The administrator of the southern zone of Tigray, Habtu Kiros, refuted the report, asserting that there were no major clashes, only a minor incident incited by forces in the Raya-Alamata. He clarified that Tigrayan protesters, advocating for the implementation of the return of IDPs, embarked on a long public demonstration march from Mahoni and Maichew towns to federal forces checkpoints over the weekend of April 13, 2024.

In contrast, Raya Alamata administrator Mola Derbew claimed that Tigray forces had employed heavy weaponry to capture the Addis Berhan and the Garjale zones near by. A few days earlier, in anticipation there were Amhara public demonstrations in and around Alamata, asking for “greater unity against the coming attack”.

Mola Derbew stated that the Tigray regional forces, commonly referred to as the TPLF, orchestrated the attack, which began at 11:00 a.m. on Saturday and continued until late Monday April 15, 2024. But given recent deep divisions between the Interim administration of Tigray and members of the TPLF, it remains doubtful if another round of war has popular support.

This flare up reignites tensions from the two-year long war that ended in late 2022 with the signing of the Pretoria Peace Agreement, which effectively needed the fighting between the Federal government and the TPLF. However, unresolved issues persist, including contested territories, disarmament of ex-combatants, and the repatriation of displaced persons, many from the Tigray region, but also from Afar and Amhara. 

Raya-Alamata, previously administered by Tigray, fell into Amhara hands during the 2020-2022 war. But the issue goes back further, with Amhara claiming the lands as having been unjustly annexed into Tigray by the TPLF in the early 1990s, after the group came to power following a protracted civil war lasting seventeen years.  

The resurgence of hostilities has seen Tigray forces reportedly advancing into some areas of the district. But sources close to the matter provide a more nuance outlook. Senior officials in Amhara say they cannot rule out involvement of some Amhara Fano rebels from North Wollo, who view a tactical cooperation with TPLF as beneficial in their fight against the federal government. 

Certain Fano factions have recently touted the merits of collaborating with the TPLF. This is especially true considering disappointments incurred by the rebels in their disjointed drive to oust the federal government. A renewed government offensive against the Fano in Amhara may have prompted some of them to reconsider their long-held misgivings for TPLF. Chatter on social media outlets closely associated with both Fano and TPLF forces seemed to predict a sort of tactical convergence between them.

Last week Ethiopian Telegram channels indicated Fano fighters operating in North Wollo were receiving arms, ammunition, and logistical support from Tigray, via the town of Sekota. Authorities in Amahara claimed their continued vigilance in confiscating the flow of arms from Tigray into the hands of insurgents in Amhara. 

It was recently revealed Fano commander Mehiret Wodajo received medical treatment at Ayder hospital in Mekelle. TPLF linked media outlets opposed to the Pretoria Peace Agreement have flaunted this as symbol of their renewed war pact to oust the federal government.

There is also plausible speculation to suggest the incursion of gunmen from Tigray into Ofla and Alamata zones is a false-flag operation, involving TPLF’s army 23 and 24, as a way of confounding federal government action. Ofla zone administrator Fisseha Mola said, “the situation is fluid and has the potential to expand into a wider war”.

Given the level of mistrust and recrimination between Fano and TPLF, it remains to be seen how this new alliance would be viewed by the public on both sides. In either case, this latest clash will have the effect of delaying a lasting and peaceful resolution to the question of disputed territories.

Immediately following the incursion on Alamata, Tigray regional interim leader, Getachew Reda, on twitter, denounced the move as instigation by “diehard enemies to the Pretoria Peace Agreement”. However, this was immediately followed by another criptic tweet meant to arouse Tigray nationalism. Observers viewed this as double-speak and contradictory to his earlier point made about “those opposed to peace”. Getachew has to perform a tight rope balancing act. On the one hand he must assuage TPLF hardliners while also maintaining his relationship with the federal government in lieu of the peace agreement.

Speaking to Abren, a senior Amhara official currently on a visit in the United States says, “there is an element of confused blabbering at play, and it seems to be deliberately designed to confuse the public about he true intention of TPLF leaders, who seek to break with the peace agreement, albeit without drawing much in the way of international attention, or condemnation”.

Efforts to resolve divides between Tigray, Amhara and the authorities in Addis Ababa have been accompanied by little reported shadow wars. Authorities in Amhara have sought to entrench their administration in disputed territories, much to the chagrin of Tigray. In response TPLF hardliners have sought inflame the current Fano rebellion in Amhara. Relatedly, little attention has been given to a recently attempted incursion of TPLF affiliated militia from Sudan near the border crossing of Metema. 

External entities have also been inserting themselves as a third-party instigator in ongoing clashes in Gambella between the Nuer and Anuak tribes. Simon Tut, chairman of the opposition Gambella People’s Democratic Movement says, “there is certainly a strategy to provoke tension in the region by outside forces.”  He adds, “these subversive activities must be seen in-light of proxy shadow wars by various actors including the TPLF and others outside of Ethiopia”.  

The latest clashes in Alamata come on the heal of efforts to mediate a lasting solution between Amhara and Tigray. Senior officials from the Amhara region, speaking on condition of antonymy accuse Tigrayan authorities of obfuscating their intentions on resolution of contested territories. “In public, as well as in our meetings with them, they say they want IDPs to return, which is wholly justified, but when we actually begin laying out the groundwork to implement this plan, they turn around and incite another round conflict”, said one official. 

For their part authorities in Tigray accuse the Amhara regional government of orchestrating an ethnic cleansing campaign in the disputed territories. They say there are hundreds of thousands of IDPs that need to go back to their homes in areas currently “occupied by the Amhara region”.

Clandestine activities are elevating mistrust on all sides, endangering the viability of the Pretoria Peace Agreement. So far, the federal government has chosen restraint, perhaps in hopes of avoiding an endless cycle of entanglements with shadow warriors in Ethiopia’s highly fractured and illusive political landscape, which is proving difficult to govern democratically. 

A bit further south, in Kobo, people remain anxious. Residents here are watching to see if in case the TPLF forces that recently entered Alamata decide to expel Amhara residents and perhaps even expand their incursion into other areas. At the time of this writing, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported the number of people displaced from Raya-Alamata spiked in just the last few days.

In the meantime, the diplomatic missions of seven Western nations, among them the US and the UK, have included their apprehension over the reported unrest in Alamata in their general collective statement issued last week. They emphasize the need for de-escalation, disarmament and demobilization efforts for all armed combatants.

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Complicated nature of ethnic politics in Africa

Ethnicity encompasses more than just physical attributes or language and traditions. It represents a people’s values, institutions, and way of life, reflecting their history, aspirations, and worldview. When ethnicity and culture are taken away from a group, their sense of purpose and direction is also lost.

In the past, dating back to the time of antiquity, African societies and states functioned through a complex system that revolved around family, lineage, clan, tribe, and larger groups sharing common ethnic, cultural, and linguistic traits. These social units formed the basis for economic, political, and social interactions between communities. These grouping were also quite fluid in many places, and so were the physical boundaries separating groups.

However, during the colonial era, groups were often divided or forced together without consideration for their shared characteristics or unique identities. They were placed under new administrative systems that operated on different values, institutions, and principles. The authority governing these systems was held by outsiders, foreign rulers, who relied on centralization of power enforced by police and military forces, leading to authoritarian rule. To give this externally imposed system a sense of legitimacy, traditional leaders were sometimes utilized as intermediaries between the state and local communities. The state also provided limited social services and development opportunities to certain privileged sectors, creating an illusion of legitimacy. Meanwhile, the country’s natural resources were exploited and exported as raw materials to support the industries of the colonial powers.

Most African states, which succumbed to colonial rule were subjected to artificial forms of government imposed by Europeans. The one nation that somehow or another escaped the European scramble for Africa was Ethiopia. Through a series of engagements, diplomatic as well as military, its leaders were able to keep colonial powers at bay. Ethiopian leaders such as Tewodros I, Yohannes I, and Menelik II pragmatically pivoted, pushed, expanded territory, and at times conceded to keep foreign powers at bay. This despite ever-present internal wars among elites, conflicts which often took on ethnic, as well as religious overtones. Colonial powers were never shy to leverage these internal squabbles to gain territory. In the end however, Ethiopia was spared direct colonization, but is did not escape the entanglements of colonialism on the continent, which it grapples with to this today.

The introduction of the new colonial state structure undermined existing indigenous system of the people, which provided them with the means to pursue modest yet sustainable life goals. Instead, they were subjected to centrally controlled resources that were scarce and fiercely competed for. Development was redefined as receiving basic services from the state, rather than a process of collective wealth accumulation and growth. The localized, inclusive, and low-risk subsistence activities were replaced by high-risk competition for power and limited resources, leading to conflicts based on tribalism or ethnicity. While independence removed the colonial oppressor, it intensified the struggle for centralized power and control over national resources.

Presently, nearly every conflict in Africa has some ethno-regional aspect to it. Even seemingly unrelated conflicts involve factions and alliances formed around ethnic loyalties. Analysts have held differing views on the role of ethnicity in these conflicts. Some view ethnicity as a root cause of conflict, while others see it as a tool used by ambitious politicians. It is both. Ethnicity, particularly when combined with territorial identity, is an inherent social reality that exists independently of political manipulation. To argue that ethnic groups are merely pawns in political games underestimates this fundamental social reality. However, it is evident that ethnicity can be exploited and manipulated by political entrepreneurs for their own gain.

Response of African states

After gaining independence, Africans were eager to reject tribalism as something that divides people. They aimed for unity, imagining a unified identity despite their diverse backgrounds. For example, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana made it illegal to form political parties based on tribe or ethnicity. Houphouet-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire strategically included ethnic groups by giving them positions in government, civil service jobs, social services, and development projects. Julius Nyerere, who came from a tribal leadership background, promoted national pride in Tanganyika and later in Tanzania, which was formed through a union with Zanzibar. Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya formed a delicate alliance of ethnic groups under the dominance of his Kenyan African National Union party.

In South Africa, apartheid policies categorized races and ethnicities in a way that was unsustainable. Although post-apartheid South Africa now strives for a racially, ethnically, and tribally blind democratic system, there is still a tension between this approach and a proud expression of ethnic identity, particularly among Zulu nationalists.

In Africa, the aim of maintaining unity within the borders established during colonial times has led to stability but has also caused ethnic tensions and violence within those borders. Sudan provides an extreme example of this. The dominant North region, which is a mix of Arab and African racial, cultural, and religious elements, is trying to address its identity crisis by emphasizing its Arab and Islamic characteristics even more than its predecessors. This distorted self-perception, fueled by the agendas of political elites, is promoted as the framework for unifying and integrating the country. Unfortunately, this approach has resulted in a destructive conflict between the Arab-Muslim North and the predominantly Christian South, which identifies more with its indigenous African roots.

In the end, founders of the African Union made a significant decision to respect colonial borders, and this principle has been remarkably successful in practice. Thus, the AU strongly opposes secession movements. For example, Katanga attempted to separate from the Congo (which later became Zaire and now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), but it was unsuccessful. The secessionist Biafran war in Nigeria also failed. Somalia’s endeavor to take control of the Ogden region from Ethiopia was decisively stopped. Southern Sudan endured a 17-year struggle to break away from the North and eventually settled for autonomy in 1972. When fighting resumed in 1983, their goal remained the creation of a new Sudan that would eliminate any form of discrimination based on race, ethnicity, culture, or religion. The African Union largely thwarted South Sudan, which eventually achieved independence in 2011.

Eritrea’s separation from Ethiopia is perceived not as a breach of colonial borders, but rather as its preservation, given that Eritrea was formerly an Italian colony, despite it having very close linkages to the Ethiopian state going back centuries. Similarly, the unofficial separation of Northern Somalia is viewed as the restoration of colonial borders, as the North had been under separate British governance. Even in Sudan, which is often suggested as a potential candidate for division, if the country were to be split, the division could be justified as an extension of the British colonial policy that governed Sudan as two distinct entities—one Arab-Islamic and the other indigenous African with elements of Christian Western influences.

In many of the newly independent African states, the commitment to maintain national unity after gaining independence led to the establishment of of authoritarianism, excessive concentration of power, and aborted democracies. These actions, in turn, provoked a response characterized by increased tension and a call for a second phase of liberation movements. Some of these liberation movements were successful in co-opting power, but their actions thereafter did not evolve politics or make governance democratic. Most remained client states for external powers and embezzled developmental funds, which were offshored in financial capitals around the globe.

For instance, Ethiopia, following the separation of Eritrea in 1993 tried to actively address the issue of tribalism and ethnicity by acknowledging territorial-based ethnic groups. These groups were purported to have a significant degree of autonomy and even the constitutional right to self-determination, including the possibility of secession. The country’s constitution firmly declared the principle of self-determination, regardless of its outcome.

Considering Ethiopia’s recent tumult however, we can say the experiment has been a failure. Warnings that the seemingly lofty goal of Ethiopia’s constitution was largely a gimmick used to divide and rule a large and restive nation under the tutelage of a small minority-led government were indeed prescient. Under this system, the very concept of self-determination deteriorated into ethnic patronage and hyper identity politics, making governance and security evermore difficult.

Effectively managing the diversity of ethnic groups within the confines of colonial borders presents a formidable challenge that African countries are hesitant to confront, yet it is an issue they cannot continue ignore, partly because of population growth and largely due to climate change, which will increase tensions and competition for resources.

The key to sustainable unity lies in mutual understanding and agreement. Unfortunately, in modern Africa, the framework for national unity is not based on consensus. Except for post-apartheid South Africa, African nations gained independence without negotiating an internal social contract that would establish and maintain national consensus. The constitutions adopted during independence were influenced by idealistic principles from outside the continent. The resulting regimes lacked legitimacy and were often overthrown without public remorse or regret. These upheavals merely led to a rotation of like-minded elites or, in some cases, military dictators who aimed to seize power after the departure of colonial rulers. Eventually, these leaders became replicas of their former colonizers.

Currently, the quest for unity in most African countries highlights the extent of disunity. If Africans avoid addressing the issue of ethnicity and fail to develop institutional norms for managing diversity within the framework of unity, peace and stability will continue to elude. For this, many African states need a deep dive into national dialogue and reconciliation that go beyond superficial politics, to give birth to a common shared framework. Only then can African states move forward and thrive in peace. This is especially true for large states like Nigeria and Ethiopia.

Managing ethnic politics.

As briefly mentioned, African governments have approached the challenge of ethnic diversity in different ways, ranging from pragmatic management to neglect and disastrous mismanagement. The specific ethnic policies adopted by a country often depend on its unique identity configuration.

Some African states exhibit a high degree of homogeneity or, at least, relatively insignificant diversity. Botswana, for instance, stands as an exemplary model of cohesiveness, democracy, stability, and sustained growth.

Most African countries, especially those in West Africa (excluding Nigeria), Kenya, and southern African countries (excluding South Africa), fall into a second category. These countries face significant ethnic diversity, but they have established effective systems of distribution that uphold the integrity and legitimacy of the state. The self-perception of these nations aligns with the self-perceptions of their constituent groups.

There is a third group of countries, including Zimbabwe, Namibia, and modern-day South Africa, which grapple with racial, ethnic, religious, or cultural divisions that necessitate special arrangements to achieve a mutually accommodating form of unity in diversity. Burundi, Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Sudan are potential candidates for this category, although they also exhibit aspects of the fourth and final category.

The fourth category comprises states embroiled in acute crises characterized by a lack of collective identification, shared values, and a common national vision. The nation-state framework is perceived as an imposition by colonial powers, perpetuated by the dominant group that defines the nation’s character. This definition can be explicit, such as in apartheid South Africa, where race and ethnicity influenced the allocation or denial of citizenship rights, or in Sudan, where Arab and Islamic identity inherently leads to racial, ethnic, and religious stratification and discrimination. Managing conflicts within the unity framework becomes exceptionally challenging in these cases, often necessitating fundamental restructuring and, in some instances, partitioning.

Policy implications for nation building

Currently, most African countries are approaching the challenges of racial and ethnic identities through a pragmatic system of distribution and allocation, focusing on pacification rather than adopting a strategic approach. What makes the issue of identity particularly crucial for the continent is that it not only affects politics but also has implications for economics and the capacity to generate sustainable development from within.

There are policy options available for managing pluralistic identities. One option is to establish a national framework that allows everyone to identify without any distinction based on race, ethnicity, tribe, or religion. This option is most suitable for highly homogeneous countries. Another option is to create a pluralistic framework that accommodates racially, ethnically, culturally, or religiously diverse nations. This approach, potentially through a federal arrangement, encourages groups to coexist based on the principle of live and let live, while still maintaining a shared commitment to national identification.

In yet another scenario, for countries facing more significant divisions, a combination of power-sharing and decentralization may be the answer, with identities being geographically defined. In zero-sum conflict situations, federalism could evolve into confederacies, paradoxically seeking to reconcile unity with separation. In cases where even this level of accommodation is unfeasible, and where territorial configurations allow, partition may be considered as a viable option.

These options are however generalizations. They don’t take into consideration the many nuances and circumstances of each nation state in Africa. Some countries like Ethiopia and Nigeria have deep divisions and surprisingly a historical sense of unity and greatness, one that sometimes trumps the divisions. And so there are many similar cases like this. The aim of generalizing here is to simply, and not merely to pontificate.

The role of the African Union

How can these options be implemented? The decision on which option to adopt primarily rests with the sovereign right of each country and people. However, regional, and continental actors also bear a responsibility that cannot be relinquished in the name of national sovereignty. Sovereignty inherently involves a tension between the demand for internal solutions and the need for external corrective measures. In other words, the responsibilities of sovereignty necessitate both internal and external accountability, which can be conflicting, particularly when external involvement becomes necessary due to internal system failures.

Given the African Union’s ambivalence and lack of critical agency for intervention, the responsibility is increasingly falling on regional and subregional actors. The sheer size of the continent demands the coming together of regional bodies, such as the East Africa Union (EAU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This is not to say the African Union is less relevant. The recent Cessations of Hostilities (CoH) between the Government of Ethiopia and the northern Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) is a good example of African Union initiatives for peace. Despite its many shortcomings, it the the AU remains a pragmatic mechanisms for resolving continental issues in Africa.

The interconnectivity of conflicts in neighboring countries should lead to the recognition that preventing, managing, or resolving conflicts is not only a concern for the countries directly involved, but also for the entire region. For example, currently ongoing fighting between the national army of Sudan and the country’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is an area where regional bodies like IGAD have at the very least dissuaded regional countries from involving themselves. A positive outcome. Therefore, regional awareness of shared threats posed by internal conflicts is growing. The importance of addressing common challenges is increasingly being realized. This handling of matters regionally allows for the African Union to keep more powerful non-continental states, who have historically played a deleterious role at bay. Most African states agree with this stance.

Reconciling two conflicting paths

The ultimate responsibility for upholding sovereignty lies with the international community, specifically the United Nations, which African states have sought to reform. African states also support reforming international multilateral financial and development institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. Concerns regarding governance, including democracy and respect for human rights, are also recognized at the international level, but have increasingly become politicized tools for intervention by more powerful states like the U.S and U.K. Apart from the longstanding issue of protecting minorities, the politics and conflicts related to identity and their impact on peace, stability, development, and nation-building must be acknowledged as crucial matters that demand responsible and accountable sovereignty.

Considering that the modern African states emerged through European conquest, the restructuring of the continent, its integration into the international system, and the reimagining and reconstruction of the state will require collaboration with Africa’s global partners. However, history has repeatedly demonstrated external actors have not been able to provide an objective and impartial perspective, which is essential for balancing the concerns of internal stakeholders in Africa. On the contrary external powers have tended to dump fuel on identity politics on the continent. This argument was recently presented by Dr. Lonzen Rugira, in his paper entitled, “How West promotes destructive politics in Africa“. International partners have not been objective. Hence one reason why the mantra “African Solutions to African Problems” is gaining traction.

On this eve of the new scramble for Africa between Western and Eastern powers, Africa finds itself at a crossroads between rediscovering its indigenous values, institutions, and experiences and pursuing the logic of the colonial state within the framework of a globalized modernity largely influenced by Western experiences. Resolving the resulting tensions is no easy task. However, an inclusive process that allows diverse groups to play a constructive role in the modern and more united African state can significantly alleviate tension, foster cooperation, and facilitate the nation-building process.

The post Ethnic politics in Africa appeared first on Abren.

Ethiopia’s controversial constitution, with its system of ethnic federalism has been a boon for demagogues and conflict merchants seeking power using identity-based propaganda. Even outside powers with interest in Ethiopia have long figured out how to exploit Ethiopia’s ethnic divisions, exacerbated by this system of governance. For instance, the State Department regularly confers with diaspora groups and organizations carefully selected by their ethnic affiliation, while regularly shunning or avoiding multi-cultural and multi-ethnic Ethiopian national organizations. Historically the collective West has promoted destructive identity politics in Africa. Leveraging the growing African diaspora in the West for this purpose is thus a natural extension of this policy. Regional powers in the Middle East have used a similar approach. In a bid to slow the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Egypt has long supported ethnic based insurgencies in Ethiopia.

It was hoped Ethiopia’s constitution adopted in 1994, would bring equity to its many nations and nationalities, whose culture and language was suppressed by successive regimes seeking centralism for fear of losing power to ungovernable separate entities. Ethiopia had been a more centralized state for a century before. Proponents argued the new constitution would bring unity and stability to a nation beset with separatist liberation movements. In hindsight, after three decades, fundamental questions of nationhood, culture, language, identity, boundaries, and equity remain unanswered, and arguably worst off. In practice, federalism in Ethiopia has led to fragmentation, not equality or democratization.

Many had argued freeing up political and civil liberties too quickly would be unsustainable, given the country’s divisive identity politics, as well as its underdeveloped economy. In light of this argument, democracy was not compatible with Ethiopia’s socio-political circumstance. In retrospect this argument seems to have been vindicated by the insurrections that followed. The way to keep a lid on Ethiopia’s discordant ethnic political discourse, encouraged by the country’s constitution seems to have been by repression. But that only buys more time, without resolving the underlying issue. Sooner or later, Ethiopia will need structural political reform, one that can accommodate and nurture unity, democracy and civility.

This trend towards ethnic balkanization in Ethiopia enshrined in the constitution has become particularly stark ever since 2018, when Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s new administration introduced a relatively more open political discourse in this country of 120 million. Previously, Ethiopia had been a security state, whereby free speech and political organization was heavily curtailed, but the country enjoyed relative peace, stability and economic development. During this period, the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) espoused a “developmental statist” approach akin to East Asia, whereby fast economic growth was given priority, as human rights deteriorated.

In the early months of Abiy Ahmed’s administration Ethiopians aspired for a truly reformist new regime. At the time, it was hoped keeping the pressure valve slightly open, while making significant reforms to the system of governance could prove to be a successful strategy. Nonetheless, political reforms were delayed by conflict, particularly by the crisis in northern Ethiopia, and the war with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), an entity that had every intention of maintaining the existing status quo. A precipitous loss of grace for its leaders does not seem to have changed minds so far, but increasing numbers of people in Ethiopia are realizing the futility of a perpetually divided nation.

TPLF is not alone is trying to derail the reform agenda in Ethiopia. Support for maintaining the current constitution and governance can also be found among members of the ruling party, although it is difficult to determine the exact extent of this support. A generation of ethnic elites have emerged in Ethiopia. These heirs of the system have a tangible interest in forestalling change. Although small in number, they provide the inertia for keeping things as they are, thanks to their key positions within the establishment as either political cadres or business persons in regular collision with them. Ethiopia has been on a path dependency towards more fragmentation, one that is beset with strife and even wars. Only a determined and unashamedly reformist political leadership can reverse course on this trend.

Most people inherently understood the challenges. Despite the setbacks and delays, the public largely wanted to see the reformists succeed, and even voted overwhelmingly in favor of the ruling Prosperity Party on that base. The Pretoria Peace Agreement, which effectively ended the conflict in northern Ethiopia, as well as relative calm in other parts of the country offered renewed belief. Yet, notwithstanding what the New York Times called “a full military victory” by the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF), Addis Ababa was unable, or as some have argued unwilling to implement a key clause of the peace deal, namely the “full disarmament of the TPLF rebels in 30 days” after its signing.

A bid to avoid another war, outstanding financial and budgetary strains, and an attempt to carry favor with the United States, a key donor with leverage on international financial institutions has come at significant political costs for the GoE. All of this is made worst by a glaring public relations and communications failure. The ruling party has waned in popularity. The prime minister has eroded his mass base of support. Key allies in Amhara, Afar, and in the diaspora, who fought alongside the national army to repel the TPLF insurgency as recently as October 2022 feel betrayed, particularly by the GoE’s failure to fully disarm the TPLF in the allotted time period, as called for by the peace agreement.

However, after months of slow moving progress, the African Union monitoring team responsible for Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration(DDR) recently stated, “85 to 90 percent of heavy weapons used by the rebels has been handed over to their team”. The statement further noted, the next phase will encompass demobilization and re-integration of forces, whose exact size is not exactly known, given many had already deserted their post. Yet the AU’s Major General Ridan remained hopeful in the process.

Costly political blunders of the ruling party go beyond recent attempted disarmament in Amhara region. They include its mismanagement of the crisis in the Ethiopian Orthodox Church in February 2023. Parishioners were incensed by the government’s response not to immediately denounce the breakaway synod, which they correctly viewed as breaking with thousands of years of church cannon. Having sensed the political fallout, the Prime Minister quickly reversed course, and admonished the breakaway synod on television. This did not instill public confidence. On the contrary it was viewed as political expediency.

Nonetheless, its noteworthy, that amidst conflict, mishaps and unforced errors, the Abiy government has made some structural changes. This was particularly the case in its early days. These changes include reforming the loosely organized EPRDF coalition, to the more inclusive and united Prosperity Party, encompassing hitherto underrepresented regions such as Somali, Afar, Gumuz, and Gambella. This was a step towards a more united and less ethnically fragmented organization. In addition, law was passed for a new digitally integrated national ID system, whereby ethnicity or place of birth is not featured.

On the economy, GoE has started some key reforms. They include the rollback of outdated fuel subsidies that were a drain on reserve currency, and encouraged a black-market export of refined fuel to neighboring countries, where prices are higher. Banks which had previously been instructed to direct their lending towards state owned enterprises have since shifted gear towards the private sector. State-owned Commercial Bank of Ethiopia recently quadrupled its share of loans to the private sector. Digital of payments is also something that is being implemented quickly, as Ethiopia tries to catch up. Digital payments will make financial transparency easier, reduce friction, as well as help by broadening Ethiopia’s tax base.

An important step has been recent policy studies and discussions looking at systemic challenges. The House of People’s Representatives will soon review a research document by the Policy Studies Institute of Ethiopia that explores possible ways of amending the constitution. The question remains whether the GoE’s reformist camp can still muster the political capital needed to embark on an ambitious plan to make structural changes to a country at war with itself. In parallel with the National Dialogue, it could be the only offramp for a government that will likely struggle to win enough support in the coming remedial elections set for 2024. These elections will take place where the 2021 general election was not conducted due to conflict.

In light of the recent past, there is no question reformists have lost the political momentum they once had. A confluence of foreign pressure, political mishaps, and a lack of clear and consistent directional leadership, as well as a reactionary war has taken a toll on ambitious plans. Nonetheless, changes to the country’s basic political structure and the constitution is an idea that still garners significant public support, one that is likely to grow.

The post Can Ethiopia still make structural political reforms? appeared first on Abren.

Conflict has increased the number of Internally Displaced Persons(IDPs) in Ethiopia. According the U.N’s humanitarian response plan, since mid-2020 the number has more than doubled from 1.8 million to 4.6 million 2023. This number does not include displaced persons from rural areas made homeless in cities and towns or crisis-affected communities and returning migrants from abroad. When including all of the above, some estimates put the number as high as 5.5 million, or approximately 4.5% of the entire population. The number of refugees or externally displaced Ethiopians as a direct result of conflict is comparatively much less. For perspective, a UNHCR report indicates more than 8.1 million have been displaced due to the ongoing war in Ukraine.

Two years of conflict (2020-2022) between the Government of Ethiopia(GoE) and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) has created high humanitarian needs across Afar, Amhara and Tigray regions, which is just recently being addressed thanks to a return to normalcy, following the Pretoria Peace Agreement. After a surprise attack of Ethiopia’s northern command by the TPLF, approximately 2.6 million were displaced across all regions of Northern Ethiopia as conflict spread. Nonetheless, if current trends towards normalization continue, almost all of these IDPs have a high chance of returning to their place of origin.

Conflict driven displacement in Ethiopia eased from its peak in the 1980s, and started to spike again in 2018, when political turmoil increased, due to a rocky regime transition. Before the Tigray crisis, in 2018 a major escalation of fighting in the Somali region had displaced over 1 million persons from both Oromia as well as Somali, according to a report. This flareup was quickly resolved and most of the displaced were re-settled. This is perhaps a test case of how to normalize tensions and return fairly quickly.

Sporadic and yet repeated episodes of conflict in western Oromia is also cause for displacement. The main armed group the area, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) has repeatedly targeted civilians, mainly Amhara as well as others. Based on a report from 2022, approximately thirty seven thousand IDPs from this region can be found concentrated in the of town of Debre Berhan. A similar number of IDPs from west Oromia, Dessie and Kombolcha are also camped near the city of Bahir Dar. If the GoE, along with the regional administration in Oromia is able to gaurantee peace, the chances of these IDPs, most of whom were previously farmers, would prefer returning.

Amidst conflict, the GoE has worked alongside international aid agencies to support IDPs to begin returning them to their place of origin. Efforts to help IDPs has been fruitful of late. According to data from Reliefweb, the number of IDPs due to conflict across Ethiopia seems to have stabilized. Historically, Ethiopia has a good track record of hosting external refugees with the help of international aid agencies. This experience will help in terms of re-instating IDPs. As recently as March, 2023 over one hundred thousand refugees from Somalia arrived in Ethiopia, according to a UNHCR report. If peace is sustained, the work of returning IDPs and resettling refuges from neighboring countries will likely succeed. But more needs to be done to address continued gaps in resettlement.

Less noticeable is displacement due to natural disaster, particularly drought displacing persons from parts of southern Somali and Oromia, the area commonly referred to as Borena. in February, 2023, with the fifth consecutive rainy season failing and livestock dying daily, increasing numbers of people from Borena started moving into internally displaced people (IDP) camps in southern Ethiopia. According to a report by ReliefWeb, “Close to 150,000 people have already moved into the 20 IDP camps. More than 867,000 people are expected to arrive in the next month and are seeking immediate food assistance”.

As relative peace in northern Ethiopia continues to hold, hope for a lasting settlement is evermore likely. This of course bodes well for IDPs in the region. Other conflict hot spots in the west as well as the south are relatively more calm today then at any point in the past four years. The near complete cessation of fighting in Ben Shangul region is a good example of how to leverage community dialogue alongside law enforcement to bring back normalcy. Similar work is currently being done in East and West Wellega. Recent visit to the by Prime Minister Abiy is a promising sign, that armed fighting in the region may finally end. Overall, the rate of returning IDPs in Ethiopia is promising. An assessment made by the U.N Migration Head Office indicates, there were an estimated 1.88 million returning IDPs (437,077 households) across 1,554 villages in Ethiopia as of September, 2022.

Sustained work is needed to grow dividends of peace and move the country forward. Easing of post war tensions, in addition to calming Ethiopia’s hyper identity based politics, which some have argued is linked to the country’s ethnic based administrative structure is crucial. The system rewards an “us versus them” political ideology, particularly among competing political elites, who have taken advantage of the comparatively open political discourse since 2018. The atmosphere among Ethiopia’s elites continues to pit communities against one another. This manifests itself in many ways, one of which is the proliferation of extremism, that has found a natural breeding ground, and is increasingly exacerbated by social media. In this environment, politicization of IDPs is an unavoidable and harmful consequence of post conflict, one that will take time and dialogue to resolve.

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On April 6, 2023, the government of Ethiopia (GoE) announced its decision to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate (DDR) the country’s regional special forces, locally known as Liyu Hail, in favor of a more traditional police force and law enforcement organization. The plan was to integrate all regional forces either into the army, federal police or regional police, a move which diminishes the autonomy of regional governments .

Official statement said, “the government has set direction to build one strong and centralized army…. it has started practical steps that will allow special forces of every region to be integrated into different security structures.”

According to Reuters News, “hours before the announcement was made public, local media from the Amhara region, Ethiopia’s second largest, reported clashes between national and regional forces brought about by a refusal among Amhara Special Forces’ units to surrender weapons as part of the integration process.” It would later be revealed the DDR plan was leaked, seemingly with the aim of sabotaging the process. Regional vice chairman, Girma Yeshitila further corroborates this point of view in his most recent interview.

Ethiopia’s sprawling regional special forces had their genesis in the year 2007 in the eastern Somali region, where they were initially intended to be an agile counter terrorism force to combat insurgents of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). Then Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi had the political impetuous to organize the special force in the Somali region to help mask accusations of ethnic cleansing by international human rights organizations. The idea was if Somalis are seen to be policing Somalis, then accusations of ethnic cleansing and atrocities against the federal government would be a mute point.

Until Prime Minister Abiy came to power in 2018, the Liyu Hail of Somali region continued to operate with impunity during their counter insurgency operations. The new government in Addis Ababa naturally wanted to reign-in the region’s autonomous security apparatus. Having sensed the coming changes however, it did not take long for the Liyu Hail of the Somali region to turn into an ethnic based premilitary force of the region’s corrupt leader, Abdi Mohamoud Omar, known by his nickname ‘Abdi Iley’.

In April of that year, with tacit support of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the Liyu Hail in the Somali region staged an armed insurrection, and attempted to cede the region from Ethiopia, a move that was quickly reversed by the the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF). Over one million civilians were displaced as a result of this conflict.

With this history behind, the new central government in Addis Ababa viewed the Liyu Hail as a dangerous and balkanizing force that would need to be reformed in time. However, Ethiopia’s continued political and security crisis did not allow for such an undertaking at the time. For one, the Liyu Hail were by now spreading to other regions, including in the rebellious Tigray, which by 2020 boasted a force numbering in the hundreds of thousands.

The TPLF, which long dominated politics in Ethiopia (1991-2018) had deep roots inside the national army. It also built an extensive parallel force disguised as Liyu Hail to secure its home base of Tigray. It felt confident it would win any military contest with the federal government. On November 4, 2020, mutinous commanders of ENDF who had allegiances to the TPLF, along with the Liyu Hail of Tigray, attacked army bases of Ethiopia’s Northern command. Ethiopia’s Tigray crisis, which followed this initial attack was accompanied by many atrocities as well as a media campaign of disinformation. As war raged, the Tigray Liyu Hail became widely referred to as “Tigray Defense Force” (TDF) by their supporters. This further complicated reforms planned not only for the Liyu Hail, but the whole of Ethiopia.

Having failed to usurp power militarily, the TPLF were forced to sign a peace agreement brokered by the African Union in Pretoria. By this point, the group was a shadow of its former self. It not only lost men and equipment, but also suffered the setback of losing the contested “Western Tigray”, a region which the Amhara consider part of “Northern Gonder”. This geographical flashpoint, along with other thorny issues continue to be a matter of serious contention between the two regions.

The Amhara region was a relative late comer to the Liyu Hail security structure. It boasted a limited special forces up until 2020, when it rapidly increased recruitment and training. Having sensed itself outgunned and outflanked by the TPLF, it sought to balance the threat posed. When Ethiopia’s northern command came under attack, the Amhara region’s Liyu Hail was underprepared, but performed surprisingly well under the circumstances. Its forces quickly came to the aid of ENDF, particularly in the region of Welkait and Humera, where they enjoy significant public support.

Since the signing of the Pretoria Peace Agreement, there has been growing anxiety by the Amhara that the long contested Welkait would be surreptitiously returned back to Tigray. In a recent interview, Getachew Reda, new interim head of the Tigray region stated, “It is not possible for us to make preparations for the next election while leaving our people of Western Tigray [out of it],”. Getachew, in his inaugural speech, he also insisted that Amhara-occupied lands are integral parts of Tigray and pledged to prioritize their return. “In the Pretoria Agreement, it was clearly stated that the territorial integrity of Tigray should be resolved in accordance with the constitution,” he stated.

For Amhara regional leaders these statements raise concern. They insist these lands were annexed by TPLF and incorporated into Tigray before the ratification of the constitution, a document in which they were largely excluded from formulating. To them the question of “Welkait” is one of Amhara identity that had previously been denied. Accordingly, they view TPLF’s reign from 1991 to 2018 as an era of great suffering and displacement of the Amhara population of Welkait, Tsegede and Humera. In their view, TPLF went the distance to uproot the demography of the region in favor of Tigray. Thus maintaining the presence of the Amhara Liyu Hail in the region is needed to protect their own. Nonetheless, Tigray regional leaders accuse the Amhara of territorial irredentism, and using their newly established control of the region, to expel people that identify with Tigray. All of this complicates peace efforts, which the federal government needs to maintain.

Not far from controversy has been special forces of the Oromia region, which have been accused of atrocities committed while combating Oromo Liberation Army (OLA). The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission(EHRC) documented these occurrences in a report written in the Amharic language. The group has also been accused of harassing minority groups within the vast territory, particularly Amhara civilians, who have also been consistently targeted by the OLA, as shown by yet another EHRC report. In February of 2023, when a rift within the Ethiopian Orthodox Synod became public, the Liyu Hail of Oromia, alongside members of the regional administration were providing support for the breakaway synod, by granting them access to church facilities they were legally not entitled to.

Given this complicated history, GoE’s decision to reform the Liyu Hail was always going to be fraught with difficulty. There would never be a good time to regularize paramilitary forces in times of deteriorating public trust and polarization. The pattern of political crises in Ethiopia has been one that festers into a negative feedback loop cycle, which impedes reform. In addition, one cannot fully discount the hand of agitators, supported by foreign agents, who seek more public unrest for color revolution styled regime change.

Nonetheless, GoE’s shortcomings in getting significant consensus on the matter from the main actors on the ground threatened to jeopardize what otherwise would be good policy, particularly in the Amhara region, where the public feels it is the only region being targeted for DDR reform of the Liyu Hail. However, the government would have done well to communicate via inside channels, that Ethiopia’s security system reorganization is aimed at preemptively averting another worst-case scenario and is equally being carried out at all regions.

Paramilitary regional forces that are semi autonomous are not unique to Ethiopia. They have become widespread in the Horn of Africa. Besides Eritrea, which boasts a significant centrally controlled army relative to its population size, all other countries of the Horn are plagued by irregular forces that are not fully beholden to central governments. For instance, Sudan’s Janjaweed militia have long been used to control the restive region of Darfur, committing countless atrocities in the process. Yet the Janjaweed have by now morphed into what is known as the Rapid support Force(RSF), led by General Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, commonly referred to as Hemeti. The RSF is currently in confrontation with Sudan’s national army, led by General Burhan. Fears of this continued strife are impeding transition towards planned elections.

Behind the scenes of armed conflict in Sudan are foreign actors, tacitly backing one side against the other. With the UAE reportedly behind the RSF forces, while Egypt is said to be behind the national army. The potential for a false flag operation in the contested Al Fashga by any of the warring parties in Sudan to get Ethiopia involved on their behalf cannot be discounted. Also, on April 16, 2023 RSF fighters arrested Egyptian airmen and soldiers stationed at Marowi Airport. This raises the possibility for Egypt to intervene directly in support of General Burhan, a development that would certainly raise concern in Addis Ababa.

The trajectory of semi-autonomous irregular forces which were initially setup for counter insurgencies has been towards more balkanization and eventually insurrection. This has been demonstrated in the case of Ethiopia, and now Sudan. These forces clearly add more volatility and instability in the long run, despite their short term advantages. Some countries in the Horn of Africa are better placed than others at reforming paramilitaries by integrating them into their regular security systems. The case of Ethiopia, if carried out successfully, would provide important lessons for the region at large. 

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The Pretoria Peace agreement is an important milestone towards lasting peace in Ethiopia. It paves the way for much needed national dialogue and reconciliation. Having ended the hot war, the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) began the more difficult job of winning the peace and rebuilding. However, this undertaking is proving to be more difficult, in a nation with entrenched challenges and recent systemic shocks.

In January of this year, the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) began a campaign to clean up corruption, made worse by a messy transition, two years of war, and the pandemic. These efforts spooked entrenched interests within the ruling party who felt threatened. Areas most affected by corruption ,including urban land and housing administration, where land rights are outright stolen and transferred for payment or for political favor have resisted investigation by federal authorities.

Residents of Addis Ababa decry the network of patronage within city government. Corruption in the city outdates the current regime, but most agree it got worse, not better. Scramble for the city’s land resources is palpable and one of the most glaring examples of corruption in the country, but it extends well beyond. More recently, several ministers, including the Minister of Mining and Petroleum, were forced to resign for what many suspect to be corrupt practices. The government refrained from publicly accusing the ministers. Other cabinet positions were re-shuffled, in keeping with Ethiopia’s ever more tense ethnic balance of power.

Stumbling attempts to purge corruption exposed the weak underbelly of a system undergirded by ethnic elites in regular collusion as well as competition. Having survived the onslaught of an armed insurrection by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the reform now faces its most difficult challenge from within his own Prosperity Party(PP), an uneasy coalition of ethnic parties Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed tried to mold into a formidable unit. The aim of morphing the party into a more united organization was met with resistance early on, particularly among some key leaders of the Oromo Regional Administration (ORA), who feel their turn to usurp power is now. This sense of entitlement is partly driven by perceived past disenfranchisement of the Oromo, given their relative size.

These tensions are cause for anxiety among the Amhara, who increasingly feel alienated, and threatened. Continued bouts of violence in Oromia have resulted in the deaths and displacement of Amhara civilians, thousands of whom have fled to the Amhara region as IDPs, adding an extra financial burden to an already stretched region, sections of which recently suffered damage due to invasion by the TPLF rebels. In a recent official statement, the Amhara Regional Administration (ARA) made reference to “existence of a harmful, and mistaken political narrative that continues to accuse the Amhara people for past oppressive regimes”. According to officials, this narrative is cause for ethnically targeted violence against the Amhara today.

Moreover, the northwestern contested districts of Humera and Welkait have not been allocated budget support by the federal government. The area is currently led by the ARA, with meager financial support. TPLF reneging on a key clause of the Pretoria peace agreement, namely the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) adds to the mistrust. While rebuilding in war torn areas continues to slowly inch forward in both Tigray and Amhara, tensions remain high. The possibility of another spark that triggers a shooting war cannot be ruled out.

Ethiopia’s ruling party is not new to factionalism. In 2018 the predecessor to the PP, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) succumbed to internal power struggles accelerated by popular unrest, a history with which the Prime Minister and his officials are keenly familiar with. Many Ethiopians still hope these tensions are resolved amicably within the party, as anything less than that would mostly likely mean more bloodshed. It behooves the GoE to double down on work being done to build a shock absorbent institutional capacity to manage and resolve conflicts, which will inevitably arise.

In February, divisions within the Ethiopian Orthodox Church Synod quickly became political and boiled over onto the public sphere, causing several clashes that resulted in dozens killed and several hundreds arrested. Parishioners of the church were incensed by the government’s response not to immediately denounce the breakaway synod, which they rightly viewed as breaking with thousands of years of church cannon. The matter exploded onto street demonstrations when evidence emerged certain members of the political class within ORA were providing support for the breakaway synod, by granting them access to church facilities they were legally not entitled to. Having sensed the political fallout, the Prime Minister quickly reversed course, and admonished the breakaway synod on television. This did not instill public confidence. On the contrary it was viewed as political expediency.

Political rivals of the sitting government have shown their willingness to take advantage of civil unrest or any other institutional instability, like that of the synod. In an environment where identity politics has reached its maximum, any wedge issue could easily become a source of public protest. Managing it is a bit like walking a tightrope. Institutions to help ease these tensions are still weak, and of little help. In particular the legal system has shown itself to be inept, requiring other means of conflict resolution outside the courts. This of course means accountability is lax. There is a general sense among the public that justice is too little, too late.

A decade ago Ethiopia was essentially a security state where the slightest deviation warranted the harshest penalty. Such tactics were fraught with gross human rights violations, but people generally felt secure from criminal gangs or armed insurgents. It is also a fact that the state bureaucracy functioned more efficiently. This was not because the pay was higher or because bureaucrats were happier. It was mainly because serious consequence followed if directives from the top were not implemented by lower officials. As a result, the state’s ability to deliver security and services was more effective.

Following the reforms led by Prime Minister Abiy, we seem to have swung in the other extreme. The federal government is less feared and regional elites more defiant. Popular social media activists regularly threaten violence against groups or individuals they dislike. Interest groups, which are usually ethnic, regularly preach hate and incite violence. and are rarely held accountable. Ruling Party discipline has waned, and with that so has the efficiency of the state itself.

In a country with weak institutions, such a laissez-faire approach presents tremendous disadvantages for maintaining order. Reforming a complex country and large country like Ethiopia requires a lot of patience and tact, and is fraught with setbacks, but recent trends seem to be counter reform. Some argue, until institutions mature, this is a necessary evil of democratization and opening up.

But leniency on the part of the state is coming at a heavy cost to safety, especially in an environment where key pillars, such as the judicial branch are failing. Public frustration is growing because people feel less protected and exposed to harm. They are now less likely to view the government as a guarantor of their safety. One notices a sort of rule-less anomie.

Then there is an economy battered with several shocks. Recent global rise in prices were compounded and made worse in Ethiopia due to conflict. A shortfall in available hard currency meant essential imports such as energy, pharmaceuticals have doubled or tripled in price. Reports indicate, the country’s dollar reserves are only enough to cover a few months of key imports. To ameliorate the exchange rate position, GoE removed long standing subsidies for fuel, removed export barriers and discouraged non-essential imports. Support from international partners in debt restructuring would greatly help cash strapped Ethiopia, but political preconditions are slowing progress.

Recent visit to Ethiopia by U.S secretary of state, Anthony Blinken could help ease Ethiopia’s debt repayment, but comes with preconditions. The United States may want parliament to remove the TPLF from the terrorist entities list before facilitating IMF loans. It also seems keen on dangling AGOA re-instatement on transitional justice for victims of war. With many unresolved sticking points abound, the process will take time and likely delay AGOA. For one, investigations on human rights violations led by the UNHCR are unlikely to be accepted by Ethiopian authorities who have pushed back against such a mandate on grounds of judicial sovereignty. Most African states support this position.

Despite these challenges, Ethiopia’s resilience must also be appreciated. There are not that many states around that could withstand similar consecutive shocks and survive. This is testament to Ethiopia’s ancient homegrown state building tradition. Despite serious disadvantages presented, Ethiopia continues to show promising signs in areas such as agriculture, infrastructure, and education. However, big gaps remain in law enforcement, judiciary and peace building. More importantly, Ethiopia is missing a clear roadmap and the kind of leadership above political expediency displayed by Prime Minister Abiy in his heyday.

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Recently, many felt relieved by the welcomed breakthrough of November 2022. A tenuous peace agreement was signed, ending the two-year long war between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), an armed insurgency in the northern Tigray region, and the Government of Ethiopia (GoE). As of now (December 2022), despite fears of relapse, the northern conflict seems to be edging closer to an enduring peace.

Although the conflict in the north has been the most concerning for the risks to national and regional stability, it is not the only security challenge faced by the GoE. Alongside the TPLF insurgency, Ethiopia’s Wellega, a western sub-region in the country’s largest ethnic enclave of Oromia, has been plagued by a three year long armed turmoil led by the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), informally referred to as Shene. In 2018 the OLA came into being as a small splinter group that broke away from the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), one of several armed rebellions born out of Ethiopia’s revolution, which ultimately deposed Emperor Haile Selassie I in 1974.

One could hardly say OLA broke with OLF over ideological disagreements. Most agree it had no ideology or plan. It was purely borne out of opportunism. Yet some fringe hardliners still prefer an armed insurrectionist path forward to secure what they deem to be the interests of the Oromo, the country’s largest and most sundry ethnic group. On the other hand, the majority of the OLF officially embarked on a reformist, middle of the road path forward, a position closer to Ethiopia’s ruling party. In the middle, opportunists straddle the fence. 

Despite its small size, OLA found a patron in the TPLF, which needed a partner to resist Abiy’s reformist new administration seeking to rollback the outsized influence of the former regime. The now deceased former intelligence chief of Ethiopia, Getachew Assefa, himself a leading figure within the TPLF was given charge of organizing and training OLA fighters throughout 2018 and 2019. During this period OLA would grow from roughly 30 fighters to more than two thousand. More recently another split occurred. There are now two groups, which call themselves OLA-Shene. One led by Jal Marro and another by less known Fekade. According to locals, the two groups oppose each other, but no less are deadly to civilians in the region.

The OLA’s extremist version of Oromo nationalism has been bloody and marked by executions of civilians, abduction of children for ransom, and disappearances of political opponents. Most glaring has been the group’s calculated and deliberate mass killings targeting Amhara residents in several conflict hotspots. In July 2022, a report by Abren outlined “Alarming reports of ethnically motivated massacres by declared terror group, Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), targeting mainly Amhara civilians in Hawa Gelan and in Kellem, Wollega took the lives of 340 individuals, many of them women and children”.

Such attacks aim to destabilize the ruling party’s most important coalition between political elites of the Amhara region and the that of the Oromo. Together these two regions comprise 70% of Ethiopia’s population and its geographic heartland. This tactical alliance, informally dubbed Oromara, had been instrumental in sidelining the TPLF, which dominated Ethiopian politics since the early 1990s, having forcibly ousted the former military government. Abren has described the precipitous decline of TPLF in previous posts.

Leaders of the TPLF had long feared formation of such an alliance between the Oromo and the Amhara that could threaten their senior position within the ruling party, which they managed to hold together and dominate from 1991 until 2018. But eventually that is exactly what happened. Reversing it has been an obsession of the group ever since.

The Government of Ethiopia has overcome an insurrection led by the clique that formerly ruled the country. However, anti-government forces continue to use every means available to uproot the state. For the time being the OLA seems to have supplanted the TPLF as the most destabilizing force. The group’s tentacles within the Oromo regional administrative bureaucracy, extent of which is still murky, complicates matters. At the very least, we know it continues to enjoy support in Wellega, where it has been most active. Most of the group’s leadership as well as its fighters are recruited from this region. According to Ethiopia’s Human Rights Commission, a majority of ethnically targeted massacres in the past 4 years have occurred in this region.

A recent anti-corruption drive whereby hundreds of officials have been arrested seems to have disturbed the hive again, or rather “the den of thieves”, as one Ethiopian government official pointed out on television. Some commentators who favor Prime Minister Abiy describe the recent flurry of violence in Wellega as retribution for mass arrests targeting corrupt officials in Oromia with links to a shadow government that is also connected to the OLA. They go further to illustrate formal TPLF alliance, made public by the two-armed groups in August 2021.

Nevertheless, graphic images of atrocities committed by the OLA are intentionally fanned by extremist outlets on social media, with aim of outraging members of the Amhara community. This in turn is fueling fringe elements within the Amhara political discourse who seek to paint the conflict as war between the two ethnic groups. Some even insinuate that the Prime Minister is complicit in the attacks. While these claims maybe untrue and even outlandish, given the government’s glaring communication failures, the whole thing lends itself to ominous conspiracies. Unfortunately for the public, perception is reality and silence is not a plan or a policy.

“All of it falls in line with the perpetrator’s plan, which is to provoke an angry reaction by members of the Amhara community, which could potentially lead towards spiraling intercommunal conflict, that then could weaken the central state”, says Seyoum Teshome, a regular political commentator on Ethiopian media outlets. Professor Brehanu Nega, a long time opposition figure who is now Minister of Education says, “those who back a violent regime change agenda have deliberately sought to infuse a sense of lawlessness and fear by carrying out heinous atrocities and broadcasting it on social media “. He adds, “extremists on all side are fools for believing their interests and their kin or tribe are better protected in a vicious cycle of violence and retribution”.

Indeed armed groups attempting to overthrow the government by force stand to gain from such a scenario. Not too long before the peace agreement was reached, general Tadesse Werede of the Tigay rebels said this was one of their key strategies. Nonetheless, most people’s worries are other than the antics of polarizing politics on social media. To them daily life is a matter of most importance. That contrast can be seen in Addis Ababa, where residents are more concerned about the rising cost of living than anything else.

According to Seyoum, “given the new age of social media, where it is difficult to control the narrative or suppress disinformation, silence makes things worse”. He is among many activists who believe the government has not done enough to bring order. A member of the regional Oromo congress, known as Cheffee Oromia reached by phone, who declined to be named, remarked, “Shene’s actions are condemned by the Oromia regional leadership, but diehard Oromo nationalists have sought to leverage violent groups for their own agenda, and this situation is being complicated by reports of Fano (an Amhara militia group) involvement in recent cashes”.

The recent clashes referred to occurred in Kiremu, a small town, 287 miles northwest of Addis Ababa on December 2nd, 2022, when residents fought back, as Shene fighters killed dozens of Amhara civilians of the town. Reports indicated Fano militia men from the neighboring Amhara region were part of the clashes. He continued, “however, the real issue is lack of consensus among the regional Oromo politicians themselves on steps forward”.

Oromia, a vast region that encompasses most of central Ethiopia is also the most diverse and most populated. Outside of the majority Afan Oromo speakers, an estimated 13 million people from other ethnic groups call it home. Many towns and villages are too rural and difficult to access by road. Consensus on regional political issues is difficult, with many sitting on several sides on the political fence at any given time. 

As happened many times before, Ethiopia’s national army has been called to intervene and stabilize this most recent flashpoint, but the root cause largely eludes authorities. In the meantime, the public continues to be frustrated by the lack of direction or plan coming from the top. Close observers of events in Ethiopia believe regular engagements with the public on these issues and a roadmap forward would go a long way to ease the pressure.

Prime Minister Abiy’s popularity, which was cemented in his party’s 2021 landslide election victory has since waned. Armed opposition groups, in some cases supported by outside powers, have successful used violence to delay, if not derail ambitious reforms of the Prime Minister. Many Ethiopians had eagerly wanted to see changes made sooner to the country’s ethnic based constitution, the only one of its kind in the world.

For now, the pace of political and economic reforms promised by Abiy administration have slowed, but not yet ground to a halt. Repeated atrocities targeting civilians for their ethnicity and the government’s ineffective response has emboldened extremist elements on all sides. Looking forward, restoring calm and embarking on a national dialogue will be a priority on par with ambitious developmental goals of ruling party. But concrete action and the public’s constructive cooperation is needed.

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The peace agreement which has ended all hostilities in Northern Ethiopia has so far failed to nudge U.S policy makers in the direction of removing sanctions directed against Ethiopian and Eritrean governments accused of exacerbating the war. The agreement could resolve the human rights and humanitarian concerns that have been the basis for several measures the United States has taken against Ethiopia and Eritrea, including sanctions, trade restrictions, and visa restrictions. According to a recent report by law firm Foley and Lardner, LLP, “until a peace deal proves durable, current restrictions by the United States — and by other countries — will continue to create uncertainty for investors and persons seeking to do business in or with Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the Greater Horn of Africa region”.

Following the conflict in Ethiopia, the United States Government enacted several punitive sanctions which remain in place today.

• In May 2021, vista restrictions were announced by the State Department on unnamed Ethiopian and Eritrean officials, military commanders, and “individuals responsible for, or complicit in, undermining resolution of the conflict in Tigray.”
  • `Simultaneously, the State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) algo began implementing a policy of prohibiting the export of defense articles and services to Ethiopia
• In August 2021, The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), citing human rights abuses in Tigray, designated General Filipos Woldeyohannes, the Eritrean army’s chief of staff, as a target for sanctions under Executive Order 13818. President Donald Trump had issued E.O. 13818 in 2017 as part of the Global Magnitsky Act, authorizing sanctions against individuals responsible for human rights abuses and corruption around the world.
• In September 2021, President Biden issued Executive Order 14046, authorizing sanctions against entities and individuals responsible for alleged “widespread violence, atrocities, and serious human rights abuse” in Ethiopia.¹ OFAC did not yet designate any targets for sanctions under E.O. 14046. These sanctions later were codified in the Ethiopia Sanctions Regulations.
• In November 2021, the State Department’s DDTC formally amended the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), codifying DDTC’s policy of denying licenses for exporting defense articles or services “to or for the armed forces, police, intelligence, or other internal security forces of either Ethiopia or Eritrea.”[2] 
• Also in November 2021, pursuant to E.O. 14046, OFAC designated four Eritrean entities and two Eritrean individuals as targets for sanctions. The entities were:
  • The Eritrean Defense Forces;The People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ, Eritrea’s sole legal political party);The Hidri Trust (a holding company affiliated with PFDJ); and
  • The Red Sea Trading Corporation (a business management company affiliated with PFDJ).
• The individuals were:
  • Abraha Kassa Nemariam, the head of the Eritrean National Security Office; and
  • Hagos Ghebrehiwet W. Kidan, the economic advisor to the PFDJ and C.E.O. of the Red Sea Trading Corporation.
• In January 2022, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative terminated Ethiopia from the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act trade program, ending the country’s duty-free access to American markets. The program had generated employment for 100,000 Ethiopians, mostly women, and had earned the country $100 million annually.

In addition, the year 2021 saw the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) also delayed its previously announced $500 million loan to a consortium of companies that had agreed to invest in Ethiopia’s telecom sector. This caused postponement of Safaricom’s initial telecom venture into Ethiopia. According to the DFC, its delays in financing the investment dragged the project and raised serious concerns for investors. However, impediments to the consortium’s investment were eased, following the possibility of a China-backed competitor consortium winning license to operate in Ethiopia’s telecom market.

Under the terms of the peace agreement reached, in addition to both parties ceasing hostilities permanently, the Tigray rebel combatants are to disarm within 30 days after the signing of the deal, and the federal government of Ethiopia will take back control of main roads, airports and facility humanitarian aid access. The federal government has started work on reconnecting hitherto cut off telecom services. Furthermore, a transitional body will be established to oversee the region’s reintegration after two years of interruption

Although U.S officials have praised the African Union-led peace agreement that was signed in Pretoria, South Africa, little has been said about the easing of sanctions. Following the breakthrough peace deal, hostilities in northern Ethiopia’s Tigray region have dramatically diminished. Humanitarian aid to the region’s 6.5 million people has resumed. War rhetoric and vilifications from both parties have subsided significantly. Yet despite these promising signs foreign policy analysts question the stability of the truce.

Hardliners of the TPLF have latched on to doubts around the agreement by disparaging the merits of the peace agreement, which they view as favoring the Government of Ethiopia, whose defense forces has essentially defeated the rebels in battle and now controls over 70% of territory, including major towns and cities in the Tigray region. Previous truces and ceasefires were in fact easier to sidestep. However, given the current dominance of the Ethiopian National Defense Forces, the rebels will find it difficult to wiggle their way out of the terms of the agreement. Some say this provides guarantees for peace, particularly if Ethiopian authorities remain magnanimous and accommodating to the reintegration of Tigray.

Given the recent developments, lingering effects of U.S measures present mixed signals. Ethiopia remains excluded from the AGOA trade preference program, despite the fact that the program’s beneficiaries have nothing to do with the conflict. Moreover, the DFC’s delayed loan did not stop the consortium of telecom companies led by Safaricom gaining license to operate in Ethiopia for a fee of $850 million. The U.S. also continued to provide humanitarian assistance, giving more than $1 billion in Fiscal year 2021 to promote health, food security, basic education, support for women and girls, and human rights and democracy.

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Following tests on a new power transmission line, Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation starts exporting energy to Kenya

According to Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation, the state-owned power company has started exporting electricity to neighboring Kenya following weeks of testing and readying a new transmission line.

The line, which took years to complete at a cost of $500 million, has the capacity to transmit 2,000 megawatts of electricity, potentially earning Ethiopia as much as $100 million annually when fully operational.

According to a report published on Bloomberg, citing Ethiopian Electric Power Corp, “The country has completed activities to ensure uninterrupted and reliable transmission of power and it is expected that similar activities will be implemented by the Kenyan side to provide dependable energy integration to a fast-growing East Africa.”

Given the possibilities, economic and infrastructure integration between the two countries is still in its infancy. More can be done to link power, roads, and ports in the Horn of Africa * and recent signs are promising. Kenya’s Safaricom, one of Africa’s biggest telecom and fin-tech companies, was recently given the greenlight to operate in Ethiopia, for a license fee of $850 million, making it the single largest foreign direct investment into Ethiopia. In years to come Safaricom will continue to invest in Ethiopia’s telecom infrastructure.

Recently, a boost has been added to Ethiopia’s power grid, thanks in large part of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, a giant hydro-power dam on a Nile River tributary, which began generating electricity in early 2021, and with plans to increase power generation turbines in the coming years. This has been a cornerstone project for economic development but it has stirred tensions with downstream neighbors Egypt and Sudan, more so Egypt than Sudan.

The $5 billion dam, which is wholly financed domestically, is a national priority. It is expected to generate 5200 megawatts of electricity once completed in 2024. In the meantime, Ethiopia has signed power supply agreements with Kenya, Sudan, Djibouti, Somaliland, Tanzania, and South Sudan. According to Bloomberg’s report, The Horn of Africa nation earned $95.4 million from electricity exports last year with room to grow. Demand for electricity has grown massively, but now there is tangible reason to believe supply is coming.

Given the nation’s capacity for hydro power, this current level of power generation only scratches the surface. The electric grid also needs modernization and further expansion. Investment for such projects will be a key priority for a government with ambitious development plans.

Ethiopia’s economy has demonstrated resilience despite several shocks, including covid-19, global supply chain disruptions, inflation, and the conflict in the northern Tigray region of the country. According to the World Bank, the nation’s GDP grew by 5.6% in 2021. In the current year, the growth rate subsided to 4.8%. Still, forecasts for 2023 estimate growth rates of 6.5%.

Indeed, given past economic growth rates, this nation of 120 million people, with a median age of 19 years will have an insatiable appetite for energy. This will have implications for the environment. The current government has emphasized green development in electric generation, hydro and solar being the two main areas.

At the recent COP27 climate summit, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed highlighted Ethiopia’s “ten-year development plan, anchored on building a climate resilient green economy as one of its key pillars”. Part of this is the Green Legacy, a campaign of nationwide afforestation, planting billions of trees every year since 2020. According to the Prime Minister, this will help to remove hundreds of millions of tons of Carbon dioxide equivalent from the atmosphere and reduce deforestation Combining this with green energy and technology is a key and striving goal.

As always, financing will be a challenge, particularly considering recent delays in IMF funding caused by U.S insistence that the government end its offensive against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, a Marxist-Leninist party which ruled the country from 1991 to 2018, but now turned rebel group, after a falling out with the new government. The recently agreed peace deal signed, however fragile, gives hope to millions of people affected by the fighting.

To fully unlock Ethiopia’s clean energy potential, peace and stability must be maintained. U.S based energy companies can play a critical role, but they will face competition from Europe as well as China. For the first time, outside powers are seeing Africa’s potential for growth beyond the extractive industries. In East Africa, there are a handful countries which have shown significant GDP growth despite shortfalls in foreign direct investment. The region’s integration drive promises to be a boon for frontier market investors.

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Once again northern Ethiopia was brought up at the UNSC on October 21, but there was no consensus among council members to issue a public statement.  Nonetheless, Linda Thomas Greenfield provided the U.S position in a press briefing afterwards. Non-permanent member African states of the UNSC held their position that Ethiopia’s northern conflict is an internal issue that should be handled by Ethiopia and the African Union. Greenfield repeated the claim that Eritrean troops are actively engaged in battle yet failed to produce evidence for this.

Advances by Ethiopian forces elicited pleas for an immediate cessation of hostilities by the rebels, a position which has many sympathizers in the West, but had little acceptance in Ethiopia. On October 23, the Government of Ethiopia claimed, “it has liberated the historic towns of Axum and Adwa and was advancing fast in all direction towards Mekelle.

A series of mass demonstrations denouncing foreign interference in Ethiopia’s internal affairs were held in several cities across Ethiopia as well as in the diaspora. Demonstrated demanded an African led peace process, as well as an end to the TPLF insurrection in Northern Ethiopia.

The pace of ENDF advances is causing the rebels to shed their reluctance for peace talks, as a flurry of recent statements appear to welcome negotiations without preconditions. Negotiators for the TPLF as well as the Government of Ethiopia arrived in south Africa on Sunday, October 24. Fearing for their personal security, TPLF’s delegation flew on a U.S. military aircraft, accompanied by Mike Hammer, the U.S. special envoy to the Horn of Africa. The situation on the ground appeared to put the government in a stronger position than its opponents going into the talks, though it was under pressure from foreign powers, including the United States and European Union, to halt its offensive.

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As fighting between Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) and Tigray rebels continues, the TPLF leadership accused both Eritrea and Ethiopia for stalled talks. The African Union’s attempted peace talks in South Africa had faltered after several prevarications by the rebels, who wanted a cessation of hostilities before willingness to join peace talks. However, Ethiopia’s government reiterated its push for talks without any preconditions.

Half a million Ethiopian high school seniors took national exams to enroll in university. The examination had been the subject of attention in recently years due to several repeated cases of fraud, leaked exams as well as cheating scandals. The ministry of education, which came under fire for these shortcomings sought to rectify these challenges in this latest round of exams. By all accounts this year’s matriculations were successfully completed, which is testament to positive reforms enacted thus far.

Ethiopia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent an open letter to the Republic of Ireland, accusing it of interfering in Ethiopia’s internal conflict. The letter stated, “Ireland continued attacking Ethiopia using its membership in the UN Security Council, the European Union, and elsewhere. Ethiopia’s plea to Ireland to reduce hostility and attacks against its sovereignty and territorial integrity had not been heeded”.

At week’s end, the 10^th year-round of the Tana forum was held in the city of Bahir Dar, Ethiopia. Guest attendees included, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed of Ethiopia, the sovereign council of Sudan, Abdul Fatah Al Burhan, the prime minister of Somalia as well as U.S Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa Mike Hammer. The high-level forum focused on security, climate change as well as economic integration of African states.

Recent military advances of ENDF could not be hidden, as TPLF supporters flood social media outlets with statements pleading for intervention by the International Community. Opponents of the insurgents cited more concocted stories of atrocities were being used by the group as part of its disinformation campaign to garner humanitarian sympathy from Western observers. Meanwhile the Ethiopian planes drop leaflets in Tigray advising residents to disassociate from the insurgents who seek to use civilians as human shields.

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