The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea have become zones of escalating tensions, where economic, military, and diplomatic ambitions intersect. This strategic region, connecting Asia, Europe, and Africa, plays a key role in international relations. While its geopolitical importance continues to grow, it is also a battleground for influence, where regional and global powers compete for dominance. The isolation of Eritrea’s regime under Isaias Afwerki, Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions, and the increasing involvement of Gulf powers—including Saudi Arabia—further complicate an already fragile balance.

Given these dynamics, the future of the region remains uncertain. Without a concerted diplomatic approach and greater cooperation, an escalation with potentially devastating consequences cannot be ruled out.

Context: A Coveted Red Sea

The Red Sea is a major commercial crossroads and a focal point of geopolitical rivalries. Eritrea, with its strategic port of Assab, and Djibouti, which controls the southern entrance to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, play crucial roles in global oil transport. Somalia, for its part, boasts an extensive coastline along the Gulf of Aden—an asset that could strengthen its regional influence and enhance its role in global maritime trade.

Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey have expanded their presence in the region by establishing military bases and making substantial investments. The competition for control over this critical maritime corridor is not only a concern for these nations but also has significant implications for Ethiopia. Despite being landlocked, Ethiopia remains a key regional player with a vested interest in Red Sea access.

Eritrea: A Regime Entrapped by Its Obsession with Tigray

Under Isaias Afwerki’s rule, Eritrea remains one of the world’s most closed states and among Africa’s most repressive regimes, characterized by widespread repression and strict control over information. After more than 30 years of authoritarian rule, the country enforces indefinite military service and prohibits any form of organized opposition, thereby consolidating the regime’s grip on power.

Asmara’s regime is built on a nationalist ideology, fueled by a historical hostility toward the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and Tigray, which it perceives as an existential threat. This rivalry has led to massive militarization and the prolongation of compulsory conscription.

The 2022 Pretoria peace agreement, signed to end the conflict between the Ethiopian government and the TPLF, was viewed by Afwerki as an acknowledgment of the TPLF and Tigray. Considering this treaty a challenge to his regional influence, he hardened his stance toward Ethiopia and continues to perceive the so-called “Tigrayan threat” as an obstacle to regional stability.

Recent internal divisions within the TPLF—driven by political tensions and regional dynamics—present an opportunity for Asmara to extend its influence. If the situation deteriorates further, it could reignite tensions in the region and pose an even greater threat to the fragile stability of the Horn of Africa.

Abiy Ahmed’s Diplomatic Actions: Reforms and Challenges

Since assuming office, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has profoundly reshaped Ethiopian diplomacy, seeking to ease tensions in a region marked by both internal and external conflicts. His most notable initiative was the 2018 peace agreement with Eritrea, which ended two decades of a cold war between the two nations and earned him the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize. While this agreement paved the way for a fragile reconciliation, it did not resolve key disputes—particularly Ethiopia’s quest for access to the sea.

At the same time, Abiy Ahmed has sought to reposition Ethiopia on the international stage, strengthening ties with Gulf powers. However, his diplomatic efforts face internal challenges, including ethnic conflicts and geopolitical rivalries that extend beyond Ethiopia’s borders, turning the region into a battleground for political and strategic control over maritime routes and resources.

Key Players: Conflicting Interests

Recently, Saudi Arabia proposed a multi-billion-dollar investment in the port of Assab—a strategic project that could redefine geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa. This Saudi initiative aims to bolster its influence in the Red Sea while simultaneously shoring up Eritrea’s regime against Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions. Such a development could further complicate Abiy Ahmed’s efforts to secure direct sea access and significantly impact the regional balance of power.

Abiy’s agreements with Gulf powers—particularly the UAE—could provide critical leverage to counterbalance the rising influence of Asmara and Riyadh. As Ethiopia continues its pursuit of direct sea access, it must navigate a complex landscape of alliances and geopolitical interests at both regional and global levels.

Although Abiy Ahmed’s peace agreement with Eritrea temporarily eased tensions, the Afwerki regime remains firm in denying Ethiopia access to Eritrean ports, despite Ethiopia’s diplomatic overtures. Control over Eritrean ports—particularly Assab—remains a major point of contention, threatening to reignite regional tensions.

Towards Reconciliation or a New Escalation?

Mounting tensions—with Ethiopia, internal dissidents, and Eritrea’s neighbors—could pave the way for internal shifts within the Asmara regime. However, an insurgency or direct Ethiopian intervention could exacerbate the situation, with unpredictable consequences for regional stability.

Abiy Ahmed’s role as both a reformer and a mediator will be crucial. His ability to navigate internal challenges while maintaining constructive dialogue with neighboring states could be the key to preventing further escalation and transforming tensions into opportunities for peace and development.

Conclusion: The Future of the Region in Limbo

The current situation remains volatile, with regional stability hanging in the balance. Under Abiy Ahmed’s leadership, Ethiopia continues to play a central diplomatic role in the pursuit of peace, but geopolitical rivalries and the issue of maritime access complicate the country’s future.

The region’s fate will depend on whether key stakeholders can overcome their differences and prioritize peaceful solutions. However, as long as the Afwerki regime persists in its repressive policies, stability will remain elusive. Abiy Ahmed’s role as a reformer will be critical in paving the way for lasting reconciliation.

The international community must rally to support these efforts, advocating for democratic reforms and an end to policies of hostility. Without genuine internal transformation in Eritrea, the region risks remaining trapped in a cycle of violence and suffering—further delaying the prospects of lasting peace and sustainable regional development.

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World-Class Facilities for a Global Stage

Spanning 40 hectares, the AICC is designed to accommodate large-scale international conferences, trade expos, and national events. Key features of the center include:

• Two massive halls capable of hosting between 3,000 to 4,000 attendees each.
• Eight medium and small-sized meeting rooms with a total capacity of 10,000 people.
• Two hotels with a combined capacity of 1,000 rooms, ensuring comfortable accommodation for guests.
• A vast outdoor exhibition space capable of hosting up to 50,000 visitors, making it one of the largest venues of its kind in Ethiopia.
• Additional facilities, including two amphitheaters, two shopping malls, banks, restaurants, and commercial spaces.
• A parking area with a capacity for 2,000 vehicles to ease accessibility.

These amenities position the AICC as a premier destination for global business summits, cultural exchanges, and policy dialogues.

A Catalyst for Economic Transformation

In his keynote speech, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed highlighted the AICC as more than just a venue; it is a platform for economic and intellectual advancement. According to the Prime Minister, when his government initially considered building a convention center, the Mayor of Addis Ababa informed them that there was already a previous plan within the city to construct such a facility. Applying the ‘Medemer’ philosophy he noted, the government took this existing plan, expanded upon it, integrated additional elements such as corridor development, and refined the project to maximize its impact. This approach not only optimized resources but also ensured that the convention center would serve as a hub for trade, knowledge, and diplomacy.

Strengthening Ethiopia’s Position on the Global Stage

The AICC is poised to attract major international conferences, diplomatic engagements, and trade fairs, strengthening Ethiopia’s position as a leading destination for global discourse. Prime Minister Abiy acknowledged the contributions of affluent Ethiopians who have supported infrastructure projects, particularly the self-financed corridor development initiative. He called on federal and regional leadership to maintain momentum, emphasizing that this inauguration is just the beginning of Ethiopia’s infrastructural renaissance.

Conclusion: A Call for Sustained Collaboration

The Addis International Convention Center represents a pivotal moment in Ethiopia’s developmental journey. It exemplifies the power of cooperation between government entities and the private sector in realizing ambitious projects. As Ethiopia continues its path toward economic transformation, the success of the AICC will depend on sustained collaboration, innovative thinking, and a commitment to leveraging this facility for national and international growth.

The call is clear: government leaders, business communities, and young entrepreneurs must embrace the opportunities presented by the AICC to foster trade, education, and diplomacy. By doing so, Ethiopia will not only strengthen its economic resilience but also shape its global identity as a center for knowledge and prosperity.

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Urban transformation in major cities is often seen as a response to growing populations, environmental challenges, and economic pressures. In cities like New York, London, and Tokyo, modernization has been crucial in addressing these very issues. Whether through comprehensive urban renewal projects or the reimagining of entire neighborhoods, the message is clear: cities must evolve to meet the demands of a new era.

Addis Ababa is following in these footsteps with its Second Phase Corridor Development, a bold initiative that is reshaping the city’s landscape while improving the quality of life for its residents. This project, which builds on the success of the first phase, extends its focus to eight key areas, demonstrating a comprehensive approach to urban growth. It’s not just about paving roads or erecting new buildings, this development is about fostering a sense of pride, security, and opportunity for millions.

The changes underway in Addis Ababa reflect a growing understanding that the well-being of residents is intimately tied to the health of the urban environment. Through the expansion of public spaces, the creation of recreational areas, the installation of sustainable infrastructure, and the revitalization of riverbanks, the project is transforming the city into a place where families can thrive. As seen in other global cities, when public spaces are thoughtfully designed, communities flourish this is the essence of what’s happening in Addis Ababa.

The transformation in Addis Ababa also mirrors efforts in cities such as Seoul, South Korea, which undertook major redevelopment of its urban spaces to combat pollution and congestion. Seoul’s Cheonggyecheon Stream Restoration Project, for example, revitalized a long-neglected waterway, turning it into a beautiful urban park that attracts tourists and improves the quality of life for locals. Addis Ababa’s initiatives are similarly focused on revitalizing polluted rivers and replacing informal settlements with sustainable, modern neighborhoods, thus improving public health and safety.

It’s not just the infrastructure that makes Addis Ababa’s transformation significant it’s the people. This development prioritizes inclusivity, ensuring that no one is left behind, regardless of their socioeconomic background. The focus on providing affordable housing, green spaces, and essential amenities is a commitment to improving the lives of all residents, from the wealthiest to the most vulnerable. This is a key lesson for other African cities, where rapid urbanization is also expected.  By placing people at the center of development, Addis Ababa is setting a precedent for how urban growth should be handled.

The creation of job opportunities, through projects like the new warehouse for job creation, provides tangible benefits to the city’s residents. This commitment to economic empowerment is essential, as African cities continue to grapple with youth unemployment. The integration of economic development and urban renewal will create new industries, foster entrepreneurship, and boost job creation, offering a path for African cities to become economic powerhouses.

But this is more than just about the present but also about the future. By investing in green spaces, improved sanitation, flood protection, and modern infrastructure, Addis Ababa is making itself a resilient city capable of adapting to the challenges of the coming decades. The lessons from cities around the world, whether it’s the green infrastructure of Copenhagen or the smart city strategies of Dubai, are evident in the Second Phase Corridor Development. It’s a model for sustainable urban development that addresses environmental, social, and economic concerns simultaneously.

 As African cities continue to grow, the importance of embracing change cannot be overstated. Addis Ababa’s bold steps are a reminder that urban transformation isn’t just possible, it’s necessary. The city’s development offers a blueprint that other African cities can adapt to their unique needs, one that balances progress with inclusivity, sustainability with innovation, and growth with resilience.

Just as cities around the world have embraced change, so too can African cities. Addis Ababa’s Second Phase Corridor Development isn’t just an opportunity to witness transformation, it’s an invitation to join a global movement of cities that are embracing their potential and reimagining their futures. Addis Ababa is embracing this transformation, turning communities into vibrant spaces that offer opportunities, sustainability, and prosperity for all.

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Hundreds of thousands of people in dozens of cities and towns across Ethiopia’s Amhara region have taken to the streets in a powerful demand for peace. Amid a year of violent conflict between the government and the Fano rebels, demonstrators are calling for an immediate end to the armed conflict, the restoration of safety and security, and the return of normalcy to their daily lives. Demonstrators defied threats by Fano not to come out onto the streets.

The Fano, a group of rebels seeking the violent overthrow of the Ethiopian government in Addis Ababa, has increasingly resorted to brutal tactics in recent months. Their violent campaign has resulted in widespread fear and suffering, including kidnappings, extrajudicial executions, closure of school, and the disruption of entire communities. Despite these grave threats, demonstrators have bravely marched across the Amhara region, demanding an end to the violence that has torn apart families and devastated lives.

Many of the protesters, mostly ordinary citizens who have endured the suffering of conflict for far too long, carried signs with bold messages, calling on armed combatants to lay down their weapons and allow safe passage for students and civilians. The blockades, often set up by Fano fighters to hinder military movement and disrupt daily life, have paralyzed entire regions. For many, the protests represent more than just an end to fighting—it is a call for the restoration of basic human rights and a return to peace.

In recent months, the rebels have executed and kidnapped hundreds. These shocking acts of violence have left scars on the community, leading to a deep sense of grief and outrage. By marching through the streets, these demonstrators are not only mourning the lives lost but are also making it clear that they will no longer stand in silence.

The significance of these protests cannot be overstated. For months, there had been an overwhelming fear of speaking out against the Fano, as the group’s violent retribution against anyone perceived as opposing them was swift and deadly. The fear of retaliation kept many quiet, with citizens forced into a state of constant anxiety and distrust. However, the bravery of these demonstrators marks a new chapter for the region. 

2024 has been a year of intense armed conflict, as Ethiopia’s security forces have engaged in direct combat with the Fano, using drones and airstrikes to target rebel positions. Tragically, these operations have also resulted in civilian casualties, further compounding the region’s suffering. Amid this military escalation, there have even been signs of infighting within the Fano itself, with factions of the group reportedly turning on each other. This fragmentation has made the rebels even more dangerous and unpredictable, further escalating the crisis in the region.

Yet, despite the growing violence, the message from these protests is clear: the people of Amhara are no longer willing to tolerate the endless bloodshed and fear. The unity displayed by protesters across cities is a significant shift in the region’s political and social landscape. For many, this is the first time in months that they have dared to speak out in such a public and unified manner, showing that, even in the face of violence and intimidation, hope for peace can still survive.

This movement, while still unfolding, represents a pivotal moment in the struggle for peace in Ethiopia’s Amhara region. It is a stark reminder that, even in the darkest times, the collective will of the people can inspire change. As these demonstrations continue to grow, there is a renewed sense of hope that the region’s ongoing conflict will come to an end—not through more violence, but through the strength and resilience of its people, standing together in the name of peace.

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Ethiopia, with a population of 130 million, has experienced remarkable economic expansion over the past two decades, positioning itself as one of the world’s fastest-growing economies. As a landlocked country, Ethiopia’s access to reliable and efficient ports is crucial for its trade, imports, and exports. Given this, port services in the Horn of Africa are highly coveted. Historically, Ethiopia relied heavily on Djibouti for access to the sea after losing the ports of Massawa and Assab in 1993, following the secession of Eritrea. Djibouti has since served as Ethiopia’s primary gateway to international trade, with the port of Djibouti handling the majority of Ethiopian cargo.

However, Ethiopia’s dependence on Djibouti has long been a point of strategic concern for Addis Ababa. In recent years, the Ethiopian government has sought to diversify its access to maritime routes to reduce its reliance on a single port. The government has explored several alternatives, including the newly developed port of Lamu in Kenya. However, the progress of infrastructure projects, including vital road and rail connections between Lamu and Ethiopia, has been slow. Political and security challenges have also hindered Ethiopia’s efforts to secure alternative routes through Sudan and Eritrea, limiting the impact of these ports.

As a result, Ethiopia has increasingly turned its attention to other regional ports, particularly in the semi-autonomous regions of Somaliland and Puntland. Both territories—Berbera in Somaliland and Bosaso in Puntland—have been seeking to attract foreign investment, but their status remains contentious. While Somaliland and Puntland both claim independence, the Somali government in Mogadishu regards them as part of its territory, complicating the legal and political landscape for international investors.

The rivalry intensified after Dubai-based DP World, a global port operator, became a key player in the region. After losing the concession to operate the Doraleh Container Terminal in Djibouti in 2018, DP World shifted its focus to the ports of Berbera and Bosaso. It has secured long-term contracts in both locations, promising to invest heavily in their development and significantly improve their infrastructure. This strategy puts DP World in direct competition with Djibouti, which has traditionally been Ethiopia’s main port partner.

In January of this year, Ethiopia and Somaliland reached an agreement allowing Ethiopia to develop port facilities on 20 kilometers of Somaliland’s coastline for a period of 50 years. This agreement gives Ethiopia a foothold in Berbera, positioning it as a key alternative to Djibouti for Ethiopian trade. The move is part of Ethiopia’s broader strategy to diversify its port access and reduce its vulnerability to political and economic changes in Djibouti.

However, Djibouti’s latest strategic move—offering Ethiopia the opportunity to operate the Tadjoura port—appears to be a direct attempt to undermine Ethiopia’s growing involvement in rival ports. Tadjoura, located on the opposite side of the Gulf of Tadjoura from Djibouti’s main port, was completed in 2017. Despite its potential, the port is still relatively small and lacks significant capacity compared to other regional ports. Built at a cost of $90 million, it has just two berths, a short Roll-on/Roll-off (RoRo) quay, and a depth of 12 meters, which limits its ability to handle larger vessels. Nonetheless, Djibouti’s offer to let Ethiopia operate Tadjoura represents an effort to create a new avenue for Ethiopian trade, while also attempting to solidify Djibouti’s role as Ethiopia’s primary port partner.

Djibouti’s decision to involve Ethiopia in the operation of Tadjoura is likely motivated by several factors. First, it may be an attempt to secure Ethiopia’s continued reliance on Djibouti for access to the sea, even as Ethiopia seeks alternatives. By offering Ethiopia the chance to develop Tadjoura, Djibouti may be trying to ensure that Ethiopia does not fully commit to the rival ports in Somaliland and Puntland. Second, it reflects the growing importance of port infrastructure in the region, where access to seaports is not just an economic matter, but also a strategic one.

While Tadjoura’s infrastructure may still be modest, its potential role in Ethiopia’s broader trade strategy should not be underestimated. With ongoing regional competition for access to Ethiopia’s booming economy, the outcome of this port rivalry will likely have far-reaching implications for the Horn of Africa’s geopolitical and economic landscape. As Ethiopia continues to explore alternative port options, including its growing involvement in Somaliland, Djibouti will need to carefully balance its offers with the broader regional competition to maintain its position as Ethiopia’s primary maritime gateway.

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The Ethiopian government has been working for four years to establish a securities exchange as part of its broader economic reform and liberalisation agenda. This includes the recent decision to allow the Ethiopian birr (ETB) to float freely and open up strategic sectors such as banking and telecommunications to competition.

The exchange’s debut will feature several significant state-owned enterprises, including Ethio Telecom, the Ethiopian Insurance Corporation, and the Ethiopian Shipping and Logistics Services Enterprise (ESLSE), which will be listed on the platform. The government views the move as a way to break the long-standing dominance of nationalised entities in the economy, increase Ethiopia’s global competitiveness, and attract foreign direct investment.

Local reports suggest that over 90 companies are expected to list on the exchange within its first few weeks of operation. So far, the exchange has raised approximately 1.6 billion birr (around $13 million) in capital.

In a bid to bolster investor trust and ensure the safety of investments, ECMA has introduced new transparency and disclosure rules. These measures are intended to enhance the credibility of the market and reassure both local and international investors.

At a recent event in Addis Ababa, Hana Tehelku, the Director-General of ECMA, highlighted that the new guidelines are essential for creating a well-regulated capital market. She explained that the measures focus on increasing transparency, standardising processes, and safeguarding investor interests, all in alignment with the country’s broader economic objectives.

The new rules include mandatory annual audited financial statements for listed companies, along with ongoing communication with shareholders. To further protect investors, a “pre-emptive rights” clause will allow existing shareholders to maintain their proportional ownership when additional shares are issued, thus preventing dilution of their holdings.

Additionally, companies will be required to demonstrate adequate capital reserves to reduce the risk of defaults and protect shareholder investments. ECMA will oversee the implementation and enforcement of these regulations.

While such regulations are common in many stock exchanges globally, some African markets have faced challenges in assuring investors of the safety of their capital due to insufficient transparency and weak disclosure practices.

A 2022 report from the African Development Bank (AfDB) noted that international investors may hesitate to engage in markets where they lack confidence in the disclosure standards, even if the underlying investments appear solid.

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On November 3, around one thousand senior Ethiopian commanders stationed in Tigray went for a dinner party with regional government officials. The invitation, however, was a ruse to take them prisoner.

That same night, while the world was focused on vote-counting in the US presidential election, a total of five federal military bases in Tigray came under fire. Defenders were killed or captured, though those in the Sero Base, near the border with Eritrea, held out for a grueling ten days. Tigrayan soldiers turned on their comrades of other ethnicities, many of whom had lived in Tigray for decades, working alongside the local communities. Reports about soldiers killed in their pyjamas and arbitrary cruelty shocked the Ethiopian public.

Thankfully, Michael Pompeo, Secretary of State under the outgoing Trump administration, condemned it immediately.

Wisely, Secretary Pompeo left it open to interpretation how to “de-escalate tensions”, but surely “immediate action to restore the peace” meant arresting those responsible for such a ferocious assault on the constitutional order.

For the first year or so, the world press downplayed or omitted this manifest casus bellialtogether, even in longreads on the war, which focused obsessively on the prime minister’s personality and on how the Nobel Peace Prize had gone to his head.

The Economist, for instance, as late as October 2021, while TPLF troops were marching on Addis Ababa, published a shockingly defamatory and inflammatory leader, to which we shall return in Part 3, attributing the cause of the conflict to an “increasingly paranoid and erratic” Abiy Ahmed deciding to attack the regional government of Tigray, “which he accused of rebellion”. This shallow phrasing amounts to speculating that the attack on the Northern Command was made up.

In fact, only ten days into the war, the high-ranking TPLF leader, Sekoture Getachew, speaking on Tigrayan television, confirmed that an elaborate plan had been executed, using soldiers from inside and outside the bases, with the aim of taking over the firepower of the Ethiopian army. Some two weeks later, this was admitted by Getachew Reda, with the excuse that “whatever we did, we did in self-defense”. In January 2021, Kjetil Tronvoll mentioned it in an article, as did, in March 2021, the diehard pro-TPLF magazine Tghat, albeit portraying it as a preemptive strike justifiedby an enemy plan to commit genocide. Accordingly, the world press eventually began to incorporate this event into its timeline.

From the first day of the war, Declan Walsh and co-author Simon Marks, writing in The New York Times, put the war down to the notion that “Mr. Abiy presented a radically different face”, from his Nobel-Peace-Prize face that was. They studiously ignored the crucial dispute over the control of the army, except for stating that “Mr. Abiy said his hand had been forced by Tigrayan leaders who brazenly defied his authority”. Of course, there is no quotation mark around the prime minister saying: they brazenly defied my authority. But this is how The New York Times interprets his denunciation of the attack on the Northern Command, which it does not even bother to mention. What the New York Times would take for granted at home in the US, namely state monopoly on violence under democratic rule of law, is reduced for Ethiopia to the big man exercising “his authority”.

Eleven days into the war, Mr. Walsh and Mr. Marks did report “a purported Tigrayan attack on an Ethiopian army base in Tigray early this month”. This is when Kjetil Tronvoll is introduced in the New York Times as a “a scholar of Ethiopian politics”. Conversations with him might have colored Mr. Walsh’s views, as he continued to overlook not only the foregoing two and a half years of political developments as the source of the tension, but also the attack on the Northern Command as the point of no return. The New York Times explanation would continue to focus on the “messianic” prime minister, who had “plunged Ethiopia into a war”. Finally, by December 2021, Declan Walsh must have felt challenged, as the attack on the five federal bases had become acknowledged as fact and was getting more mention in the media. This accounts for the timing of the “new evidence” that the prime minister “had been planning a military campaign in the northern Tigray region for months before the war (…)”. Mr. Walsh was rationalizing his early choice of virtually ignoring the attack on the Northern Command.

That this is how the war began is no longer controversial. Yet even as of 2023, The Guardian’s official view frames it as a mere accusation: “Fighting broke out in November 2020 when Ethiopia’s prime minister Abiy Ahmed deployed the army to arrest Tigrayan leaders who had been challenging his authority for months and whom he accused of attacking federal military bases.”

Once again, legitimacy to rule Ethiopia is reduced to the big man exercising “his authority”. And “challenging his authority” is a hell of a euphemism for raiding national armories and usurping the command of the national army.

“Getting Ethiopia Dead Wrong” is now available on Amazon Kindle, paperback, or hardcover

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His article cited the New York Times’ 2015 piece about how “Time-Worn Village in Moldova Springs Back to Life, Thanks to Port”, which celebrated the way in which the aforesaid swap helped that former Soviet Republic’s struggling economy. The historical context is that the medieval Principality of Moldavia used to connect to the Black Sea, as did the Russian Empire’s Bessarabia Governorate, which is one of its subnational successors. Contemporary Moldova then became landlocked as a result of border changes.

Stalin gave the historically Moldovan/Romanian land (they’re kindred people who are considered to be part of the same civilization) of what’s now known as Budjak to Ukraine after World War II upon capturing it from interwar Romania, which cut Moldova off from the Black Sea. The post-independence era was very difficult for Moldova, but its leadership knew that restoring their access to the sea could help stabilize the socio-economic situation and therefore the political one a lot more.

For all their faults, of which there are many, their leadership and Ukraine’s agreed to swap land to this end. Kiev’s motives were pragmatic since it didn’t want its smaller neighbor to remain unstable and impoverished, which could further impede its own development plans. Although Ukraine was ultimately unable to improve its domestic situation for reasons that are beyond the scope of this analysis, the point is that it agreed to this swap in order to advance the greater regional good.

Ethiopia’s history is similar to Moldova’s in that it too used to have access to the sea, but distant imperial powers were responsible for changing that, not its neighbors like in Moldova’s case. Italy’s colonization of Ethiopia’s historical Red Sea coast was then falsely “legitimized” by its fellow European empires, after which the administrative borders of “Italian Eritrea” were inherited upon that land’s reunification with Ethiopia. This policy later became the standard for post-colonial territories across the world.

That wasn’t a problem for Ethiopia until after Eritrea became independent in 1993 and then provoked a war between them five years later, which once again cut Ethiopia off from the sea and made it dependent on Djibouti since the nearby port of Assab was no longer accessible for obvious reasons. This new geo-economic reality was exploited by Djibouti to enrich itself at Ethiopia’s expense, with neither Eritrea nor Somalia wanting to help Ethiopia diversify from that statelet since they sought to contain it.

The regional strategic situation is altogether different for Ethiopia than for Moldova though since the latter’s economy depends largely on nearby states with whom there are many overland trade opportunities and the nearby Black-Mediterranean Sea beyond the Danube River is very safe. The same can’t be said for Ethiopia, whose top trade partners are in different corners of the world, and the maritime logistics upon which its economic and therefore political stability depend aren’t safe at all.

Moreover, Ethiopia is the second most populous state in Africa and while Moldova is one of the least populous in Europe, so instability stemming from the first’s fragile maritime supply chains could reverberate much more widely to the detriment of millions while the second’s instability is manageable. If ulterior motives weren’t at play and Ethiopia’s neighbors didn’t conspire to contain it, both on their own, and on behalf of its historical rival Egypt, then they would rationally help it regain access to the sea.

After all, ensuring Ethiopia’s economic growth and associated stability would naturally benefit them too, and this can only be achieved by allowing it military-commercial access to a nearby port in order to rebuild its navy (for protecting its maritime supply chains with time) and freely conducting global trade. In furtherance of this end, Ethiopia clinched its Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)with Somaliland, but complementing it with more deals in the region would expand the scope of benefits for all.

With this in mind, just like justice in Southeastern Europe was served by Ukraine swapping land with Moldova in order to restore the latter’s historical access to the sea, so too could it be served in the Horn of Africa through a spiritually similar deal between Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti if the political will existed. Land doesn’t need to be swapped, but an arrangement modeled off of the Somaliland MoU could be negotiated in which Ethiopia would obtain military-commercial access to Assab and Tadjoura.

Commercial access isn’t enough due to Ethiopia’s need to eventually defend the maritime logistics upon which its economic and political depends, which ideally requires a set of bases in the Gulf of Aden-Red Sea (GARS) region instead of relying on the one that it plans to obtain in Somaliland. Eritrea and Djibouti would do well to stop trying to contain Ethiopia and enrich itself at its expense respectively and instead seriously consider the mutual benefits inherent in replicating the Somaliland MoU model.

Stakes in Ethiopia’s national companies can be offered to them too, which can help Eritrea obtain more sources of revenue while assisting Djibouti in diversifying from its dependence on port fees. Eritrea previously flirted with resuming Ethiopia’s commercial access to Assab while Djibouti recently offered full management of Tadjoura, but neither wants to include military rights into their proposal. Therein lies the rub since they still want to contain Ethiopia, but that’s counterproductive and dangerous.

It’s better to move beyond the regional security dilemma and towards more complex economic interdependence in order for the Horn to rise as one instead of being picked apart by others like Egypt. The Moldovan-Ukrainian land swap occurred one-quarter of a century ago in very different conditions, but the example of restoring a landlocked state’s historical access to the sea in pursuit of mutual benefits can form the basis of a spiritually similar deal in the Horn if Eritrea and/or Djibouti agree.

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The new airport will be situated near Bishoftu, approximately 45 kilometers southeast of Addis Ababa, the nation’s capital. Once operational, it is expected to have four runways and accommodate up to 100 million passengers annually and feature parking facilities for 270 aircraft, according to Tasew. The new hub of EAL will be connected to Addis Ababa via train. In addition, the already existing Addis-Adama toll road will be linked to airport terminal.

The design work for the airport will be undertaken by Sidara, a Dubai-based engineering and consulting firm. Tariq Al Qanni, the firm’s Director of Operations, confirmed their involvement in the project.

The initiative to build this massive infrastructure was first unveiled in 2018. Mesfin highlighted that the current primary airport, Bole Addis Ababa International Airport, which serves as the main hub for Ethiopian Airlines, is nearing its limit with a passenger capacity of 25 million per year. It is expected to continue operating after the construction of the Bishoftu hub is completed, to accommodate the continents increasing demand for air travel in the decades ahead.

“This new airport project is a major endeavor expected to be completed within five years. It will be the largest airport in Africa,” Mesfin remarked. He elaborated that the initial phase of construction alone will require an investment of at least $6 billion, with funding to be sourced through loans. Several companies have already expressed interest in participating in the project.

In the financial year 2023/2024, Ethiopian Airlines transported 17 million passengers and anticipates an increase to 20 million passengers in the current fiscal year that began in July. The Airline plans to double its current capacity by 2034 with the purchase of 104 new aircraft from Boeing.

In May Boeing agreed to set up its new Africa head quarters in Addis Ababa.

Moreover, in a bid to make its fleet energy consumption more sustainable, the airline recently entered an MoU with Satarem Ameerica Inc. The move aims to produce sustainable aviation fuel from sugar cane ethanol locally. This partnership aims to reduce carbon emissions and support global climate efforts by integrating SAF into Ethiopian Airlines’ operations.

Recent developments taking place at Ethiopian Airlines is the biggest shakeup in the company’s history. It sets the stage for growth in the 21^st century, in which Africa will become a major market for aviation.

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Located in the Oromia region, the Asela Wind Power project is set to add 100 MW to Ethiopia’s energy grid. Yidnekachew reported that each wind tower’s foundation requires between 7 and 12 days to complete. The project is scheduled to begin generating electricity by December 2024, with remaining construction tasks expected to be finalized within this timeframe.

Funded by a €145 million investment from Ethiopian Electric Power, the project benefits from substantial financial support through a Danish government subsidy and loan. This partnership exemplifies Denmark’s commitment to advancing global renewable energy initiatives while leveraging its expertise in wind technology. The Danish contribution brings cutting-edge technology and best practices to Ethiopia, ensuring both the efficiency of the windfarm and the transfer of valuable technical knowledge.

The Asela Windfarm will play a pivotal role in enhancing Ethiopia’s green energy capacity, helping the country reduce its reliance on fossil fuels and decrease its environmental footprint. This expansion is crucial for strengthening Ethiopia’s energy infrastructure, providing a more reliable and sustainable power supply that supports industrial growth and improves the quality of life for its citizens.

The project also promises significant economic benefits, including job creation and local economic development. The construction and operation of the windfarm will generate numerous employment opportunities, ranging from construction roles to technical positions in wind turbine maintenance, thereby building a skilled workforce in the renewable energy sector.

Moreover, the successful collaboration between Denmark and Ethiopia fosters increased trade relations and sets a positive precedent for future international partnerships in green energy. By advancing global climate goals and showcasing the benefits of international cooperation, the Asela Windfarm project highlights how shared expertise and resources can drive progress in sustainable development.

Upon its completion, the Asela Windfarm will boost Ethiopia’s total wind power generation capacity to 544 MW, contributing to the country’s efforts in combating climate change and promoting sustainable development. This project stands as a testament to the powerful impact of international collaboration in achieving green energy goals and fostering economic growth.

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Ethiopia has tremendous capacity in SAF production from Ethanol due to its large-scale sugar cane plantations, with over 4 million hectors of land under cultivation. In addition, the recently reorganized state-owned Ethiopian Sugar Industry Group(ESIG) owns a total of eight sugar mills that ran into financial problems from 2013 to 2018. ESIG was one of the most leveraged state-owned enterprises (SoE) in the country. The state has since restructured a large chunk of this debt overhang and is now soliciting bids for private investors. 

Ethiopian Investment Holdings, an entity that manages the country’s sovereign assets, has sought to invite foreign direct investment that fosters value addition in the country’s sugar sector. Satarem America seeks to leverage Ethiopia’s latent capacity in ethanol production and conversion to jet fuel. Crucially, the company will gain a guaranteed large customer in Ethiopian Airlines, which is eager to convert a portion of its fuel to the more sustainable SAF. Authorities in Ethiopia view this as a win-win market approach, one that also helps to reduce imported Jet fuel. 

Despite the promising MoU however, the Satarem’s capacity and strength are not easily discernible from public resources. Satarem lacks broad public coverage and detailed business information. As a niche market player, it may have limited visibility and confidentiality around its operations, financial health, and strategic plans. For a more accurate assessment of Satarem America’s capabilities, proper due diligence and direct engagement with the company or insights from industry experts would be necessary.

Mesfin Tasew, CEO of Ethiopian Airlines Group, expressed enthusiasm about the partnership with Satarem America Inc. He stated, “We are thrilled to collaborate with Satarem America Inc as we advance towards a greener and more sustainable future. Adopting Sustainable Aviation Fuel is more than just a business choice; it demonstrates our dedication to fighting climate change and investing in innovative solutions that foster a more sustainable aviation industry.”

This MoU comes on the heels of Ethiopia’s recently announced macroeconomic reforms, which promises to ease foreign exchange, rid long established economic distortions, and attract quality investment into the country.

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The report added, ‘Pezeshkian also condemned the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, Chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau, describing it as a heinous and inexcusable act that will not go unanswered’. He criticized the international community’s failure to act against the atrocities committed by the Zionist regime in Gaza, calling the attacks on defenseless women and children historically unparalleled.

Eritrean Foreign Minister Osman Saleh Mohammed congratulated Pezeshkian on his presidency and advocated for strengthening ties between Iran and Eritrea. He also denounced the assassination of Haniyeh and extended condolences to both Iran and Palestine.

Despite years of Western-led sanctions against it, Eritrea’s government has proven adaptable and determined to survive at any cost. It frequently changes its alliances to ensure its continued existence. Whether dealing with the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel or Saudi Arabia and Iran, the regime continuously shifts its positions to navigate its survival.

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