ethiopia over Somaliland further complicates the situation. Somalia has condemned Ethiopia’s recent agreement with Somaliland, which involves leasing its coastal territory for a Naval bases in exchange for potential recognition of Somaliland’s independence from Somalia, which views this agreement as a breach of its sovereignty and has threatened military action if Ethiopia and Somaliland proceed with their plans. On September 12, Ahmed Moalim Fiqi, the foreign minister of Somalia told Universal TV that ‘Somalia could choose to engage with armed rebels in Ethiopia if it wishes, noting that this option remains available.’

The heated rhetoric elicited a response from Nebiyu Tedla, Ethiopia’s deputy permanent representative to the African Union and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, who took issue with remarks from Somalia’s foreign minister. On X, he described it as “comical” to see al-Shabab affiliates masquerading as government officials, ineffective beyond the Banaadir region, engaging in empty nationalism fueled by narrow clan interests”.

Amid the ongoing cycle of horse trading and temporary alliances, the Horn of Africa continues to serve as battlefield for external powers. There is no clearer premonition of the potential disaster of proxy violence than the ongoing war in Sudan, which has displaced millions, alongside the persistent threat from militant groups like Al Shabab in Somalia. Egypt’s increasingly aggressive posture aims to contain Ethiopia and prevent it from establishing a naval presence near the strategic Bab El-Mandeb.

For its part, through the construction of the GERD, Addis Ababa has demonstrated resilience in achieving national objectives despite difficult circumstances. It remains troubling, however, that existing regional and international mechanisms for cooperation and dispute resolution have so far failed to address the growing rivalry between Egypt and Ethiopia.

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Ethiopians can observe that Egypt’s efforts in eastern Libya, Sudan, and especially Gaza have been ineffective despite an over-the-top posturing. Formal meetings further highlight that Egypt’s so-called “intervention” in Somalia was little more than grandstanding, because after all, no other nation is better suited to understand and navigate Somalia’s complex clan politics than Ethiopia, which has entrenched itself in the country for over twenty years. Already several powerful clans in regions, including Baykol, Hiraan, and Jubaland have denounced Mogadishu’s Hawiye clan for making a military pact with Egypt, thus increasing the chances for Somalia becoming a proxy battle ground.

Authorities in Mogadishu, grappling with territorial mismanagement, the Al-Shabaab insurgency, and regional pressures, might find some benefit in Egypt’s renewed engagement. However, people are aware that Egypt’s recent efforts in eastern Libya and Sudan indicate its primary aim is to apply pressure on Ethiopia vis-à-vis GERD, rather than genuinely expanding its influence to include Somalia. Furthermore, a hot war between Egypt and Ethiopia in Somalia is not in the cards, otherwise Egypt would need significantly more than just the ten thousand troops it plans to deploy, not to mention the logistical nightmare that presents.

Rather than deterring the MoU, the presence of Egyptian troops in the Horn of Africa seems to be accelerating Ethiopia’s increasingly revisionist stance vis-à-vis access to and from the sea. Djibouti’s recent willingness to provide Ethiopia with an expanded alternative trade outlet to the sea has had no bearing on Addis Ababa’s decision to take advantage of the opportunity for escalation. It just graduated thousands of Somaliland soldiers, appointed an ambassador to Hargeisa, while deploying more forces on the border with Somalia, and warning Mogadishu against seeking support from external powers. But it has also said through its foreign minister that the door for negotiations is always open. 

Somalia, despite its ongoing internal strife and geographical significance, remains distant from Egypt’s core interests compared to Ethiopia’s pressing regional ambitions. Ethiopia’s strategic move to secure access to the Gulf of Aden through Somaliland has notably increased its regional clout. This development, alongside its successful dam project, amplifies Ethiopia’s negotiating strength, especially in relation to Egypt’s attempts to exert regional influence.

Despite its own internal conflicts, Ethiopia’s enhanced diplomatic and military positioning allows it to challenge Egypt’s regional maneuvers more effectively now than at any time in recent history. While Egypt’s actions in Somalia might seem impressive on the surface, they are overshadowed by Ethiopia’s growing assertiveness and strategic advantages, including its control over the Nile’s flow and its military presence in Somalia. As such, Ethiopia is adeptly using the situation to strengthen its position by counterbalance Egypt’s efforts. Nevertheless, Egypt will continue to leverage Ethiopia’s internal rifts as well as hostile neighbors to exert more pressure on Addis Ababa.

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Before I explain this, a caveat is in place. Fano is a movement rather than an organization. Notwithstanding repeated and ongoing attempts to unify the various Fano factions, there is still no Fano central command, let alone an official Fano platform. Incidentally, this is why it is harder to negotiate with Fano than with the TPLF, as the most extremist Fano groups, who tend to become empowered under a state of war, will disavow concessions made by compromise-minded ones. It also makes it harder to pin down the Fano philosophy, so this is but a rough generalization based on reading and listening to pro-Fano individuals.

Their claim that Amharas have been persecuted ever since the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 is an exaggeration. But there is a kernel of truth in that the scapegoating of Amharas has been the staple of various ethnonationalist discourses for decades in Ethiopia. This has even seeped into the world press. For instance, a recent BBC article describes the Amharas as “historic rulers of Ethiopia”. The characterization of Amharas as oppressors is inaccurate and incendiary. However, as already mentioned, it is fair to say that Amharas generally identify with and are identified with Ethiopia. Fano used to be the term for the patriotic guerrilla soldiers who resisted the fascist Italian occupation from 1935 to 1941 (which is why the militia’s adversaries today will often call it something else). Stressing how the Ethiopian and the Amhara identity are interwoven, Fano uses the basic version of the Ethiopian flag, just green, yellow and red, that is, without the blue disk with the golden pentagram, which was put there by the EPRDF in 1996. While secession is the lodestar of the OLA and a fallback option for the TPLF, only coming to power on the national stage makes any sense for Fano. If anything, people in the Fano camp wish to abolish the Amhara Region, which is a brainchild of the hated ethnic federalism.

Another Fano talking point is that the federal government, elected though it is, has lost its legitimacy through acts of oppression, such as arrests of opposition leaders, journalists etc. The government likes to refute this by comparing to the darkest years of the TPLF/EPRDF. But it is hard to deny that the liberalization and democratization agenda has backslid to give way to the security state. We saw how the soft touch of Abiymania in 2018-2020 enabled violent ethnonationalism to bubble up across the country. The response to all this bloodshed has been a hardening of minds and policies. The Ethiopian judiciary has no history of being independent. Still today, it is safe to assume that both the jailing and the freeing of politicians, and probably of journalists too, takes place on orders from the executive. Thus, without examining the details, I will not vouch for the fairness of detentions and trials of politicians and journalists. Some of them may well be innocent by normal democratic legal standards. However, whenever I have cast a glance at their cases, there is direct or indirect advocacy for violence. Learning from the TPLF’s propagandists, Fano supporters will portray the motive of the government and judiciary as ethnic-based persecution. In reality, not necessarily the justification, but the root cause, is the fact that people are getting killed, which is making everyone involved, bar the diaspora activists, live in fear. It is simply unrealistic to have the same rules apply in peace and in war.

Another justification held up by the Fano camp is all manners of cruelty against Amharas en masse. Exhibit A for this accusation is, as mentioned in Part 3, the massacres in Wollega in western Oromia, which have cost the lives of thousands of unarmed Amharas, with whole families being slaughtered. A particularly nasty episode took place in August 2022, just as the war with the TPLF entered its final phase. These and similar crimes against Amharas in Oromia, including mass kidnappings of Amhara university students, have caused public outrage. The federal government has been rightly criticized for not providing security, and the prime minister for failing to strike the right empathetic note. But the perpetrators have been Oromo extremists, not least the TPLF’s old ally, the OLA, which remains, as of mid-2024, at war with the federal government.

And quite a dirty war at that, it seems. According to a Reuters investigation from February 2024, when Abiy Ahmed rose to power in 2018, senior government officials in Oromia set up a secretive Korree Nageenyaa (Security Committee in the Oromo language), aimed at crushing the OLA with extrajudicial killings. Fano supporters have used this to paint a picture of a government that operates with callous disregard for due process. This is a fair point, but it shatters a core tenet of Fano’s case for war, namely that the leading Oromos in the governing Prosperity Party are on the same side as the OLA. If this does not hold true, it is in fact the Fano insurgents who are helping the OLA by keeping the federal army overstretched on two fronts.

Were it not for the federal army, the OLA and Fano would probably conquer their own regions, and then clash in a cataclysmic showdown. Thus far, there have only been occasional skirmishes between the two, but their hatred of one another helps fuel both regional wars. You never know in Ethiopian politics, but formal collaboration between the OLA and Fano is an absurd suggestion. And yet, they are both fighting the federal government. They are enemies in theory, but they are allies in practice.

As for the accusations of civilians being killed by federal troops in Amhara Region, trust in the reports of international human-rights organizations ought to be rock bottom after their partisanship during the war with the TPLF. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the war in Amhara, like the one in Oromia, can be dirty. Extrajudicial revenge killings of mere suspects and other counterinsurgency measures outside the law must be condemned.

Again, this is no different from the war with the TPLF. There are the closeups of individual war crimes on both sides that call for justice. And there is the zoom-out of a political scenario that calls for respecting state monopoly on violence. The minimum requirements for taking up arms is that the established government is illegitimate, that the rebellion has broad popular support, that a sound context analysis is in place, and that a better alternative is within realistic reach. The Fano insurgency meets none of these conditions. In particular, those who paint Fano as fighting under the banner of democracy and human rights should notice how assiduously Fano politicians are courting the dictator of Eritrea, Isaias Afeworki, seeking his sponsorship, albeit apparently with limited success.

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The gradual withdrawal of ATMIS troops, which has been underway for nearly a year, has raised fears that an uncoordinated exit could lead to a dangerous power vacuum. This, in turn, could allow Al-Shabaab to establish an ISIS-like caliphate in Somalia, exacerbating instability in an already volatile Horn of Africa region. Moreover, Al-Shabaab’s affiliations with Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and increasingly the Houthis of Yemen present a broader threat to regional security, especially impacting maritime routes in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

In response, the African Union (AU) has proposed a new peacekeeping initiative, the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), scheduled to replace ATMIS in January 2025. This new mission was proposed after extensive consultations involving the AU, UN, EU, and other stakeholders, including Turkey and the UAE. The AU dispatched a team of experts to Somalia to assess the security situation and help formulate AUSSOM’s mandate, which will focus on protecting strategic population centers, UN facilities, and key government installations.

ATMIS troops are slated to withdraw entirely by December 2024. The AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) is currently reviewing the successes and failures of previous missions to inform AUSSOM’s planning. Egypt and Djibouti have already pledged to contribute troops, and additional support from other AU member states is expected. However, Ethiopia’s participation remains uncertain due to recent diplomatic tensions with Somalia, which has requested Addis Ababa to withdraw its MoU with Somaliland, a region that has governed itself independently since 1991, and now seeks recognition for its vaunted independence, something Ethiopia is keen to do. 

It’s not exactly clear how AUSSOM would be effective without Ethiopia’s participation, which not only shares the longest border with Somalia, but also has contributed a bulk of the fighting capability in previous AU-led peace keeping missions. It also deploys an additional 15,000 troops bilaterally to secure some of the most difficult sectors of Somalia and has done so since 2007. 

Following its recent fallout with Addis Ababa, Mogadishu has threatened to expel Ethiopian troops and invite Egyptian forces to replace them. This or course could further complicate regional dynamics and impact Ethiopia’s strategic security interests. In reaction, Ethiopia may accelerate MoU with Somaliland. Having spent decades engraining itself in Somalia and with the ongoing threat of terrorism, Addis Ababa will be unlikely to withdraw its army completely either. These may include parts of Bakool, Gedo, and Baidoa where reportedly Ethiopian forces retain good will among the public.

The failures of AMISOM and ATMIS highlight deep-rooted issues that may undermine the new mission’s effectiveness. Central to this uncertainty is Somalia’s enduring governance crisis. For over three decades, Somalia has struggled to establish a stable and effective government, and expectations that a new mission will resolve these long-entrenched issues are overly optimistic. Somalia risks further balkanization and even occupation with the arrival of more and more foreign forces, all of whom have diverging interests, and are determined to take advantage of a weak state for their own benefit. 

Previous peacekeeping missions faced numerous challenges, including inadequate resources, political infighting, and corruption within institutions, but now there appears to be international exhaustion at Somalia’s endless internal clan wars. In addition, other more pressing regional and global conflicts are carting away more resources from the international community.

The financial sustainability of AUSSOM also poses a concern. Previous missions were heavily reliant on external funding, and recent global financial strains and other priority global security challenges have made obtaining such support more challenging. While a new UN resolution aims to alleviate this burden by redistributing funding responsibilities between the UN and the AU, the effectiveness of this approach remains uncertain.

The AU’s new mission, AUSSOM is yet another effort to address Somalia’s deteriorating security needs, but three decades of governance failures, and persistent instability in the country present formidable challenges. The potential for AUSSOM to succeed where AMISOM and ATMIS fell short is highly questionable.

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The new airport will be situated near Bishoftu, approximately 45 kilometers southeast of Addis Ababa, the nation’s capital. Once operational, it is expected to have four runways and accommodate up to 100 million passengers annually and feature parking facilities for 270 aircraft, according to Tasew. The new hub of EAL will be connected to Addis Ababa via train. In addition, the already existing Addis-Adama toll road will be linked to airport terminal.

The design work for the airport will be undertaken by Sidara, a Dubai-based engineering and consulting firm. Tariq Al Qanni, the firm’s Director of Operations, confirmed their involvement in the project.

The initiative to build this massive infrastructure was first unveiled in 2018. Mesfin highlighted that the current primary airport, Bole Addis Ababa International Airport, which serves as the main hub for Ethiopian Airlines, is nearing its limit with a passenger capacity of 25 million per year. It is expected to continue operating after the construction of the Bishoftu hub is completed, to accommodate the continents increasing demand for air travel in the decades ahead.

“This new airport project is a major endeavor expected to be completed within five years. It will be the largest airport in Africa,” Mesfin remarked. He elaborated that the initial phase of construction alone will require an investment of at least $6 billion, with funding to be sourced through loans. Several companies have already expressed interest in participating in the project.

In the financial year 2023/2024, Ethiopian Airlines transported 17 million passengers and anticipates an increase to 20 million passengers in the current fiscal year that began in July. The Airline plans to double its current capacity by 2034 with the purchase of 104 new aircraft from Boeing.

In May Boeing agreed to set up its new Africa head quarters in Addis Ababa.

Moreover, in a bid to make its fleet energy consumption more sustainable, the airline recently entered an MoU with Satarem Ameerica Inc. The move aims to produce sustainable aviation fuel from sugar cane ethanol locally. This partnership aims to reduce carbon emissions and support global climate efforts by integrating SAF into Ethiopian Airlines’ operations.

Recent developments taking place at Ethiopian Airlines is the biggest shakeup in the company’s history. It sets the stage for growth in the 21^st century, in which Africa will become a major market for aviation.

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Located in the Oromia region, the Asela Wind Power project is set to add 100 MW to Ethiopia’s energy grid. Yidnekachew reported that each wind tower’s foundation requires between 7 and 12 days to complete. The project is scheduled to begin generating electricity by December 2024, with remaining construction tasks expected to be finalized within this timeframe.

Funded by a €145 million investment from Ethiopian Electric Power, the project benefits from substantial financial support through a Danish government subsidy and loan. This partnership exemplifies Denmark’s commitment to advancing global renewable energy initiatives while leveraging its expertise in wind technology. The Danish contribution brings cutting-edge technology and best practices to Ethiopia, ensuring both the efficiency of the windfarm and the transfer of valuable technical knowledge.

The Asela Windfarm will play a pivotal role in enhancing Ethiopia’s green energy capacity, helping the country reduce its reliance on fossil fuels and decrease its environmental footprint. This expansion is crucial for strengthening Ethiopia’s energy infrastructure, providing a more reliable and sustainable power supply that supports industrial growth and improves the quality of life for its citizens.

The project also promises significant economic benefits, including job creation and local economic development. The construction and operation of the windfarm will generate numerous employment opportunities, ranging from construction roles to technical positions in wind turbine maintenance, thereby building a skilled workforce in the renewable energy sector.

Moreover, the successful collaboration between Denmark and Ethiopia fosters increased trade relations and sets a positive precedent for future international partnerships in green energy. By advancing global climate goals and showcasing the benefits of international cooperation, the Asela Windfarm project highlights how shared expertise and resources can drive progress in sustainable development.

Upon its completion, the Asela Windfarm will boost Ethiopia’s total wind power generation capacity to 544 MW, contributing to the country’s efforts in combating climate change and promoting sustainable development. This project stands as a testament to the powerful impact of international collaboration in achieving green energy goals and fostering economic growth.

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Ethiopia has tremendous capacity in SAF production from Ethanol due to its large-scale sugar cane plantations, with over 4 million hectors of land under cultivation. In addition, the recently reorganized state-owned Ethiopian Sugar Industry Group(ESIG) owns a total of eight sugar mills that ran into financial problems from 2013 to 2018. ESIG was one of the most leveraged state-owned enterprises (SoE) in the country. The state has since restructured a large chunk of this debt overhang and is now soliciting bids for private investors. 

Ethiopian Investment Holdings, an entity that manages the country’s sovereign assets, has sought to invite foreign direct investment that fosters value addition in the country’s sugar sector. Satarem America seeks to leverage Ethiopia’s latent capacity in ethanol production and conversion to jet fuel. Crucially, the company will gain a guaranteed large customer in Ethiopian Airlines, which is eager to convert a portion of its fuel to the more sustainable SAF. Authorities in Ethiopia view this as a win-win market approach, one that also helps to reduce imported Jet fuel. 

Despite the promising MoU however, the Satarem’s capacity and strength are not easily discernible from public resources. Satarem lacks broad public coverage and detailed business information. As a niche market player, it may have limited visibility and confidentiality around its operations, financial health, and strategic plans. For a more accurate assessment of Satarem America’s capabilities, proper due diligence and direct engagement with the company or insights from industry experts would be necessary.

Mesfin Tasew, CEO of Ethiopian Airlines Group, expressed enthusiasm about the partnership with Satarem America Inc. He stated, “We are thrilled to collaborate with Satarem America Inc as we advance towards a greener and more sustainable future. Adopting Sustainable Aviation Fuel is more than just a business choice; it demonstrates our dedication to fighting climate change and investing in innovative solutions that foster a more sustainable aviation industry.”

This MoU comes on the heels of Ethiopia’s recently announced macroeconomic reforms, which promises to ease foreign exchange, rid long established economic distortions, and attract quality investment into the country.

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