Urban transformation in major cities is often seen as a response to growing populations, environmental challenges, and economic pressures. In cities like New York, London, and Tokyo, modernization has been crucial in addressing these very issues. Whether through comprehensive urban renewal projects or the reimagining of entire neighborhoods, the message is clear: cities must evolve to meet the demands of a new era.

Addis Ababa is following in these footsteps with its Second Phase Corridor Development, a bold initiative that is reshaping the city’s landscape while improving the quality of life for its residents. This project, which builds on the success of the first phase, extends its focus to eight key areas, demonstrating a comprehensive approach to urban growth. It’s not just about paving roads or erecting new buildings, this development is about fostering a sense of pride, security, and opportunity for millions.

The changes underway in Addis Ababa reflect a growing understanding that the well-being of residents is intimately tied to the health of the urban environment. Through the expansion of public spaces, the creation of recreational areas, the installation of sustainable infrastructure, and the revitalization of riverbanks, the project is transforming the city into a place where families can thrive. As seen in other global cities, when public spaces are thoughtfully designed, communities flourish this is the essence of what’s happening in Addis Ababa.

The transformation in Addis Ababa also mirrors efforts in cities such as Seoul, South Korea, which undertook major redevelopment of its urban spaces to combat pollution and congestion. Seoul’s Cheonggyecheon Stream Restoration Project, for example, revitalized a long-neglected waterway, turning it into a beautiful urban park that attracts tourists and improves the quality of life for locals. Addis Ababa’s initiatives are similarly focused on revitalizing polluted rivers and replacing informal settlements with sustainable, modern neighborhoods, thus improving public health and safety.

It’s not just the infrastructure that makes Addis Ababa’s transformation significant it’s the people. This development prioritizes inclusivity, ensuring that no one is left behind, regardless of their socioeconomic background. The focus on providing affordable housing, green spaces, and essential amenities is a commitment to improving the lives of all residents, from the wealthiest to the most vulnerable. This is a key lesson for other African cities, where rapid urbanization is also expected.  By placing people at the center of development, Addis Ababa is setting a precedent for how urban growth should be handled.

The creation of job opportunities, through projects like the new warehouse for job creation, provides tangible benefits to the city’s residents. This commitment to economic empowerment is essential, as African cities continue to grapple with youth unemployment. The integration of economic development and urban renewal will create new industries, foster entrepreneurship, and boost job creation, offering a path for African cities to become economic powerhouses.

But this is more than just about the present but also about the future. By investing in green spaces, improved sanitation, flood protection, and modern infrastructure, Addis Ababa is making itself a resilient city capable of adapting to the challenges of the coming decades. The lessons from cities around the world, whether it’s the green infrastructure of Copenhagen or the smart city strategies of Dubai, are evident in the Second Phase Corridor Development. It’s a model for sustainable urban development that addresses environmental, social, and economic concerns simultaneously.

 As African cities continue to grow, the importance of embracing change cannot be overstated. Addis Ababa’s bold steps are a reminder that urban transformation isn’t just possible, it’s necessary. The city’s development offers a blueprint that other African cities can adapt to their unique needs, one that balances progress with inclusivity, sustainability with innovation, and growth with resilience.

Just as cities around the world have embraced change, so too can African cities. Addis Ababa’s Second Phase Corridor Development isn’t just an opportunity to witness transformation, it’s an invitation to join a global movement of cities that are embracing their potential and reimagining their futures. Addis Ababa is embracing this transformation, turning communities into vibrant spaces that offer opportunities, sustainability, and prosperity for all.

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For context, Somalia’s initial alignment with Egypt—an archrival of Ethiopia—came as a response to Ethiopia’s Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland, a de-facto independent region that Somalia considers part of its sovereign territory. Egypt, ever wary of Ethiopia’s growing influence sought to draw Eritrea into a broader coalition aimed at containing Ethiopia’s maritime and Nile River ambitions.

While initially appearing to strengthen Somalia’s position vis-à-vis Ethiopia, the axis with Egypt and Eritrea risked alienating Turkey, in addition to Ethiopia. Turkey, economically the most important partner to Somalia, has poured the most financial and developmental resources into the Horn of Africa nation. Ethiopia for its part is the most crucial in helping Somalia combat the threat of Al Shabab. Losing both strategic partners to placate Cairo and Asmara would be a massive miscalculation, and one that the government of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) would be wise to avoid.

Moreover, the European Union and the United States, which play a significant role in funding the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), may oppose the idea of a peacekeeping force composed of both Ethiopia and Egypt—two nations with starkly conflicting geopolitical interests, particularly in light of their longstanding dispute over Nile water resource sharing. The inclusion of both may worsen Somalia’s internal conflicts, especially if each side takes onto backing a certain faction.

Indeed, the Ankara Declaration is a direct response to these competing pressures. By opting for a pragmatic partnership with Turkey and Ethiopia, Somalia ensures that it maintains critical diplomatic and security relationships. In return it recognized Ethiopia’s legitimate quest for reliable and unmediated access the sea. Considering the sea-access question by Addis Ababa, President Erdogan of Turkey stated, “the world is big enough for all of us”. 

This is not to say that Cairo and Asmara are irrelevant to Somalia’s calculations; however, their role in Somalia’s future is limited, and their strategic importance pales in comparison to that of Ethiopia and Turkey.

The Ankara Declaration has not been well-received by Cairo and Asmara. Both are reportedly looking for ways to undermine the agreement, likely out of frustration with Somalia’s shift away from their sphere of influence. Yet, despite their best efforts, Somalia’s government seems unlikely to renege on a deal that was facilitated by its most important international partner, Turkey. Western powers, too, have expressed overwhelming support for the agreement, underscoring its significance on the global stage.

More importantly, Somalia cannot afford to alienate Ethiopia, with which it shares a vast and porous border. For years, Ethiopian troops have been instrumental in combatting Al Shabab, a threat that continues to destabilize Somalia and the wider region. Without Ethiopia’s cooperation, Somalia’s security would be severely compromised, and peace and stability would remain elusive. While Egypt has sought to influence the Horn of Africa, its policies are often distant and disconnected from the practical realities on the ground in Somalia. If it were to send troops to Somalia, it will likely be at odds with Ethiopia’s mission, which would serve to deteriorate the security situation in Somalia. This of course would be a huge loss for Turkey, which needs peaceful coexistence to secure its many investments made in Somalia, which includes a significant share of Somalia’s maritime resources to include fisheries, as well as long range rocket test sites on the expansive Indian Ocean

The government of HSM likely understands that leveraging Egypt and Eritrea as a short-term tactic to put pressure on Ethiopia is just that—a temporary maneuver. Such a strategy might yield some tactical victories, but it cannot be sustained in the long run without endangering Somalia’s broader national interests. The Ankara Declaration, by contrast, offers a durable framework for collaboration with both Ethiopia and Turkey, two key players in Somalia’s future.

Therefore, The Ankara Declaration represents a wise recalibration of Somalia’s foreign policy. While it may have been tempting for Somalia to align itself with Egypt and Eritrea to counter Ethiopia, such a strategy would have come at the cost of essential partnerships with Turkey and Ethiopia. By embracing a more pragmatic approach, Somalia secures its position, as one that values strategic relationships over transient rivalries. For Mogadishu, the path forward is clear: collaboration, not confrontation, is the key to securing peace and stability.

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Hundreds of thousands of people in dozens of cities and towns across Ethiopia’s Amhara region have taken to the streets in a powerful demand for peace. Amid a year of violent conflict between the government and the Fano rebels, demonstrators are calling for an immediate end to the armed conflict, the restoration of safety and security, and the return of normalcy to their daily lives. Demonstrators defied threats by Fano not to come out onto the streets.

The Fano, a group of rebels seeking the violent overthrow of the Ethiopian government in Addis Ababa, has increasingly resorted to brutal tactics in recent months. Their violent campaign has resulted in widespread fear and suffering, including kidnappings, extrajudicial executions, closure of school, and the disruption of entire communities. Despite these grave threats, demonstrators have bravely marched across the Amhara region, demanding an end to the violence that has torn apart families and devastated lives.

Many of the protesters, mostly ordinary citizens who have endured the suffering of conflict for far too long, carried signs with bold messages, calling on armed combatants to lay down their weapons and allow safe passage for students and civilians. The blockades, often set up by Fano fighters to hinder military movement and disrupt daily life, have paralyzed entire regions. For many, the protests represent more than just an end to fighting—it is a call for the restoration of basic human rights and a return to peace.

In recent months, the rebels have executed and kidnapped hundreds. These shocking acts of violence have left scars on the community, leading to a deep sense of grief and outrage. By marching through the streets, these demonstrators are not only mourning the lives lost but are also making it clear that they will no longer stand in silence.

The significance of these protests cannot be overstated. For months, there had been an overwhelming fear of speaking out against the Fano, as the group’s violent retribution against anyone perceived as opposing them was swift and deadly. The fear of retaliation kept many quiet, with citizens forced into a state of constant anxiety and distrust. However, the bravery of these demonstrators marks a new chapter for the region. 

2024 has been a year of intense armed conflict, as Ethiopia’s security forces have engaged in direct combat with the Fano, using drones and airstrikes to target rebel positions. Tragically, these operations have also resulted in civilian casualties, further compounding the region’s suffering. Amid this military escalation, there have even been signs of infighting within the Fano itself, with factions of the group reportedly turning on each other. This fragmentation has made the rebels even more dangerous and unpredictable, further escalating the crisis in the region.

Yet, despite the growing violence, the message from these protests is clear: the people of Amhara are no longer willing to tolerate the endless bloodshed and fear. The unity displayed by protesters across cities is a significant shift in the region’s political and social landscape. For many, this is the first time in months that they have dared to speak out in such a public and unified manner, showing that, even in the face of violence and intimidation, hope for peace can still survive.

This movement, while still unfolding, represents a pivotal moment in the struggle for peace in Ethiopia’s Amhara region. It is a stark reminder that, even in the darkest times, the collective will of the people can inspire change. As these demonstrations continue to grow, there is a renewed sense of hope that the region’s ongoing conflict will come to an end—not through more violence, but through the strength and resilience of its people, standing together in the name of peace.

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This is an excerpt from the latest extended version of “Getting Ethiopia Dead Wrong” a book by veteran Horn of Africa correspondent Rasmus Sonderris

A quick Google search finds that “Meaza Mohammed is an Ethiopian journalist and human rights activist”. Countless newspaper articles depict her as an advocate for raped women. International organizations dedicated to press freedom portray her as persecuted for speaking truth to power. The website of the US State Department, no less, pays homage to her in this manner:

This honorable mention is because the State Department bestowed upon her the International Women of Courage Award on March 8, 2023, at a ceremony with First Lady Jill Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Following up on this event, a Voice of America video opens with the words: “Meaza Mohamed was arrested three times within the span of one year, all for doing her job.”

Meaza Mohammed is not only the founder, but also the chief editor and voiceover woman of Roha TV, one of the more successful of a plethora of ethnic-based Youtube channels produced by Ethiopians in the West. These can be watched freely in Ethiopia too (although until July 2023, a VPN was required). Most of the worldwide sympathy with Meaza Mohammed predates the Fano insurgency in the Amhara Region, which broke out in April 2023, but she was known in Ethiopia as an ethnonationalist firebrand before that. Certainly, Roha TV today is wholly dedicated to propagandizing for Fano, which is, as of 2024, just like the TPLF was until late 2022, an irregular army with the ambition of toppling the elected federal government. However, in this case, the first obstacle on its warpath is the local Amhara regional government, which also has a democratic mandate dating from 2021. We shall return to how Fano both resembles and differs from the two other major ethnonationalist militias in Ethiopia, the TPLF and OLA.

Roha TV serves up a fare of ethnicity-obsessed hate-, fear- and war-mongering. One claim is that the capital Addis Ababa, whose population is majority Amhara, is now in the hands of Oromo extremists who hate all things Amhara.

Roha TV is not all doom, however, as a triumphalist tone is important for recruitment. Just like the TPLF’s propagandists, Fano’s Meaza Mohammed plays a tune about human rights in English, but beats the drums of war in her own language. For instance, at the Amhara Grand Convention, held by the Confederation of Amharas in North America in Atlanta, USA, on March 9-10, 2024, she delivered a fiery speech in Amharic.^[4] Dressed in a T-shirt with three raised fists in the Ethiopian colors, she denounced the realists within the movement who seek a negotiated settlement: “We’re not talking about politics, in which we engage in compromise,”^[5] she thundered, and ended on this note: “We’re saying that if we don’t achieve victory, the outcome will be our destruction as a people. If this does not bother you, those of us who do care will struggle and we will win, and you better get out of our way!”^[6]

The last part is a thinly veiled threat to fellow Amharas who disagree with her. Many of them have been killed. Apart from attacks on federal soldiers and officers, basically anyone in constitutional authority in the Amhara Region, such as mayors, policemen, journalists for government media, and elected members of the regional parliament live with the risk of assassination. In some cases, bounties have been placed on their heads on social media.

In May 2024, I travelled to Bahir Dar, the beautiful capital of Amhara Region by the shores of Lake Tana. Despite a curfew in force after 8pm, life goes on. Amhara Region is suffering an insurgency, but not, as Tigray during the war with the TPLF, an all-encompassing insurgency regime. Banks and businesses continue to function. The mobile-phone network is up, but not for data. Those who can afford a coffee at a major hotel can get a wifi password for internet access. In general, the mood is depressed. People complain of disinvestment, economic sabotage, absence of tourists and rich people fleeing the city: “If they don’t pay Fano, Fano kills them, and if they do pay, the government arrests them,” the locals explained to me. In the parts of the countryside where Fano is in control, either schools have been closed or parents are afraid of sending their children.

There are no two ways about it. Meaza Mohammed campaigns and raises funds for Ethiopians killing Ethiopians, and particularly for Amharas killing Amharas. Of course, she and her backers genuinely believe that this is for a noble cause. To convince themselves and others that Fano’s killings are just, rather than extremist, they play up how the State Department as well as do-gooders around the world celebrate Meaza Mohammed as a champion of human rights. The international community’s failure to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate violence is depressingly déjà vu from the war with the TPLF.

“Getting Ethiopia Dead Wrong” is now available on Amazon Kindle, paperback, or hardcover

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Ethiopia, with a population of 130 million, has experienced remarkable economic expansion over the past two decades, positioning itself as one of the world’s fastest-growing economies. As a landlocked country, Ethiopia’s access to reliable and efficient ports is crucial for its trade, imports, and exports. Given this, port services in the Horn of Africa are highly coveted. Historically, Ethiopia relied heavily on Djibouti for access to the sea after losing the ports of Massawa and Assab in 1993, following the secession of Eritrea. Djibouti has since served as Ethiopia’s primary gateway to international trade, with the port of Djibouti handling the majority of Ethiopian cargo.

However, Ethiopia’s dependence on Djibouti has long been a point of strategic concern for Addis Ababa. In recent years, the Ethiopian government has sought to diversify its access to maritime routes to reduce its reliance on a single port. The government has explored several alternatives, including the newly developed port of Lamu in Kenya. However, the progress of infrastructure projects, including vital road and rail connections between Lamu and Ethiopia, has been slow. Political and security challenges have also hindered Ethiopia’s efforts to secure alternative routes through Sudan and Eritrea, limiting the impact of these ports.

As a result, Ethiopia has increasingly turned its attention to other regional ports, particularly in the semi-autonomous regions of Somaliland and Puntland. Both territories—Berbera in Somaliland and Bosaso in Puntland—have been seeking to attract foreign investment, but their status remains contentious. While Somaliland and Puntland both claim independence, the Somali government in Mogadishu regards them as part of its territory, complicating the legal and political landscape for international investors.

The rivalry intensified after Dubai-based DP World, a global port operator, became a key player in the region. After losing the concession to operate the Doraleh Container Terminal in Djibouti in 2018, DP World shifted its focus to the ports of Berbera and Bosaso. It has secured long-term contracts in both locations, promising to invest heavily in their development and significantly improve their infrastructure. This strategy puts DP World in direct competition with Djibouti, which has traditionally been Ethiopia’s main port partner.

In January of this year, Ethiopia and Somaliland reached an agreement allowing Ethiopia to develop port facilities on 20 kilometers of Somaliland’s coastline for a period of 50 years. This agreement gives Ethiopia a foothold in Berbera, positioning it as a key alternative to Djibouti for Ethiopian trade. The move is part of Ethiopia’s broader strategy to diversify its port access and reduce its vulnerability to political and economic changes in Djibouti.

However, Djibouti’s latest strategic move—offering Ethiopia the opportunity to operate the Tadjoura port—appears to be a direct attempt to undermine Ethiopia’s growing involvement in rival ports. Tadjoura, located on the opposite side of the Gulf of Tadjoura from Djibouti’s main port, was completed in 2017. Despite its potential, the port is still relatively small and lacks significant capacity compared to other regional ports. Built at a cost of $90 million, it has just two berths, a short Roll-on/Roll-off (RoRo) quay, and a depth of 12 meters, which limits its ability to handle larger vessels. Nonetheless, Djibouti’s offer to let Ethiopia operate Tadjoura represents an effort to create a new avenue for Ethiopian trade, while also attempting to solidify Djibouti’s role as Ethiopia’s primary port partner.

Djibouti’s decision to involve Ethiopia in the operation of Tadjoura is likely motivated by several factors. First, it may be an attempt to secure Ethiopia’s continued reliance on Djibouti for access to the sea, even as Ethiopia seeks alternatives. By offering Ethiopia the chance to develop Tadjoura, Djibouti may be trying to ensure that Ethiopia does not fully commit to the rival ports in Somaliland and Puntland. Second, it reflects the growing importance of port infrastructure in the region, where access to seaports is not just an economic matter, but also a strategic one.

While Tadjoura’s infrastructure may still be modest, its potential role in Ethiopia’s broader trade strategy should not be underestimated. With ongoing regional competition for access to Ethiopia’s booming economy, the outcome of this port rivalry will likely have far-reaching implications for the Horn of Africa’s geopolitical and economic landscape. As Ethiopia continues to explore alternative port options, including its growing involvement in Somaliland, Djibouti will need to carefully balance its offers with the broader regional competition to maintain its position as Ethiopia’s primary maritime gateway.

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The Ethiopian government has been working for four years to establish a securities exchange as part of its broader economic reform and liberalisation agenda. This includes the recent decision to allow the Ethiopian birr (ETB) to float freely and open up strategic sectors such as banking and telecommunications to competition.

The exchange’s debut will feature several significant state-owned enterprises, including Ethio Telecom, the Ethiopian Insurance Corporation, and the Ethiopian Shipping and Logistics Services Enterprise (ESLSE), which will be listed on the platform. The government views the move as a way to break the long-standing dominance of nationalised entities in the economy, increase Ethiopia’s global competitiveness, and attract foreign direct investment.

Local reports suggest that over 90 companies are expected to list on the exchange within its first few weeks of operation. So far, the exchange has raised approximately 1.6 billion birr (around $13 million) in capital.

In a bid to bolster investor trust and ensure the safety of investments, ECMA has introduced new transparency and disclosure rules. These measures are intended to enhance the credibility of the market and reassure both local and international investors.

At a recent event in Addis Ababa, Hana Tehelku, the Director-General of ECMA, highlighted that the new guidelines are essential for creating a well-regulated capital market. She explained that the measures focus on increasing transparency, standardising processes, and safeguarding investor interests, all in alignment with the country’s broader economic objectives.

The new rules include mandatory annual audited financial statements for listed companies, along with ongoing communication with shareholders. To further protect investors, a “pre-emptive rights” clause will allow existing shareholders to maintain their proportional ownership when additional shares are issued, thus preventing dilution of their holdings.

Additionally, companies will be required to demonstrate adequate capital reserves to reduce the risk of defaults and protect shareholder investments. ECMA will oversee the implementation and enforcement of these regulations.

While such regulations are common in many stock exchanges globally, some African markets have faced challenges in assuring investors of the safety of their capital due to insufficient transparency and weak disclosure practices.

A 2022 report from the African Development Bank (AfDB) noted that international investors may hesitate to engage in markets where they lack confidence in the disclosure standards, even if the underlying investments appear solid.

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Even in the event of peace, Ethiopia is not going to achieve a democratic political culture overnight. It may even get worse before it gets better. However, it is wrong and reckless to conclude that violence is now a last resort. During the darkest years of the TPLF/EPRDF, when armed resistance was in every way legitimate, I personally disagreed with that path, not out of pacifism, but from a strategic perspective. Because violence begets violence. Conversely, making the most of a small democratic space can expand democracy. There are plenty of political parties in Ethiopia that have taken this path. Some examples are the National Movement of Amhara (NaMA), Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice, EZEMA, the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), the Enat Party, and the Tigray Democratic Party (TDP). Some of them complain of all manners of harassment. In the name of national unity, others have joined the government and been awarded with places in the cabinet, but they too will be running against the ruling Prosperity Party in the next election in 2026.

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has often promised a peaceful transition of power, if he loses at the polls. It is admittedly hard to find Ethiopians who envisage that, if push comes to shove, he and the powerful people around him will just admit defeat and gracefully swap places with the opposition. But this needs to be tested rather than dismissed out of hand in a call to arms by actors whose democratic credentials are actually more dubious than the government’s.

Many have accused me of “shilling for the regime”, even of being a paid mouthpiece and what not. Of course, I would never take money from a party to a conflict that I am covering as an independent. Apart from giving interviews to Ethiopian state media, I have never even met anyone from the Ethiopian government, which has committed and will undoubtedly continue to commit acts that I disagree with, even condemn. Most international classifications use the term “hybrid regime” about the current system, that is, a mix of authoritarianism and democracy. This is probably fair.

But it is the legitimate government. It may sometimes commit illegitimate acts, but none of the armed alternatives today has a shred of legitimacy, let alone any prospect of making things better. Even if the government sometimes categorizes fair criticism as “incitement” and misuses the judiciary as in the bad old days, constructive opposition is the only way to go. Ethiopians demand solutions to everyday problems like long lines for public transport, bribe-demanding traffic police, power cuts, red tape, pollution, unaffordable healthcare, homelessness, low-quality schools, etc. Fundamentally, ethnic rivalry is not the root cause of war, but ethnic rivalry is an effective mobilizer for war. Unresolved bread-and-butter problems can make people vote for the opposition, but do not usually make them pick up a gun. If the most urgent issue of security gets under control, peaceful political competition should be able to focus on the second- most urgent issues, like growing the economy and fighting corruption. Conversely, if security continues to be the overriding concern, democracy, human rights and even good governance will look increasingly like unaffordable luxuries.

When I first got involved in opining on war in Ethiopia around November 2021, I set myself the goal of getting through it without regret. Notwithstanding some quick- tempered tweets,390 the only thing I would change, if I could go back, would be the headline of my speech for the Danish Society of Engineers in March 2022, in which I characterized Ethiopia as “a fellow democracy”. This was overselling a point in the heat of the propaganda battles. Building an Ethiopian democracy, let alone a democratic culture, remains a daunting project with no guarantee of completion. As we have seen, it backslides under pressure and polarization. Tensions lurk and can erupt into the next big war, in which the security state takes over and rolls back the reforms.

And yet, there is hope. The vast majority of Ethiopians both preach and practice multiethnic cooperation. Although ethnically-exclusive rebel outfits brandishing genocide hashtags still have too much manpower and firepower, their popularity seems to be in decline.

Meanwhile, outside of Ethiopia, despite the endurance of a narrative about a “Tigray genocide”, the Pretoria Peace Agreement has become unanimously endorsed. The TPLF has not been properly disarmed or stopped being a threat, but nearly everyone agrees that it should. The TPLF is unlikely to get much international support for another round of aggression under the cover of resisting a genocide. A retired Western diplomat told me that one lesson had been learned after all: “We should have listened less to the media and more to the African Union.” Indeed, and the African Union issticking firmly to the Pretoria Agreement.

However, there has been no reckoning over the tragic cost of achieving the Pretoria Agreement. Those who got Ethiopia dead wrong are not wondering aloud why the TPLF sent young Tigrayans to kill and die for peace terms that could have been easily obtained without firing a shot. Having learned so little, the world is perfectly capable of getting Ethiopia and other countries dead wrong yet again.

With this in mind, the final word goes to Dr. Steven Were Omamo, the results-oriented humanitarian sabotaged by self-serving, glory-seeking cowboy humanitarians during the war ‘At the Centre of the World in Ethiopia’:

“I also lament how the politics of major powers was allowed to infiltrate and corrupt a fragile but promising science-based process, destroying hard-earned credibility, along with the trust that went with that. Nobody has admitted that ‘the people are dying of hunger in Tigray’ narrative was total fabrication. There were no consequences. There are never any consequences as the ‘international community’ recycles itself from crisis to crisis. Incompetent and unethical people who lie, distort, and mess up can just walk away and do the same thing somewhere else. To me, that is annoying. For the world, it should be unacceptable.”

“Getting Ethiopia Dead Wrong” is now available on Amazon Kindle, paperback, or hardcover

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On November 3, around one thousand senior Ethiopian commanders stationed in Tigray went for a dinner party with regional government officials. The invitation, however, was a ruse to take them prisoner.

That same night, while the world was focused on vote-counting in the US presidential election, a total of five federal military bases in Tigray came under fire. Defenders were killed or captured, though those in the Sero Base, near the border with Eritrea, held out for a grueling ten days. Tigrayan soldiers turned on their comrades of other ethnicities, many of whom had lived in Tigray for decades, working alongside the local communities. Reports about soldiers killed in their pyjamas and arbitrary cruelty shocked the Ethiopian public.

Thankfully, Michael Pompeo, Secretary of State under the outgoing Trump administration, condemned it immediately.

Wisely, Secretary Pompeo left it open to interpretation how to “de-escalate tensions”, but surely “immediate action to restore the peace” meant arresting those responsible for such a ferocious assault on the constitutional order.

For the first year or so, the world press downplayed or omitted this manifest casus bellialtogether, even in longreads on the war, which focused obsessively on the prime minister’s personality and on how the Nobel Peace Prize had gone to his head.

The Economist, for instance, as late as October 2021, while TPLF troops were marching on Addis Ababa, published a shockingly defamatory and inflammatory leader, to which we shall return in Part 3, attributing the cause of the conflict to an “increasingly paranoid and erratic” Abiy Ahmed deciding to attack the regional government of Tigray, “which he accused of rebellion”. This shallow phrasing amounts to speculating that the attack on the Northern Command was made up.

In fact, only ten days into the war, the high-ranking TPLF leader, Sekoture Getachew, speaking on Tigrayan television, confirmed that an elaborate plan had been executed, using soldiers from inside and outside the bases, with the aim of taking over the firepower of the Ethiopian army. Some two weeks later, this was admitted by Getachew Reda, with the excuse that “whatever we did, we did in self-defense”. In January 2021, Kjetil Tronvoll mentioned it in an article, as did, in March 2021, the diehard pro-TPLF magazine Tghat, albeit portraying it as a preemptive strike justifiedby an enemy plan to commit genocide. Accordingly, the world press eventually began to incorporate this event into its timeline.

From the first day of the war, Declan Walsh and co-author Simon Marks, writing in The New York Times, put the war down to the notion that “Mr. Abiy presented a radically different face”, from his Nobel-Peace-Prize face that was. They studiously ignored the crucial dispute over the control of the army, except for stating that “Mr. Abiy said his hand had been forced by Tigrayan leaders who brazenly defied his authority”. Of course, there is no quotation mark around the prime minister saying: they brazenly defied my authority. But this is how The New York Times interprets his denunciation of the attack on the Northern Command, which it does not even bother to mention. What the New York Times would take for granted at home in the US, namely state monopoly on violence under democratic rule of law, is reduced for Ethiopia to the big man exercising “his authority”.

Eleven days into the war, Mr. Walsh and Mr. Marks did report “a purported Tigrayan attack on an Ethiopian army base in Tigray early this month”. This is when Kjetil Tronvoll is introduced in the New York Times as a “a scholar of Ethiopian politics”. Conversations with him might have colored Mr. Walsh’s views, as he continued to overlook not only the foregoing two and a half years of political developments as the source of the tension, but also the attack on the Northern Command as the point of no return. The New York Times explanation would continue to focus on the “messianic” prime minister, who had “plunged Ethiopia into a war”. Finally, by December 2021, Declan Walsh must have felt challenged, as the attack on the five federal bases had become acknowledged as fact and was getting more mention in the media. This accounts for the timing of the “new evidence” that the prime minister “had been planning a military campaign in the northern Tigray region for months before the war (…)”. Mr. Walsh was rationalizing his early choice of virtually ignoring the attack on the Northern Command.

That this is how the war began is no longer controversial. Yet even as of 2023, The Guardian’s official view frames it as a mere accusation: “Fighting broke out in November 2020 when Ethiopia’s prime minister Abiy Ahmed deployed the army to arrest Tigrayan leaders who had been challenging his authority for months and whom he accused of attacking federal military bases.”

Once again, legitimacy to rule Ethiopia is reduced to the big man exercising “his authority”. And “challenging his authority” is a hell of a euphemism for raiding national armories and usurping the command of the national army.

“Getting Ethiopia Dead Wrong” is now available on Amazon Kindle, paperback, or hardcover

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During the event, Governor Mamo addressed concerns from the Ethiopian diaspora regarding the floating exchange rate of the Birr and the significant regulatory changes underway. He noted real progress towards convergence between the parallel exchange rate and the newly established market-based bank exchange rate over the past two months, a natural result of the free exchange rate system.

Concerns about rampant inflation and a drastic depreciation of the Birr have diminished, with the governor asserting, “such a scenario was highly unlikely due to a monetary policy that’s periodically reviewed and adjusted according to market conditions.” He emphasized that measures have been taken to mitigate inflationary pressures and currency depreciation.

The shift to a free-floating currency has bolstered the export sector and increased remittances, with Dashen Bank reporting a staggering 300% year-over-year rise in dollar remittances in its third-quarter report. Despite the increased availability of foreign exchange in the banking sector however, bankers contend that importers have shied away, relying on their customary and informal means to access hard currency. “This could be a case of old habits die hard, but I believe it is more likely to be a problem of being misinformed about recent changes—we as banker certainly need to do more to clear up the confusion, said Abe Sano, CEO of state owned, Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, the country’s largest. 

Historically, many people in Ethiopia depended on traditional savings and loans schemes, mostly based on small knit circles of friends and family. Modern banking, although more than 120-year-old in the country, only started to make inroads just in the last few decades. For this reason, many remained unbanked up until very recently. This traditional way of thinking about money and credit is baked into the culture. This means relationships, be they familial or communal are still strong in business. These are not as easy to reform of to modernize. For this reason, a parallel market for foreign currency exchange will likely remain. But the price gap will converge as institutional trust grows. Combined with other incentives provided by licensed financial entities, the legal route for exchanging foreign currency should become more attractive. NBE Governor Mamo reiterated, “our ultimate goal is to instill trust in our banking institutions by building the right incentive mechanism for a healthy financial architecture, one that centers economic development and growth”. 

In a bid to enhance transparency and competitiveness, the NBE recently implemented a 2% cap on bank fees for foreign exchange transactions. However, questions linger about potential collusion among major banks in setting similar pricing for dollars and euros, as the price gap between buying and selling rates remains substantial. To further diversify the market, the NBE has licensed five new Independent Foreign Exchange Bureaus, including Dugda Fidelity Investment PLC and Global Independent Foreign Exchange Bureau.

While the Ethiopian banking sector shows signs of recovery, with restructured debt and improved capital adequacy, loan portfolios remain constrained, primarily serving a limited clientele. Governor Mamo pointed to the success of microfinance as a model for broader lending, suggesting that larger banks need to adopt similar strategies to reach a wider public. New fintech players, such as Ethio-Telecom’s TeleBirr, are poised to outpace traditional banks in attracting borrowers.

Ethiopia is also considering the entry of foreign retail banks into its previously closed market, a move that could disrupt the landscape for domestic banks that have historically faced little competition due to stringent regulations. “The layers of strict regulation meant there was little incentive to innovate for banks,” Governor Mamo noted. Dashen Bank’s CEO Asfaw Alemu said “Stringent regulation meant there was little you can do to fail as a bank in Ethiopia—you were always parented by the state”. Indeed, bank failure is very rare in Ethiopia, not because the banks are good, but rather because of moral hazard. The recent reforms aim to reduce bureaucratic obstacles and enhance the overall banking environment, though many local banks may struggle to compete against foreign entrants without adequate capitalization.

Legislation is on the horizon to encourage bank mergers, aiming to centralize capital and strengthen the sector in anticipation of increased competition. Pooling resources will be a matter of survival even for the biggest of the current institutions. As Ethiopia navigates these transformative changes, the future of its banks is poised for historic evolution, one that is long overdue. 

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For months, the TPLF’s old guard and the interim regional government, led by Getachew Reda, have engaged in a blame game over the region’s botched recovery, marked by military defeats, what many claim to be “loss of territory”, and a breakdown in law and order. These tensions have roots in the discord that emerged in 2019 when the newly formed Prosperity Party, led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed embarked on a series of reforms that threatened the TPLF’s grip on power. Hostilities then ultimately led to a devastating war that claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands is what has come to be referred to as the “Tigray War”.

The Pretoria Peace Agreement was welcome news, as it ended the war. It also served as somewhat of a face-saving surrender for the TPLF, averting its total collapse, potentially leaving an unpredictable and perhaps even more dangerous power vacuum. Since then, however, internal frictions within the region’s long time ruling party have multiplied, with divisions deepening, especially after the Ethiopian Electoral Board refused to reinstate the TPLF, demanding its re-registration as a new political party.

Faced with diminishing prospects for regaining power, the TPLF’s old guard now appears to be relinquishing control of regional capital Mekelle to Getachew Reda’s interim administration, which is gaining support from key districts across central, eastern, and southern parts of the Tigray region, chiefly among the young.

Meanwhile, Debretsion Gebremichael, head of TPLF’s other more senior faction, seems to be consolidating power in Shire, the region’s second-largest city. Shire’s proximity to lucrative gold mines, currently under the control of TPLF warlords and generals aligned with Debretsion adds another layer of complexity to the situation.

Interim leader Getachew Reda accused his adversaries of engaging in the illicit gold trade. In a recent meeting with his supporters Getachew said, “Those who accuse me of falsehoods are involved in facilitating the export of gold from Tigray to the Gulf States via Eritrea” -— which has also relied on its own gold exports to finance itself despite years of Western sanctions. 

Before the war, licensed miners in Tigray sold gold to the National Bank of Ethiopia. Since the conflict began however, much of the region’s gold has been smuggled out. Other more urgent political priorities overshadowed the issue, but there is now growing concern the illicit trade may fuel yet another round of conflict. Any attempt by the interim administration, backed by the federal government to intervene could spark further violence due to the political nature of the mining interests.

As public dissatisfaction grows, pressure is building on the region’s government to utilize its resources to provide adequate services and to punish criminals. Many schools in the region remain shuttered. The vice chair of the Tigray Regional Board of Education reported that out of 2,492 schools ranging from kindergarten to high school, 1,835 are fully operational. However, approximately 500 schools are currently being used as arms depots and garrison to house the region’s large number of idled fighters. This despite nearly two years of relative peace. 

It is in this context the town of Shire emerged as a stronghold for the TPLF’s hardliners, as cadres continue trade blame for the region’s challenges and race to gather support for what appears to be another round of struggle, which so far has been limited to public rallies and heated public meetings organized by each side.

Considering the TPLF’s intolerant political culture and history of armed conflict, recent developments could trigger another wave of violence, especially since the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of TPLF fighters has not been fully realized. The situation in Ethiopia’s Tigray region remains unstable, raising significant concerns about the possibility of renewed conflict, a scenario feared by many in the international community, particularly the peace deal signatories like the African Union and the United States.

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His article cited the New York Times’ 2015 piece about how “Time-Worn Village in Moldova Springs Back to Life, Thanks to Port”, which celebrated the way in which the aforesaid swap helped that former Soviet Republic’s struggling economy. The historical context is that the medieval Principality of Moldavia used to connect to the Black Sea, as did the Russian Empire’s Bessarabia Governorate, which is one of its subnational successors. Contemporary Moldova then became landlocked as a result of border changes.

Stalin gave the historically Moldovan/Romanian land (they’re kindred people who are considered to be part of the same civilization) of what’s now known as Budjak to Ukraine after World War II upon capturing it from interwar Romania, which cut Moldova off from the Black Sea. The post-independence era was very difficult for Moldova, but its leadership knew that restoring their access to the sea could help stabilize the socio-economic situation and therefore the political one a lot more.

For all their faults, of which there are many, their leadership and Ukraine’s agreed to swap land to this end. Kiev’s motives were pragmatic since it didn’t want its smaller neighbor to remain unstable and impoverished, which could further impede its own development plans. Although Ukraine was ultimately unable to improve its domestic situation for reasons that are beyond the scope of this analysis, the point is that it agreed to this swap in order to advance the greater regional good.

Ethiopia’s history is similar to Moldova’s in that it too used to have access to the sea, but distant imperial powers were responsible for changing that, not its neighbors like in Moldova’s case. Italy’s colonization of Ethiopia’s historical Red Sea coast was then falsely “legitimized” by its fellow European empires, after which the administrative borders of “Italian Eritrea” were inherited upon that land’s reunification with Ethiopia. This policy later became the standard for post-colonial territories across the world.

That wasn’t a problem for Ethiopia until after Eritrea became independent in 1993 and then provoked a war between them five years later, which once again cut Ethiopia off from the sea and made it dependent on Djibouti since the nearby port of Assab was no longer accessible for obvious reasons. This new geo-economic reality was exploited by Djibouti to enrich itself at Ethiopia’s expense, with neither Eritrea nor Somalia wanting to help Ethiopia diversify from that statelet since they sought to contain it.

The regional strategic situation is altogether different for Ethiopia than for Moldova though since the latter’s economy depends largely on nearby states with whom there are many overland trade opportunities and the nearby Black-Mediterranean Sea beyond the Danube River is very safe. The same can’t be said for Ethiopia, whose top trade partners are in different corners of the world, and the maritime logistics upon which its economic and therefore political stability depend aren’t safe at all.

Moreover, Ethiopia is the second most populous state in Africa and while Moldova is one of the least populous in Europe, so instability stemming from the first’s fragile maritime supply chains could reverberate much more widely to the detriment of millions while the second’s instability is manageable. If ulterior motives weren’t at play and Ethiopia’s neighbors didn’t conspire to contain it, both on their own, and on behalf of its historical rival Egypt, then they would rationally help it regain access to the sea.

After all, ensuring Ethiopia’s economic growth and associated stability would naturally benefit them too, and this can only be achieved by allowing it military-commercial access to a nearby port in order to rebuild its navy (for protecting its maritime supply chains with time) and freely conducting global trade. In furtherance of this end, Ethiopia clinched its Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)with Somaliland, but complementing it with more deals in the region would expand the scope of benefits for all.

With this in mind, just like justice in Southeastern Europe was served by Ukraine swapping land with Moldova in order to restore the latter’s historical access to the sea, so too could it be served in the Horn of Africa through a spiritually similar deal between Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti if the political will existed. Land doesn’t need to be swapped, but an arrangement modeled off of the Somaliland MoU could be negotiated in which Ethiopia would obtain military-commercial access to Assab and Tadjoura.

Commercial access isn’t enough due to Ethiopia’s need to eventually defend the maritime logistics upon which its economic and political depends, which ideally requires a set of bases in the Gulf of Aden-Red Sea (GARS) region instead of relying on the one that it plans to obtain in Somaliland. Eritrea and Djibouti would do well to stop trying to contain Ethiopia and enrich itself at its expense respectively and instead seriously consider the mutual benefits inherent in replicating the Somaliland MoU model.

Stakes in Ethiopia’s national companies can be offered to them too, which can help Eritrea obtain more sources of revenue while assisting Djibouti in diversifying from its dependence on port fees. Eritrea previously flirted with resuming Ethiopia’s commercial access to Assab while Djibouti recently offered full management of Tadjoura, but neither wants to include military rights into their proposal. Therein lies the rub since they still want to contain Ethiopia, but that’s counterproductive and dangerous.

It’s better to move beyond the regional security dilemma and towards more complex economic interdependence in order for the Horn to rise as one instead of being picked apart by others like Egypt. The Moldovan-Ukrainian land swap occurred one-quarter of a century ago in very different conditions, but the example of restoring a landlocked state’s historical access to the sea in pursuit of mutual benefits can form the basis of a spiritually similar deal in the Horn if Eritrea and/or Djibouti agree.

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According to Egyptian authorities, the partnership among Cairo, Mogadishu, and Asmara is officially aimed at combating terrorism and securing Red Sea shipping, which has been disrupted by Houthi (Ansarullah) attacks from Yemen. These attacks target ships in “solidarity with Palestinians” amid the ongoing conflict in Gaza, significantly impacting maritime traffic through the Bab El-Mandeb strait.

Beneath the surface, however, the emerging relationship may also involve potential Egyptian mediation to address the longstanding conflict between Eritrea and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Cairo will likely seek to provide support to dissenting factions of the TPLF via Eritrea to pressure the Ethiopian government, which has effectively completed the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)—a project Egypt views as a threat to its vital share of the Nile River’s water.

During the two-year war in the Tigray region, Egypt supplied logistics and weapons to the TPLF via secret flights, one of which was shot down in 2022. Ethiopia has consistently accused Egypt of undermining its stability by supporting anti-government factions for decades. Recently, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed stated that “thousands of rebel groups were given assignments to impede the construction of the GERD.” Whether Asmara will allow itself to be used as a conduit for Cairo remains to be seen.

The potential rapprochement between Eritrea’s long-time ruler, Isaias Afwerki, and the TPLF leadership, once deemed implausible, is contributing to divisions in Tigray and threatening the relative peace in the region as various factions vie for power.

Historically, Egypt has played a crucial role in Eritrea’s political landscape. As early as 1960, Egypt supported the Eritrean independence movement, which eventually led to the rise of the current Eritrean regime. This historical involvement has established a complex relationship, with Eritrea often functioning as a client state of Egypt, seeking to intervene in Ethiopian affairs. The recent visit by Egyptian intelligence chief Gen Kamal Abbas and Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty to Asmara underscores the rekindling of long-standing ties between the two nations.

Egypt’s collaboration with Eritrea is part of a broader strategy to counter Ethiopia’s growing influence in the Horn of Africa. By strengthening ties with Eritrea, Egypt aims to exert pressure on Addis Ababa and influence regional geopolitics. This move aligns with a series of engagements Egypt has pursued with other regional actors, including Djibouti, Sudan, and Somalia.

A recent military cooperation agreement between Egypt and Somalia further highlights this strategy. Under this deal, Egypt has airlifted arms, military hardware, and a limited number of military advisors to Somalia, which has heightened tensions with Ethiopia. The Ethiopian government has expressed strong objections, warning that these actions could destabilize the Horn of Africa, vowing to respond firmly. Arms supplies and other forms of assistance to the dysfunctional government of Somalia have consistently leaked to the Al Qaeda-linked Al Shabab terrorist group.

The historical context adds depth to the current dynamic. Eritrea’s independence from Ethiopia in 1993, following a prolonged civil war, has been marked by ongoing tension despite periods of peace. The 1998-2000 border war between Eritrea and Ethiopia left a legacy of mistrust that continues to influence their interactions today.

The initial brief period of positive relations following Eritrea’s independence in 1993 ultimately gave way to a shooting border war from 1998 to 2000. The 2018 rapprochement, which earned Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed a Nobel Peace Prize, was never formalized and lacked any legal basis. The honeymoon ended with the Pretoria Peace Agreement, which concluded what is now commonly referred to as the “Tigray War,” during which Eritrea backed the federal government of Ethiopia against an armed insurrection in the Tigray region.

Somalia’s ongoing dispute with Ethiopia over Somaliland further complicates the situation. Somalia has condemned Ethiopia’s recent agreement with Somaliland, which involves leasing its coastal territory for a Naval bases in exchange for potential recognition of Somaliland’s independence from Somalia, which views this agreement as a breach of its sovereignty and has threatened military action if Ethiopia and Somaliland proceed with their plans. On September 12, Ahmed Moalim Fiqi, the foreign minister of Somalia told Universal TV that ‘Somalia could choose to engage with armed rebels in Ethiopia if it wishes, noting that this option remains available.’

The heated rhetoric elicited a response from Nebiyu Tedla, Ethiopia’s deputy permanent representative to the African Union and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, who took issue with remarks from Somalia’s foreign minister. On X, he described it as “comical” to see al-Shabab affiliates masquerading as government officials, ineffective beyond the Banaadir region, engaging in empty nationalism fueled by narrow clan interests”.

Amid the ongoing cycle of horse trading and temporary alliances, the Horn of Africa continues to serve as battlefield for external powers. There is no clearer premonition of the potential disaster of proxy violence than the ongoing war in Sudan, which has displaced millions, alongside the persistent threat from militant groups like Al Shabab in Somalia. Egypt’s increasingly aggressive posture aims to contain Ethiopia and prevent it from establishing a naval presence near the strategic Bab El-Mandeb.

For its part, through the construction of the GERD, Addis Ababa has demonstrated resilience in achieving national objectives despite difficult circumstances. It remains troubling, however, that existing regional and international mechanisms for cooperation and dispute resolution have so far failed to address the growing rivalry between Egypt and Ethiopia.

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