This plan took shape following Abiy’s speech outlining Ethiopia’s need for secure sea access, which he proposed could be achieved through bartering stakes in major national assets such as Ethiopian Airlines or the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Eritrea’s response was swift, mobilizing state-controlled media, social media operatives, and diplomatic channels to discredit Ethiopia’s push for maritime access. Egypt, a long-standing rival of Ethiopia over control of the Nile, joined Eritrea in opposing Ethiopia’s aspirations, even attempting to bar Ethiopia from participating in the Red Sea Forum, a regional platform for cooperation among nations bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

A concerted disinformation campaign soon followed, orchestrated to distort Ethiopia’s narrative. The campaign leveraged Ethiopia’s ethnic and religious divisions, particularly by portraying the Oromo people as ruthless expansionists seeking territorial dominance. At the same time, it sought to widen the divide between Ethiopia’s two largest ethnic groups, the Amhara, and Oromo, exacerbating internal tensions that could derail Ethiopia’s strategic goals.

Following the Pretoria Peace Agreement, Eritrea escalated its disruptive measures against Ethiopia. Social Media operatives intensified their propaganda efforts, flooding platforms with misinformation. Meanwhile, Asmara’s autocracy took direct economic actions to weaken Ethiopia, including freezing Ethiopian Airlines’ bank accounts in Eritrea, severing air links between the two nations, and readjusting its support to insurgent groups such as Fano, the TPLF, and the OLA. The objective was clear: to ensure Ethiopia remained embroiled in internal strife. Egypt has openly backed this strategy, with its parliament acknowledging that fueling ethnic discord in Ethiopia could delay GERD’s full operation—set for inauguration in six months, and hinder future dam projects.

For Egypt and its regional ally, Isaias Afewerki, Ethiopia’s expanding influence in the Horn of Africa represents a fundamental threat. As Ethiopia strengthens its economy and broadens its regional impact, neighboring countries in Africa and the Middle East increasingly depend on its resources, undermining Egypt’s strategic leverage while highlighting Eritrea’s stagnation. Afewerki, who has held an unchallenged grip on power in Eritrea for over three decades without fostering significant development or establishing a stable institutional framework, faces growing internal and external pressure. To preserve his control, he aims to perpetuate instability in Ethiopia, preventing its rise as a regional power.

Eritrea’s current maneuvers in the Horn of Africa did not emerge in isolation. While Asmara publicly frames Ethiopia’s quest for sea access as the primary trigger, the dispute has deep historical roots. Ethiopia lost its maritime outlet when Eritrea gained independence in 1993, a shift that Ethiopian historians have labeled the biggest geopolitical loss in the country’s modern history. This loss was exacerbated by the brutal 1998–2000 border war, which deepened mistrust between the two nations. A brief window for cooperation opened in 2018 when Abiy Ahmed and Afewerki signed a peace deal, but negotiations over the development of Assab stalled despite investments from Italy, the UAE, and Ethiopia. The Pretoria Peace Agreement of 2022, which ended Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict, further altered regional dynamics, prompting Eritrea to intensify its subversive tactics.

Asmara’s response has been multifaceted. Beyond economic and diplomatic moves, Eritrea has sought to exploit Ethiopia’s ethnic tensions through psychological warfare. The regime has deliberately framed Prime Minister Abiy’s half Oromo heritage as evidence of an “Oromo expansionist agenda.” At the same time, violence in the Oromo region has been weaponized in propaganda efforts to paint the Oromo people as orchestrators of ethnic aggression. The once-celebrated concept of “Oromuma,” which signifies Oromo identity and cultural pride, has been repurposed as a derogatory term, portraying Oromos as aggressors against the Amhara. This tactic also mirrors historically rooted derogatory smear campaigns that sought to delegitimize Ethiopian agency, such as the use of “Hadgi” to vilify the Amhara or at times the Haile Selassie. “Agame” to cast TPLF-linked Tigrayans as politically toxic. The ultimate aim is to fragment Ethiopia’s social fabric, fostering deep mistrust among its major ethnic groups.

The Eritrean regime’s repression extends beyond its borders, leveraging transnational cruelty to control Eritreans abroad. The Eritrean diaspora is subject to a mandatory two percent tax on their income, with noncompliance often resulting in threats of imprisonment or torture for family members still in Eritrea. This coercive system ensures continued allegiance to Afewerki’s government while transforming sections of the diaspora into instruments of propaganda. Eritrean exiles who dare to criticize the regime risk not only personal retaliation but also collective punishment against their relatives.

For Eritrea, the endgame is clear: to keep Ethiopia weak, divided, and distracted from reclaiming Assab or securing multiple ports along the Horn of Africa. However, despite relentless propaganda campaigns and the proliferation of disinformation, a growing number of Ethiopians remain resolute in their belief that maritime access will be secured through legal and diplomatic means. As the geopolitical landscape in the Horn of Africa shifts, the question remains, why does Eritrea’s leadership fear diplomacy and negotiation? And why resort to disinformation if the case against Ethiopia’s sea access is truly justified? For now, Ethiopia’s growing economic and political momentum suggests that the battle over the Red Sea is only beginning.

The post The Existence of Eritrea’s Authoritarian Regime Depends on Undermining Ethiopia appeared first on Abren.

The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea have become zones of escalating tensions, where economic, military, and diplomatic ambitions intersect. This strategic region, connecting Asia, Europe, and Africa, plays a key role in international relations. While its geopolitical importance continues to grow, it is also a battleground for influence, where regional and global powers compete for dominance. The isolation of Eritrea’s regime under Isaias Afwerki, Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions, and the increasing involvement of Gulf powers—including Saudi Arabia—further complicate an already fragile balance.

Given these dynamics, the future of the region remains uncertain. Without a concerted diplomatic approach and greater cooperation, an escalation with potentially devastating consequences cannot be ruled out.

Context: A Coveted Red Sea

The Red Sea is a major commercial crossroads and a focal point of geopolitical rivalries. Eritrea, with its strategic port of Assab, and Djibouti, which controls the southern entrance to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, play crucial roles in global oil transport. Somalia, for its part, boasts an extensive coastline along the Gulf of Aden—an asset that could strengthen its regional influence and enhance its role in global maritime trade.

Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey have expanded their presence in the region by establishing military bases and making substantial investments. The competition for control over this critical maritime corridor is not only a concern for these nations but also has significant implications for Ethiopia. Despite being landlocked, Ethiopia remains a key regional player with a vested interest in Red Sea access.

Eritrea: A Regime Entrapped by Its Obsession with Tigray

Under Isaias Afwerki’s rule, Eritrea remains one of the world’s most closed states and among Africa’s most repressive regimes, characterized by widespread repression and strict control over information. After more than 30 years of authoritarian rule, the country enforces indefinite military service and prohibits any form of organized opposition, thereby consolidating the regime’s grip on power.

Asmara’s regime is built on a nationalist ideology, fueled by a historical hostility toward the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and Tigray, which it perceives as an existential threat. This rivalry has led to massive militarization and the prolongation of compulsory conscription.

The 2022 Pretoria peace agreement, signed to end the conflict between the Ethiopian government and the TPLF, was viewed by Afwerki as an acknowledgment of the TPLF and Tigray. Considering this treaty a challenge to his regional influence, he hardened his stance toward Ethiopia and continues to perceive the so-called “Tigrayan threat” as an obstacle to regional stability.

Recent internal divisions within the TPLF—driven by political tensions and regional dynamics—present an opportunity for Asmara to extend its influence. If the situation deteriorates further, it could reignite tensions in the region and pose an even greater threat to the fragile stability of the Horn of Africa.

Abiy Ahmed’s Diplomatic Actions: Reforms and Challenges

Since assuming office, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has profoundly reshaped Ethiopian diplomacy, seeking to ease tensions in a region marked by both internal and external conflicts. His most notable initiative was the 2018 peace agreement with Eritrea, which ended two decades of a cold war between the two nations and earned him the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize. While this agreement paved the way for a fragile reconciliation, it did not resolve key disputes—particularly Ethiopia’s quest for access to the sea.

At the same time, Abiy Ahmed has sought to reposition Ethiopia on the international stage, strengthening ties with Gulf powers. However, his diplomatic efforts face internal challenges, including ethnic conflicts and geopolitical rivalries that extend beyond Ethiopia’s borders, turning the region into a battleground for political and strategic control over maritime routes and resources.

Key Players: Conflicting Interests

Recently, Saudi Arabia proposed a multi-billion-dollar investment in the port of Assab—a strategic project that could redefine geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa. This Saudi initiative aims to bolster its influence in the Red Sea while simultaneously shoring up Eritrea’s regime against Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions. Such a development could further complicate Abiy Ahmed’s efforts to secure direct sea access and significantly impact the regional balance of power.

Abiy’s agreements with Gulf powers—particularly the UAE—could provide critical leverage to counterbalance the rising influence of Asmara and Riyadh. As Ethiopia continues its pursuit of direct sea access, it must navigate a complex landscape of alliances and geopolitical interests at both regional and global levels.

Although Abiy Ahmed’s peace agreement with Eritrea temporarily eased tensions, the Afwerki regime remains firm in denying Ethiopia access to Eritrean ports, despite Ethiopia’s diplomatic overtures. Control over Eritrean ports—particularly Assab—remains a major point of contention, threatening to reignite regional tensions.

Towards Reconciliation or a New Escalation?

Mounting tensions—with Ethiopia, internal dissidents, and Eritrea’s neighbors—could pave the way for internal shifts within the Asmara regime. However, an insurgency or direct Ethiopian intervention could exacerbate the situation, with unpredictable consequences for regional stability.

Abiy Ahmed’s role as both a reformer and a mediator will be crucial. His ability to navigate internal challenges while maintaining constructive dialogue with neighboring states could be the key to preventing further escalation and transforming tensions into opportunities for peace and development.

Conclusion: The Future of the Region in Limbo

The current situation remains volatile, with regional stability hanging in the balance. Under Abiy Ahmed’s leadership, Ethiopia continues to play a central diplomatic role in the pursuit of peace, but geopolitical rivalries and the issue of maritime access complicate the country’s future.

The region’s fate will depend on whether key stakeholders can overcome their differences and prioritize peaceful solutions. However, as long as the Afwerki regime persists in its repressive policies, stability will remain elusive. Abiy Ahmed’s role as a reformer will be critical in paving the way for lasting reconciliation.

The international community must rally to support these efforts, advocating for democratic reforms and an end to policies of hostility. Without genuine internal transformation in Eritrea, the region risks remaining trapped in a cycle of violence and suffering—further delaying the prospects of lasting peace and sustainable regional development.

The post The Red Sea and the Horn of Africa: A Geopolitical Crossroads appeared first on Abren.

Western diplomacy has issued a statement (see below) that waxes pacifist with bothsidesism. A long list of rich countries offer their help to the parties in dispute, but their statement could not be more obstructive. They supposedly give their “full support” to the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (also known as the Pretoria Peace Agreement) from November 2, 2022, between Ethiopia’s federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the leading force in the dictatorship that ruled Ethiopia from 1991 to 2018. Yet they cannot bring themselves to unequivocally condemn the hardliners from the TPLF for just taking over Tigray with military force and launching a fierce crackdown on pro-peace Tigrayans. 

The most recent regional coup makers do claim to act in the spirit of the Pretoria peace agreement (never mind that it obliges them to disarm and demobilize as the very first step, which should have been completed over two years ago). They also point to the unfulfilled promise of returning “1 million IDPs” from what they refer to as “Western Tigray”. But firstly, this figure is grossly inflated (the real figure is several times less). And secondly, they never talk about coexistence with Amhara in the contested territories, which is key to peacefully returning Tigrayan IDPs. Recently, interim leader of the Tigray region, Getachew Reda finally admitted to political intrigues in keeping IDPs hostage, impeding their safe return, to use them as political pawns. This is the sad, yet well known reality on the ground.

The continued use of the term “Western Tigray” about what has long been known in Ethiopia as Welkait, shows that their goal is reestablishing the pre-2020 reign of Tigray-ethnonationalism in the contested territories, perhaps using the Tigrayan IDPs as foot soldiers. Such a violent take over will not be acceptable to the parties involved and would lead to more conflict. Moreover, the peace agreement does not actually determine the future status of Welkait. That is to be determined within the laws and legal framework of Ethiopia.

Some reports also suggest neighboring Eritrea is working in coordination with the TPLF faction that ousted the Transitional Interim Administration. Further investigation is needed on the matter, and of course it marks a significant escalation in the ongoing conflict, one that could lead to interstate war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. 

So Western diplomacy calling for “engaging in urgent dialogue” is hollow. it pales in comparison to the gravity of the situation. This is insulting and not the behavior of helpful peacemakers. It is appeasement that encourages more instability in the region.

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World-Class Facilities for a Global Stage

Spanning 40 hectares, the AICC is designed to accommodate large-scale international conferences, trade expos, and national events. Key features of the center include:

• Two massive halls capable of hosting between 3,000 to 4,000 attendees each.
• Eight medium and small-sized meeting rooms with a total capacity of 10,000 people.
• Two hotels with a combined capacity of 1,000 rooms, ensuring comfortable accommodation for guests.
• A vast outdoor exhibition space capable of hosting up to 50,000 visitors, making it one of the largest venues of its kind in Ethiopia.
• Additional facilities, including two amphitheaters, two shopping malls, banks, restaurants, and commercial spaces.
• A parking area with a capacity for 2,000 vehicles to ease accessibility.

These amenities position the AICC as a premier destination for global business summits, cultural exchanges, and policy dialogues.

A Catalyst for Economic Transformation

In his keynote speech, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed highlighted the AICC as more than just a venue; it is a platform for economic and intellectual advancement. According to the Prime Minister, when his government initially considered building a convention center, the Mayor of Addis Ababa informed them that there was already a previous plan within the city to construct such a facility. Applying the ‘Medemer’ philosophy he noted, the government took this existing plan, expanded upon it, integrated additional elements such as corridor development, and refined the project to maximize its impact. This approach not only optimized resources but also ensured that the convention center would serve as a hub for trade, knowledge, and diplomacy.

Strengthening Ethiopia’s Position on the Global Stage

The AICC is poised to attract major international conferences, diplomatic engagements, and trade fairs, strengthening Ethiopia’s position as a leading destination for global discourse. Prime Minister Abiy acknowledged the contributions of affluent Ethiopians who have supported infrastructure projects, particularly the self-financed corridor development initiative. He called on federal and regional leadership to maintain momentum, emphasizing that this inauguration is just the beginning of Ethiopia’s infrastructural renaissance.

Conclusion: A Call for Sustained Collaboration

The Addis International Convention Center represents a pivotal moment in Ethiopia’s developmental journey. It exemplifies the power of cooperation between government entities and the private sector in realizing ambitious projects. As Ethiopia continues its path toward economic transformation, the success of the AICC will depend on sustained collaboration, innovative thinking, and a commitment to leveraging this facility for national and international growth.

The call is clear: government leaders, business communities, and young entrepreneurs must embrace the opportunities presented by the AICC to foster trade, education, and diplomacy. By doing so, Ethiopia will not only strengthen its economic resilience but also shape its global identity as a center for knowledge and prosperity.

The post Addis International Convention Center: A Hub for Growth and Collaboration appeared first on Abren.

One of the key initiatives driving this change is the Addis Abeba Urban Transformation (Corridor Development Project, Redevelopment and Riverside Development) launched by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. This project seeks to modernize transportation networks, expand public spaces, and improve connectivity between different districts. It has introduced new green areas, recreational centers, and enhanced public transport, significantly improving the city’s liveability and attractiveness for both residents and tourists.

Addis Abeba ’s transformation has gained international recognition. UN-Habitat Executive Director Anacláudia Rossbach has praised the city’s sustainable urban planning efforts as a model for other African cities. She further stated that the city has increased its independent tax collection to fund its development, a strategy that could inspire other rapidly urbanizing African cities.

Despite these advancements, challenges remain. Construction material shortages, skill gaps, and occasional displacement of residents pose concerns. To mitigate these issues, the Addis Abeba administration has been working on compensating relocated homeowners and integrating community feedback into the urban planning process.

This urban transformation places Addis Abeba among other global cities implementing large-scale redevelopment projects, including Montreal, major Chinese cities, and Cairo. Beyond improving infrastructure, the transformation is fostering job creation, supporting small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and promoting a more inclusive and sustainable urban environment.

A significant focus of these changes has been addressing Addis Abeba ‘s transportation challenges. Factors such as urban expansion, population growth, and inadequate infrastructure contribute to congestion and inefficiencies. To tackle these issues, the city has implemented various interventions, including public transport improvements, road expansion projects, and sustainable mobility initiatives. These efforts aim to enhance the city’s transportation system, ensuring greater accessibility and efficiency for its growing population. 

This article delves into the underlying causes of mobility challenges in the city, analysing the various factors that contribute to traffic congestion, inefficient public transportation, and inadequate infrastructure. It examines how urban planning deficiencies, poor traffic management, insufficient investment in public transit, and a lack of pedestrian-friendly infrastructure have collectively hindered the city’s mobility.

Beyond identifying the root causes, the article also explores the far-reaching consequences of these mobility issues. The impacts extend beyond mere inconvenience, affecting multiple aspects of urban life. Socially, prolonged commute times and inadequate transport options disproportionately burden low-income residents. Economically, productivity losses, increased fuel consumption, and logistical inefficiencies hinder business operations and economic growth. Environmentally, heightened air and noise pollution contribute to health problems and reduce the overall quality of life.

Finally, the article highlights the sustainable solutions being implemented as part of the city’s ongoing urban transformation initiatives. These measures include significant investments in parking infrastructure, public transportation improvements, better traffic management, and the promotion of non-motorized transport options such as pedestrian walkways and cycling lanes. The city administration’s approach emphasizes long-term planning, ensuring that these efforts contribute to a more efficient, accessible, and environmentally friendly urban mobility system.

Decoding Causality: Understanding Mobility Constraints in Addis Abeba 

Core Problem and Immediate Causes

Constrained mobility in Addis Abeba has led to inefficiencies in urban transportation, reduced quality of life, and hindered economic development. The primary driver of this mobility crisis is severe traffic congestion, which arises from multiple interconnected factors.

Root Causes of Mobility Constraints

The root causes of Addis Abeba ’s traffic problems are diverse and deeply embedded in urban planning deficiencies. A lack of integrated land use and transportation planning, inadequate foresight in infrastructure development, and weak enforcement of planning regulations have all contributed to the current crisis. Additionally, the road network is both limited and inefficient, suffering from insufficient capacity, poor design, lack of strategic expansion, and inadequate maintenance. Ineffective traffic management further exacerbates congestion, making daily commutes increasingly difficult.

Public transportation is another major challenge, characterized by insufficient capacity, poor integration between different transport modes, weak regulation, and limited investment. Non-motorized transport options, such as pedestrian walkways and dedicated bike lanes, are largely absent, while safe pedestrian crossings are inadequate.

Parking management has historically been inefficient, with widespread on-street parking, a lack of off-street facilities, and ineffective enforcement contributing to the problem. Socio-economic factors, including rising car ownership, heavy reliance on private vehicles, and limited awareness of alternative transport options, further strain the urban mobility system.

As seen in this exhibit, one of the three lanes—the rightmost lane—is being used for taxi parking, while the leftmost lane is designated for minibus passenger pick-ups. As a result, out of the six available lanes, two are occupied (thirty three percent), contributing to both traffic congestion and an increased risk of accidents. This scenario is a clear reflection of how road space is utilized in Addis Abeba.

The critical question that arises is: Why are taxis parked on the road, and why do minibuses pick up and drop off passengers directly on the main asphalt road? The answer is simple—there is no designated terminal or parking area for these vehicles. While it is true that the city faces a shortage of road networks, the improper use of existing roads further exacerbates the problem.

To address this specific issue, a new parking facility covering 3,000 square meters is currently under development at this location. This initiative aims to provide a structured solution, reducing road obstructions and improving traffic flow in the area.

Impacts of Constrained Mobility

The consequences of constrained mobility in Addis Abeba are far-reaching. Commute times have increased drastically, disproportionately affecting low-income residents who rely on public transportation. Economic losses are substantial, with productivity declines, increased fuel consumption, and delays in business operations.

Environmental degradation is another major concern, as rising air and noise pollution contribute to serious health issues, particularly in high-traffic areas. The frequency of traffic accidents further adds to the crisis, resulting in injuries and fatalities. Ultimately, the overall quality of life is diminished due to stress, frustration, and lost time, while economic development is stifled by logistical difficulties in moving goods and people across the city.

Effectively addressing Addis Abeba’s mobility challenges demand a holistic and well-coordinated strategy. This includes improving urban planning to ensure better land use and transportation integration, enhancing public transportation to make it more reliable and accessible, investing in non-motorized transport options such as pedestrian walkways and bike lanes, and implementing more efficient traffic and parking management systems. 

Addis Ababa is actively engaged in significant infrastructure development to address its growing mobility challenges. As part of the city’s Second Phase Urban Transformation, which encompasses corridor development, redevelopment, and riverside projects, substantial construction is underway. This includes the building of 119.9 kilometres of asphalt roads, 246.3 kilometres of pedestrian walkways, and 140.7 kilometres of bike lanes. These projects represent a concerted effort to improve transportation infrastructure within the city.

Recognizing these pressing concerns, the city administration has been making significant investments in infrastructure improvements. A major focus has been placed on expanding pedestrian walkways, ensuring that walking remains a safe and viable mode of transport. Additionally, dedicated bike lanes are being introduced to encourage cycling as an alternative means of transportation, reducing reliance on motorized vehicles. Alongside these efforts, substantial resources are being allocated to developing new parking facilities and transportation terminals. By providing designated areas for vehicle parking and passenger transfers, the city aims to alleviate congestion caused by informal parking and roadside pickups.

With these ongoing reforms and infrastructure developments, Addis Abeba is steadily progressing toward a more efficient and sustainable urban mobility system. By prioritizing long-term solutions over short-term fixes, the city is laying the foundation for a transport network that supports economic growth, enhances quality of life, and minimizes environmental impact. Continued commitment to these initiatives will be essential in transforming Addis Abeba into a well-connected, accessible, and liveable City.

Positive Developments in Parking and Terminal Management

Despite these challenges, there have been notable improvements in parking management. A resident interviewed at a newly developed parking facility in Kazanchis area described how finding parking used to be a major challenge due to a lack of accessible and well-maintained spaces. Many parking lots were informal, unpaved, and posed security risks. However, the situation has improved significantly with the construction of new, well-equipped parking facilities in key locations, such as shopping districts and major roads. These spaces now include essential amenities like restrooms and are managed by legally registered enterprises, ensuring better security and organization. This transformation represents a significant step forward in addressing Addis Abeba ’s urban mobility challenges.

Your Safety, Our Priority

 Addressing these challenges requires a comprehensive approach. Improved urban planning is crucial, including developing a long-term integrated transportation plan, establishing a strong planning authority, and promoting mixed-use development. The road network must be improved through strategic expansion, better traffic management, and a comprehensive maintenance program. 

Public transportation needs a major overhaul, with increased capacity, an integrated system, improved management and regulation, and significant investment. Non-motorized transport should be prioritized through the construction of bike lanes and walkways, traffic calming measures, and bicycle parking facilities.  Parking management strategies, including off-street facilities, and strict enforcement are essential. 

The graph illustrates the expansion of parking infrastructure in the city, highlighting the growth in the number of parking areas (both completed and under development), the total land area allocated for these facilities, and their overall car capacity. This development reflects a significant investment by the city administration in addressing long-standing parking challenges and improving urban mobility.

A key driving force behind this initiative is the city’s commitment to alleviating traffic congestion through enhanced parking facilities. The focus is not only on increasing accessibility but also on improving the quality of these spaces. By ensuring well-structured and adequately maintained parking areas, the administration aims to create a more efficient and organized urban transport system.

The data presented in the graph clearly demonstrates this commitment, as evidenced by substantial growth across all three metrics. The number of parking areas has surged by 195%, while the land area dedicated to parking has expanded by 165%. Most notably, the overall parking capacity, measured by the number of cars these facilities can accommodate, has experienced an impressive 434% increase. These figures underscore the administration’s strong efforts in scaling up parking infrastructure to support better traffic management and urban mobility.

Conclusion 

The development of adequate parking lots for vehicles and terminals for public transportation has long been an overlooked aspect of Addis Abeba ’s infrastructure. The lack of these essential facilities has significantly hindered mobility, leading to a wide range of social, environmental, and economic challenges. Recognizing the severity of this issue, the city administration has committed substantial attention and resources to addressing the root causes of the problem.

As part of this initiative, the efforts to improve parking and terminal infrastructure are not only enhancing urban mobility but also generating considerable job opportunities. This dual benefit effectively tackles both transportation inefficiencies and unemployment, demonstrating a well-rounded approach to urban development. In essence, the city is addressing two major challenges simultaneously.

Ultimately, the city administration has embarked on a strategic path that prioritizes long-term, sustainable solutions over short-term fixes. By taking a comprehensive approach, Addis Abeba is already beginning to reap the rewards of its vision—transforming itself into a city that truly lives up to its name.

The post Unlocking Addis Abeba’s Traffic: A Path to Better Mobility appeared first on Abren.

Urban transformation in major cities is often seen as a response to growing populations, environmental challenges, and economic pressures. In cities like New York, London, and Tokyo, modernization has been crucial in addressing these very issues. Whether through comprehensive urban renewal projects or the reimagining of entire neighborhoods, the message is clear: cities must evolve to meet the demands of a new era.

Addis Ababa is following in these footsteps with its Second Phase Corridor Development, a bold initiative that is reshaping the city’s landscape while improving the quality of life for its residents. This project, which builds on the success of the first phase, extends its focus to eight key areas, demonstrating a comprehensive approach to urban growth. It’s not just about paving roads or erecting new buildings, this development is about fostering a sense of pride, security, and opportunity for millions.

The changes underway in Addis Ababa reflect a growing understanding that the well-being of residents is intimately tied to the health of the urban environment. Through the expansion of public spaces, the creation of recreational areas, the installation of sustainable infrastructure, and the revitalization of riverbanks, the project is transforming the city into a place where families can thrive. As seen in other global cities, when public spaces are thoughtfully designed, communities flourish this is the essence of what’s happening in Addis Ababa.

The transformation in Addis Ababa also mirrors efforts in cities such as Seoul, South Korea, which undertook major redevelopment of its urban spaces to combat pollution and congestion. Seoul’s Cheonggyecheon Stream Restoration Project, for example, revitalized a long-neglected waterway, turning it into a beautiful urban park that attracts tourists and improves the quality of life for locals. Addis Ababa’s initiatives are similarly focused on revitalizing polluted rivers and replacing informal settlements with sustainable, modern neighborhoods, thus improving public health and safety.

It’s not just the infrastructure that makes Addis Ababa’s transformation significant it’s the people. This development prioritizes inclusivity, ensuring that no one is left behind, regardless of their socioeconomic background. The focus on providing affordable housing, green spaces, and essential amenities is a commitment to improving the lives of all residents, from the wealthiest to the most vulnerable. This is a key lesson for other African cities, where rapid urbanization is also expected.  By placing people at the center of development, Addis Ababa is setting a precedent for how urban growth should be handled.

The creation of job opportunities, through projects like the new warehouse for job creation, provides tangible benefits to the city’s residents. This commitment to economic empowerment is essential, as African cities continue to grapple with youth unemployment. The integration of economic development and urban renewal will create new industries, foster entrepreneurship, and boost job creation, offering a path for African cities to become economic powerhouses.

But this is more than just about the present but also about the future. By investing in green spaces, improved sanitation, flood protection, and modern infrastructure, Addis Ababa is making itself a resilient city capable of adapting to the challenges of the coming decades. The lessons from cities around the world, whether it’s the green infrastructure of Copenhagen or the smart city strategies of Dubai, are evident in the Second Phase Corridor Development. It’s a model for sustainable urban development that addresses environmental, social, and economic concerns simultaneously.

 As African cities continue to grow, the importance of embracing change cannot be overstated. Addis Ababa’s bold steps are a reminder that urban transformation isn’t just possible, it’s necessary. The city’s development offers a blueprint that other African cities can adapt to their unique needs, one that balances progress with inclusivity, sustainability with innovation, and growth with resilience.

Just as cities around the world have embraced change, so too can African cities. Addis Ababa’s Second Phase Corridor Development isn’t just an opportunity to witness transformation, it’s an invitation to join a global movement of cities that are embracing their potential and reimagining their futures. Addis Ababa is embracing this transformation, turning communities into vibrant spaces that offer opportunities, sustainability, and prosperity for all.

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For context, Somalia’s initial alignment with Egypt—an archrival of Ethiopia—came as a response to Ethiopia’s Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland, a de-facto independent region that Somalia considers part of its sovereign territory. Egypt, ever wary of Ethiopia’s growing influence sought to draw Eritrea into a broader coalition aimed at containing Ethiopia’s maritime and Nile River ambitions.

While initially appearing to strengthen Somalia’s position vis-à-vis Ethiopia, the axis with Egypt and Eritrea risked alienating Turkey, in addition to Ethiopia. Turkey, economically the most important partner to Somalia, has poured the most financial and developmental resources into the Horn of Africa nation. Ethiopia for its part is the most crucial in helping Somalia combat the threat of Al Shabab. Losing both strategic partners to placate Cairo and Asmara would be a massive miscalculation, and one that the government of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) would be wise to avoid.

Moreover, the European Union and the United States, which play a significant role in funding the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), may oppose the idea of a peacekeeping force composed of both Ethiopia and Egypt—two nations with starkly conflicting geopolitical interests, particularly in light of their longstanding dispute over Nile water resource sharing. The inclusion of both may worsen Somalia’s internal conflicts, especially if each side takes onto backing a certain faction.

Indeed, the Ankara Declaration is a direct response to these competing pressures. By opting for a pragmatic partnership with Turkey and Ethiopia, Somalia ensures that it maintains critical diplomatic and security relationships. In return it recognized Ethiopia’s legitimate quest for reliable and unmediated access the sea. Considering the sea-access question by Addis Ababa, President Erdogan of Turkey stated, “the world is big enough for all of us”. 

This is not to say that Cairo and Asmara are irrelevant to Somalia’s calculations; however, their role in Somalia’s future is limited, and their strategic importance pales in comparison to that of Ethiopia and Turkey.

The Ankara Declaration has not been well-received by Cairo and Asmara. Both are reportedly looking for ways to undermine the agreement, likely out of frustration with Somalia’s shift away from their sphere of influence. Yet, despite their best efforts, Somalia’s government seems unlikely to renege on a deal that was facilitated by its most important international partner, Turkey. Western powers, too, have expressed overwhelming support for the agreement, underscoring its significance on the global stage.

More importantly, Somalia cannot afford to alienate Ethiopia, with which it shares a vast and porous border. For years, Ethiopian troops have been instrumental in combatting Al Shabab, a threat that continues to destabilize Somalia and the wider region. Without Ethiopia’s cooperation, Somalia’s security would be severely compromised, and peace and stability would remain elusive. While Egypt has sought to influence the Horn of Africa, its policies are often distant and disconnected from the practical realities on the ground in Somalia. If it were to send troops to Somalia, it will likely be at odds with Ethiopia’s mission, which would serve to deteriorate the security situation in Somalia. This of course would be a huge loss for Turkey, which needs peaceful coexistence to secure its many investments made in Somalia, which includes a significant share of Somalia’s maritime resources to include fisheries, as well as long range rocket test sites on the expansive Indian Ocean

The government of HSM likely understands that leveraging Egypt and Eritrea as a short-term tactic to put pressure on Ethiopia is just that—a temporary maneuver. Such a strategy might yield some tactical victories, but it cannot be sustained in the long run without endangering Somalia’s broader national interests. The Ankara Declaration, by contrast, offers a durable framework for collaboration with both Ethiopia and Turkey, two key players in Somalia’s future.

Therefore, The Ankara Declaration represents a wise recalibration of Somalia’s foreign policy. While it may have been tempting for Somalia to align itself with Egypt and Eritrea to counter Ethiopia, such a strategy would have come at the cost of essential partnerships with Turkey and Ethiopia. By embracing a more pragmatic approach, Somalia secures its position, as one that values strategic relationships over transient rivalries. For Mogadishu, the path forward is clear: collaboration, not confrontation, is the key to securing peace and stability.

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Hundreds of thousands of people in dozens of cities and towns across Ethiopia’s Amhara region have taken to the streets in a powerful demand for peace. Amid a year of violent conflict between the government and the Fano rebels, demonstrators are calling for an immediate end to the armed conflict, the restoration of safety and security, and the return of normalcy to their daily lives. Demonstrators defied threats by Fano not to come out onto the streets.

The Fano, a group of rebels seeking the violent overthrow of the Ethiopian government in Addis Ababa, has increasingly resorted to brutal tactics in recent months. Their violent campaign has resulted in widespread fear and suffering, including kidnappings, extrajudicial executions, closure of school, and the disruption of entire communities. Despite these grave threats, demonstrators have bravely marched across the Amhara region, demanding an end to the violence that has torn apart families and devastated lives.

Many of the protesters, mostly ordinary citizens who have endured the suffering of conflict for far too long, carried signs with bold messages, calling on armed combatants to lay down their weapons and allow safe passage for students and civilians. The blockades, often set up by Fano fighters to hinder military movement and disrupt daily life, have paralyzed entire regions. For many, the protests represent more than just an end to fighting—it is a call for the restoration of basic human rights and a return to peace.

In recent months, the rebels have executed and kidnapped hundreds. These shocking acts of violence have left scars on the community, leading to a deep sense of grief and outrage. By marching through the streets, these demonstrators are not only mourning the lives lost but are also making it clear that they will no longer stand in silence.

The significance of these protests cannot be overstated. For months, there had been an overwhelming fear of speaking out against the Fano, as the group’s violent retribution against anyone perceived as opposing them was swift and deadly. The fear of retaliation kept many quiet, with citizens forced into a state of constant anxiety and distrust. However, the bravery of these demonstrators marks a new chapter for the region. 

2024 has been a year of intense armed conflict, as Ethiopia’s security forces have engaged in direct combat with the Fano, using drones and airstrikes to target rebel positions. Tragically, these operations have also resulted in civilian casualties, further compounding the region’s suffering. Amid this military escalation, there have even been signs of infighting within the Fano itself, with factions of the group reportedly turning on each other. This fragmentation has made the rebels even more dangerous and unpredictable, further escalating the crisis in the region.

Yet, despite the growing violence, the message from these protests is clear: the people of Amhara are no longer willing to tolerate the endless bloodshed and fear. The unity displayed by protesters across cities is a significant shift in the region’s political and social landscape. For many, this is the first time in months that they have dared to speak out in such a public and unified manner, showing that, even in the face of violence and intimidation, hope for peace can still survive.

This movement, while still unfolding, represents a pivotal moment in the struggle for peace in Ethiopia’s Amhara region. It is a stark reminder that, even in the darkest times, the collective will of the people can inspire change. As these demonstrations continue to grow, there is a renewed sense of hope that the region’s ongoing conflict will come to an end—not through more violence, but through the strength and resilience of its people, standing together in the name of peace.

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This is an excerpt from the latest extended version of “Getting Ethiopia Dead Wrong” a book by veteran Horn of Africa correspondent Rasmus Sonderris

A quick Google search finds that “Meaza Mohammed is an Ethiopian journalist and human rights activist”. Countless newspaper articles depict her as an advocate for raped women. International organizations dedicated to press freedom portray her as persecuted for speaking truth to power. The website of the US State Department, no less, pays homage to her in this manner:

This honorable mention is because the State Department bestowed upon her the International Women of Courage Award on March 8, 2023, at a ceremony with First Lady Jill Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Following up on this event, a Voice of America video opens with the words: “Meaza Mohamed was arrested three times within the span of one year, all for doing her job.”

Meaza Mohammed is not only the founder, but also the chief editor and voiceover woman of Roha TV, one of the more successful of a plethora of ethnic-based Youtube channels produced by Ethiopians in the West. These can be watched freely in Ethiopia too (although until July 2023, a VPN was required). Most of the worldwide sympathy with Meaza Mohammed predates the Fano insurgency in the Amhara Region, which broke out in April 2023, but she was known in Ethiopia as an ethnonationalist firebrand before that. Certainly, Roha TV today is wholly dedicated to propagandizing for Fano, which is, as of 2024, just like the TPLF was until late 2022, an irregular army with the ambition of toppling the elected federal government. However, in this case, the first obstacle on its warpath is the local Amhara regional government, which also has a democratic mandate dating from 2021. We shall return to how Fano both resembles and differs from the two other major ethnonationalist militias in Ethiopia, the TPLF and OLA.

Roha TV serves up a fare of ethnicity-obsessed hate-, fear- and war-mongering. One claim is that the capital Addis Ababa, whose population is majority Amhara, is now in the hands of Oromo extremists who hate all things Amhara.

Roha TV is not all doom, however, as a triumphalist tone is important for recruitment. Just like the TPLF’s propagandists, Fano’s Meaza Mohammed plays a tune about human rights in English, but beats the drums of war in her own language. For instance, at the Amhara Grand Convention, held by the Confederation of Amharas in North America in Atlanta, USA, on March 9-10, 2024, she delivered a fiery speech in Amharic.^[4] Dressed in a T-shirt with three raised fists in the Ethiopian colors, she denounced the realists within the movement who seek a negotiated settlement: “We’re not talking about politics, in which we engage in compromise,”^[5] she thundered, and ended on this note: “We’re saying that if we don’t achieve victory, the outcome will be our destruction as a people. If this does not bother you, those of us who do care will struggle and we will win, and you better get out of our way!”^[6]

The last part is a thinly veiled threat to fellow Amharas who disagree with her. Many of them have been killed. Apart from attacks on federal soldiers and officers, basically anyone in constitutional authority in the Amhara Region, such as mayors, policemen, journalists for government media, and elected members of the regional parliament live with the risk of assassination. In some cases, bounties have been placed on their heads on social media.

In May 2024, I travelled to Bahir Dar, the beautiful capital of Amhara Region by the shores of Lake Tana. Despite a curfew in force after 8pm, life goes on. Amhara Region is suffering an insurgency, but not, as Tigray during the war with the TPLF, an all-encompassing insurgency regime. Banks and businesses continue to function. The mobile-phone network is up, but not for data. Those who can afford a coffee at a major hotel can get a wifi password for internet access. In general, the mood is depressed. People complain of disinvestment, economic sabotage, absence of tourists and rich people fleeing the city: “If they don’t pay Fano, Fano kills them, and if they do pay, the government arrests them,” the locals explained to me. In the parts of the countryside where Fano is in control, either schools have been closed or parents are afraid of sending their children.

There are no two ways about it. Meaza Mohammed campaigns and raises funds for Ethiopians killing Ethiopians, and particularly for Amharas killing Amharas. Of course, she and her backers genuinely believe that this is for a noble cause. To convince themselves and others that Fano’s killings are just, rather than extremist, they play up how the State Department as well as do-gooders around the world celebrate Meaza Mohammed as a champion of human rights. The international community’s failure to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate violence is depressingly déjà vu from the war with the TPLF.

“Getting Ethiopia Dead Wrong” is now available on Amazon Kindle, paperback, or hardcover

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Ethiopia, with a population of 130 million, has experienced remarkable economic expansion over the past two decades, positioning itself as one of the world’s fastest-growing economies. As a landlocked country, Ethiopia’s access to reliable and efficient ports is crucial for its trade, imports, and exports. Given this, port services in the Horn of Africa are highly coveted. Historically, Ethiopia relied heavily on Djibouti for access to the sea after losing the ports of Massawa and Assab in 1993, following the secession of Eritrea. Djibouti has since served as Ethiopia’s primary gateway to international trade, with the port of Djibouti handling the majority of Ethiopian cargo.

However, Ethiopia’s dependence on Djibouti has long been a point of strategic concern for Addis Ababa. In recent years, the Ethiopian government has sought to diversify its access to maritime routes to reduce its reliance on a single port. The government has explored several alternatives, including the newly developed port of Lamu in Kenya. However, the progress of infrastructure projects, including vital road and rail connections between Lamu and Ethiopia, has been slow. Political and security challenges have also hindered Ethiopia’s efforts to secure alternative routes through Sudan and Eritrea, limiting the impact of these ports.

As a result, Ethiopia has increasingly turned its attention to other regional ports, particularly in the semi-autonomous regions of Somaliland and Puntland. Both territories—Berbera in Somaliland and Bosaso in Puntland—have been seeking to attract foreign investment, but their status remains contentious. While Somaliland and Puntland both claim independence, the Somali government in Mogadishu regards them as part of its territory, complicating the legal and political landscape for international investors.

The rivalry intensified after Dubai-based DP World, a global port operator, became a key player in the region. After losing the concession to operate the Doraleh Container Terminal in Djibouti in 2018, DP World shifted its focus to the ports of Berbera and Bosaso. It has secured long-term contracts in both locations, promising to invest heavily in their development and significantly improve their infrastructure. This strategy puts DP World in direct competition with Djibouti, which has traditionally been Ethiopia’s main port partner.

In January of this year, Ethiopia and Somaliland reached an agreement allowing Ethiopia to develop port facilities on 20 kilometers of Somaliland’s coastline for a period of 50 years. This agreement gives Ethiopia a foothold in Berbera, positioning it as a key alternative to Djibouti for Ethiopian trade. The move is part of Ethiopia’s broader strategy to diversify its port access and reduce its vulnerability to political and economic changes in Djibouti.

However, Djibouti’s latest strategic move—offering Ethiopia the opportunity to operate the Tadjoura port—appears to be a direct attempt to undermine Ethiopia’s growing involvement in rival ports. Tadjoura, located on the opposite side of the Gulf of Tadjoura from Djibouti’s main port, was completed in 2017. Despite its potential, the port is still relatively small and lacks significant capacity compared to other regional ports. Built at a cost of $90 million, it has just two berths, a short Roll-on/Roll-off (RoRo) quay, and a depth of 12 meters, which limits its ability to handle larger vessels. Nonetheless, Djibouti’s offer to let Ethiopia operate Tadjoura represents an effort to create a new avenue for Ethiopian trade, while also attempting to solidify Djibouti’s role as Ethiopia’s primary port partner.

Djibouti’s decision to involve Ethiopia in the operation of Tadjoura is likely motivated by several factors. First, it may be an attempt to secure Ethiopia’s continued reliance on Djibouti for access to the sea, even as Ethiopia seeks alternatives. By offering Ethiopia the chance to develop Tadjoura, Djibouti may be trying to ensure that Ethiopia does not fully commit to the rival ports in Somaliland and Puntland. Second, it reflects the growing importance of port infrastructure in the region, where access to seaports is not just an economic matter, but also a strategic one.

While Tadjoura’s infrastructure may still be modest, its potential role in Ethiopia’s broader trade strategy should not be underestimated. With ongoing regional competition for access to Ethiopia’s booming economy, the outcome of this port rivalry will likely have far-reaching implications for the Horn of Africa’s geopolitical and economic landscape. As Ethiopia continues to explore alternative port options, including its growing involvement in Somaliland, Djibouti will need to carefully balance its offers with the broader regional competition to maintain its position as Ethiopia’s primary maritime gateway.

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The Ethiopian government has been working for four years to establish a securities exchange as part of its broader economic reform and liberalisation agenda. This includes the recent decision to allow the Ethiopian birr (ETB) to float freely and open up strategic sectors such as banking and telecommunications to competition.

The exchange’s debut will feature several significant state-owned enterprises, including Ethio Telecom, the Ethiopian Insurance Corporation, and the Ethiopian Shipping and Logistics Services Enterprise (ESLSE), which will be listed on the platform. The government views the move as a way to break the long-standing dominance of nationalised entities in the economy, increase Ethiopia’s global competitiveness, and attract foreign direct investment.

Local reports suggest that over 90 companies are expected to list on the exchange within its first few weeks of operation. So far, the exchange has raised approximately 1.6 billion birr (around $13 million) in capital.

In a bid to bolster investor trust and ensure the safety of investments, ECMA has introduced new transparency and disclosure rules. These measures are intended to enhance the credibility of the market and reassure both local and international investors.

At a recent event in Addis Ababa, Hana Tehelku, the Director-General of ECMA, highlighted that the new guidelines are essential for creating a well-regulated capital market. She explained that the measures focus on increasing transparency, standardising processes, and safeguarding investor interests, all in alignment with the country’s broader economic objectives.

The new rules include mandatory annual audited financial statements for listed companies, along with ongoing communication with shareholders. To further protect investors, a “pre-emptive rights” clause will allow existing shareholders to maintain their proportional ownership when additional shares are issued, thus preventing dilution of their holdings.

Additionally, companies will be required to demonstrate adequate capital reserves to reduce the risk of defaults and protect shareholder investments. ECMA will oversee the implementation and enforcement of these regulations.

While such regulations are common in many stock exchanges globally, some African markets have faced challenges in assuring investors of the safety of their capital due to insufficient transparency and weak disclosure practices.

A 2022 report from the African Development Bank (AfDB) noted that international investors may hesitate to engage in markets where they lack confidence in the disclosure standards, even if the underlying investments appear solid.

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Even in the event of peace, Ethiopia is not going to achieve a democratic political culture overnight. It may even get worse before it gets better. However, it is wrong and reckless to conclude that violence is now a last resort. During the darkest years of the TPLF/EPRDF, when armed resistance was in every way legitimate, I personally disagreed with that path, not out of pacifism, but from a strategic perspective. Because violence begets violence. Conversely, making the most of a small democratic space can expand democracy. There are plenty of political parties in Ethiopia that have taken this path. Some examples are the National Movement of Amhara (NaMA), Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice, EZEMA, the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), the Enat Party, and the Tigray Democratic Party (TDP). Some of them complain of all manners of harassment. In the name of national unity, others have joined the government and been awarded with places in the cabinet, but they too will be running against the ruling Prosperity Party in the next election in 2026.

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has often promised a peaceful transition of power, if he loses at the polls. It is admittedly hard to find Ethiopians who envisage that, if push comes to shove, he and the powerful people around him will just admit defeat and gracefully swap places with the opposition. But this needs to be tested rather than dismissed out of hand in a call to arms by actors whose democratic credentials are actually more dubious than the government’s.

Many have accused me of “shilling for the regime”, even of being a paid mouthpiece and what not. Of course, I would never take money from a party to a conflict that I am covering as an independent. Apart from giving interviews to Ethiopian state media, I have never even met anyone from the Ethiopian government, which has committed and will undoubtedly continue to commit acts that I disagree with, even condemn. Most international classifications use the term “hybrid regime” about the current system, that is, a mix of authoritarianism and democracy. This is probably fair.

But it is the legitimate government. It may sometimes commit illegitimate acts, but none of the armed alternatives today has a shred of legitimacy, let alone any prospect of making things better. Even if the government sometimes categorizes fair criticism as “incitement” and misuses the judiciary as in the bad old days, constructive opposition is the only way to go. Ethiopians demand solutions to everyday problems like long lines for public transport, bribe-demanding traffic police, power cuts, red tape, pollution, unaffordable healthcare, homelessness, low-quality schools, etc. Fundamentally, ethnic rivalry is not the root cause of war, but ethnic rivalry is an effective mobilizer for war. Unresolved bread-and-butter problems can make people vote for the opposition, but do not usually make them pick up a gun. If the most urgent issue of security gets under control, peaceful political competition should be able to focus on the second- most urgent issues, like growing the economy and fighting corruption. Conversely, if security continues to be the overriding concern, democracy, human rights and even good governance will look increasingly like unaffordable luxuries.

When I first got involved in opining on war in Ethiopia around November 2021, I set myself the goal of getting through it without regret. Notwithstanding some quick- tempered tweets,390 the only thing I would change, if I could go back, would be the headline of my speech for the Danish Society of Engineers in March 2022, in which I characterized Ethiopia as “a fellow democracy”. This was overselling a point in the heat of the propaganda battles. Building an Ethiopian democracy, let alone a democratic culture, remains a daunting project with no guarantee of completion. As we have seen, it backslides under pressure and polarization. Tensions lurk and can erupt into the next big war, in which the security state takes over and rolls back the reforms.

And yet, there is hope. The vast majority of Ethiopians both preach and practice multiethnic cooperation. Although ethnically-exclusive rebel outfits brandishing genocide hashtags still have too much manpower and firepower, their popularity seems to be in decline.

Meanwhile, outside of Ethiopia, despite the endurance of a narrative about a “Tigray genocide”, the Pretoria Peace Agreement has become unanimously endorsed. The TPLF has not been properly disarmed or stopped being a threat, but nearly everyone agrees that it should. The TPLF is unlikely to get much international support for another round of aggression under the cover of resisting a genocide. A retired Western diplomat told me that one lesson had been learned after all: “We should have listened less to the media and more to the African Union.” Indeed, and the African Union issticking firmly to the Pretoria Agreement.

However, there has been no reckoning over the tragic cost of achieving the Pretoria Agreement. Those who got Ethiopia dead wrong are not wondering aloud why the TPLF sent young Tigrayans to kill and die for peace terms that could have been easily obtained without firing a shot. Having learned so little, the world is perfectly capable of getting Ethiopia and other countries dead wrong yet again.

With this in mind, the final word goes to Dr. Steven Were Omamo, the results-oriented humanitarian sabotaged by self-serving, glory-seeking cowboy humanitarians during the war ‘At the Centre of the World in Ethiopia’:

“I also lament how the politics of major powers was allowed to infiltrate and corrupt a fragile but promising science-based process, destroying hard-earned credibility, along with the trust that went with that. Nobody has admitted that ‘the people are dying of hunger in Tigray’ narrative was total fabrication. There were no consequences. There are never any consequences as the ‘international community’ recycles itself from crisis to crisis. Incompetent and unethical people who lie, distort, and mess up can just walk away and do the same thing somewhere else. To me, that is annoying. For the world, it should be unacceptable.”

“Getting Ethiopia Dead Wrong” is now available on Amazon Kindle, paperback, or hardcover

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