The gradual withdrawal of ATMIS troops, which has been underway for nearly a year, has raised fears that an uncoordinated exit could lead to a dangerous power vacuum. This, in turn, could allow Al-Shabaab to establish an ISIS-like caliphate in Somalia, exacerbating instability in an already volatile Horn of Africa region. Moreover, Al-Shabaab’s affiliations with Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and increasingly the Houthis of Yemen present a broader threat to regional security, especially impacting maritime routes in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

In response, the African Union (AU) has proposed a new peacekeeping initiative, the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), scheduled to replace ATMIS in January 2025. This new mission was proposed after extensive consultations involving the AU, UN, EU, and other stakeholders, including Turkey and the UAE. The AU dispatched a team of experts to Somalia to assess the security situation and help formulate AUSSOM’s mandate, which will focus on protecting strategic population centers, UN facilities, and key government installations.

ATMIS troops are slated to withdraw entirely by December 2024. The AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) is currently reviewing the successes and failures of previous missions to inform AUSSOM’s planning. Egypt and Djibouti have already pledged to contribute troops, and additional support from other AU member states is expected. However, Ethiopia’s participation remains uncertain due to recent diplomatic tensions with Somalia, which has requested Addis Ababa to withdraw its MoU with Somaliland, a region that has governed itself independently since 1991, and now seeks recognition for its vaunted independence, something Ethiopia is keen to do. 

It’s not exactly clear how AUSSOM would be effective without Ethiopia’s participation, which not only shares the longest border with Somalia, but also has contributed a bulk of the fighting capability in previous AU-led peace keeping missions. It also deploys an additional 15,000 troops bilaterally to secure some of the most difficult sectors of Somalia and has done so since 2007. 

Following its recent fallout with Addis Ababa, Mogadishu has threatened to expel Ethiopian troops and invite Egyptian forces to replace them. This or course could further complicate regional dynamics and impact Ethiopia’s strategic security interests. In reaction, Ethiopia may accelerate MoU with Somaliland. Having spent decades engraining itself in Somalia and with the ongoing threat of terrorism, Addis Ababa will be unlikely to withdraw its army completely either. These may include parts of Bakool, Gedo, and Baidoa where reportedly Ethiopian forces retain good will among the public.

The failures of AMISOM and ATMIS highlight deep-rooted issues that may undermine the new mission’s effectiveness. Central to this uncertainty is Somalia’s enduring governance crisis. For over three decades, Somalia has struggled to establish a stable and effective government, and expectations that a new mission will resolve these long-entrenched issues are overly optimistic. Somalia risks further balkanization and even occupation with the arrival of more and more foreign forces, all of whom have diverging interests, and are determined to take advantage of a weak state for their own benefit. 

Previous peacekeeping missions faced numerous challenges, including inadequate resources, political infighting, and corruption within institutions, but now there appears to be international exhaustion at Somalia’s endless internal clan wars. In addition, other more pressing regional and global conflicts are carting away more resources from the international community.

The financial sustainability of AUSSOM also poses a concern. Previous missions were heavily reliant on external funding, and recent global financial strains and other priority global security challenges have made obtaining such support more challenging. While a new UN resolution aims to alleviate this burden by redistributing funding responsibilities between the UN and the AU, the effectiveness of this approach remains uncertain.

The AU’s new mission, AUSSOM is yet another effort to address Somalia’s deteriorating security needs, but three decades of governance failures, and persistent instability in the country present formidable challenges. The potential for AUSSOM to succeed where AMISOM and ATMIS fell short is highly questionable.

The post Somalia: Yet Another AU Peace Mission Amid Chaos and Fallout With Ethiopia appeared first on Abren.

In a previous note, Abren Editorial refuted the report made by the New Lines Institute, as a replay of debunked claims and misjudgments on Ethiopia. It was important to first disprove the claims solely on their merit, but now we take things a bit further, to explore the controversial background and history of the New Lines Institute itself.

Beneath the guise of independence lies a harsh reality. An examination of the report and its institutional ties reveals a significant discrepancy with its claims of impartiality and expertise. Many of the supposed experts and founding members have close affiliations with the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), an organization linked to the Muslim Brotherhood and allegations of supporting terrorism.

A report by the National Review in 2010 exposed, following the 911 terrorist attacks and the resulting war on terror, IIIT had been demonstrated by the Justice Department to be an unindicted coconspirator with extremist Islamic groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood.

According to a report Kyle Shideler, Director and Senior Analyst for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism at the Center for Security and Policy, “Previously known as the Center for Global Policy (CGP), the now rebranded “New Lines Institute” has emerged as a newcomer in Washington D.C.’s think-tank scene, presenting itself with a polished image akin to numerous others in the capital”. CGP positioned itself as the first independent, non-partisan American think tank dedicated to the intersection of U.S. foreign policy and Muslim geopolitics.

Senior Fellow David Reaboi from the Center for Security Policy highlighted the revelation, commenting, “It turns out that the ‘new’ Center for Global Policy is actually the International Institute for Islamic Thought—an organization associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, considered one of the most dangerous and subversive groups.”

Moreover, at the time, Ahmed Alwani, the founder and president of New Lines Institute, also held the vice-president position at IIIT, as detailed on their website. His background includes a presidency at Fairfax University of America, the institution funding the contentious report.

However, Fairfax University of America has faced severe credibility challenges, coming under scrutiny from local regulators and nearly facing closure. Originally named Virginia International University, it has been categorized as a private university in Virginia. The U.S. National Advisory Committee on Institutional Quality and Integrity recommended withdrawing its accreditation due to insufficient oversight. Official statistics from the U.S. Department of Education paint a bleak picture, with only 153 students enrolled between 2020 and 2021, and the university’s Twitter account having a mere 13 followers.

Despite public perception, operating affiliates of the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States are neither uncommon nor illegal. For instance, in February 2012, Donald Trump accused President Obama’s administration of allocating significant funding to support the ‘Arab Spring’ and the Muslim Brotherhood’s role in Egypt. Trump continued his criticism later that year, alleging Obama’s intentions to allocate further millions to the Muslim Brotherhood to foment the Arab Spring revolution, which later turned out to be an Arab Winter, leading to multiple seemingly intractable infernos in Libya, Yemen, and Syria.

While direct evidence of collaboration between the U.S. government and New Lines has not been substantiated, the group acknowledges receiving funding from government offices. Characterizations along these lines have also been made. Last month, a report by alternative Mint Press stated, “With their quiet admission of U.S. government funding, New Lines joins an ever-growing list of organizations like Graphika and Bellingcat that present themselves as independent but receive funding from the government. The article, goes on to say, ‘Worse still, New Lines has been at the forefront of attacking and demonizing the few dissenting voices in American foreign Policy’.

The New Lines Institute’s historical affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood network does not automatically suggest that every scholar there is a member of the Brotherhood, or that they are fully aware of this affiliation. However, the institutes’ repeated attempts to rebrand itself following media revelations, coupled with efforts to mislead people about the true nature of their connection with IIIT, raises significant doubts and undermines confidence in the group’s initiatives.

Given its shady history and multiple deception attempts, it is not extraordinary for the New Lines Institute to accept payment to produce a dubious report. Indeed, its latest claim that the now ended war in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region constituted a “Genocide” is absurd. Not only are the merits of that story unsubstantiated, but the storytellers themselves have grave shortcomings, compromising their objectivity. The New Lines Institute is yet another addition to a long list of cons claiming to be experts on Ethiopia.

The post Unmasking the New Lines Institute and Its Sinister Allegiances appeared first on Abren.

Downplaying or omitting the fact the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) instigated the war by attacking army bases on the Ethiopian National Defense Forces lays the foundations for manipulating the history and narrative of the entire conflict. 

The report then distills various accusations into their simplest forms to argue that the conflict was not about political power but rather a “genocide” against Tigrayans, advocating for the Ethiopia’s leadership to face charges at the International Criminal Court.

Predictably the report largely ignores the fact TPLF was an ethnically exclusively political organization that presided over a brutal authoritarian system of government in Ethiopia from 1991 to 2018, and that the “Tigray War” was largely about this group’s desperate attempt to come back to power again, after being ousted by a series of popular revolts from 2016 to 2018. 

Despite branding its findings as “ground-breaking,” The New Lines Institute acknowledges its study was primarily a desk-based research, summarizing previous reports from specialized NGOs, academic opinions, news articles, and blog posts. Upon closer enquiry however, the sources cited for the report are the same ones that were so thoroughly scrutinized by Danish Journalist Rasmus Sonderiis in “Getting Ethiopia Dead Wrong”, a comprehensive examination revealing the mainstream media’s detrimental misrepresentation of Ethiopia’s 2020-2022 conflict, perpetuating the stereotypical single story of Africa, as a continent of bestial animosity and genocide.

While the likes of Tony Magaña and Mirjam van Reisen are omitted from the report, others who no less distorted narrative of the war, including Martin Plaut, Kjetil Tronvoll, Alex De Waal, Jan Nyssen, and Will Brown are frequently cited. Notably absent however are accurate predictions by Professor Ann Fitz-Gerald and Bronwyn Bruton, whose perspectives are not even considered for rebuttal. This selective referencing raises questions about the report’s objectivity, as it elevates certain experts while completely ignoring opposing viewpoints.

Of particular concern is the timing of the report’s release, coinciding with the TPLF’s latest violation of the Pretoria Peace Agreement in order to reclaim lost territories Raya-Alamata and Welkait, another name for the region referred to as “West Tigray” in the report. While justifying this violent breach as resistance to genocide may prove challenging, a concerted media effort could potentially frame it as vindicated retaliation or an effort to restore justice. The New Lines Institute seems to be laying the foundations for exactly that, but trying to violently reclaim territory will only bring more suffering. Not to mention it foils ongoing talks between conflicting parties to amenably resolve the issue. 

Ethiopians have become familiar with such cynical publicity stunts, of positioning false narratives as cover for a war of aggression. It is as sinister as it gets and consistent with Nazi propagandist Joseph Gobbles’ famed proclamation of “accuse your enemy of that which you are guilty of”. Intriguingly, the “Tigray Genocide” narrative first appeared within hours of the attack on the northern command, a fact signaling a coordinated and premeditated information operation. 

The ensuing war did claim the lives of many thousands, although the numbers frequently cited by media are overly exaggerated and cannot withstand introspection. Nevertheless, civilians did suffer tremendously, with all warring sides committing atrocities. Yet, it was a far cry from genocide. Little talked about by most Western accounts is the rampaging violence perpetrated by Tigray’s insurgency regime in the Amhara and Afar regions as well as a barrage of missile strikes on Eritrea’s capital Asmara. This period was documented in the timeline of the war published by Abren.

The continued insistence on the “Tigray Genocide” narrative in media discourse, despite its inaccuracies and misjudgments is frustrating. Those perpetuating the story seem to enjoy unchecked access to mass communication channels, evading scrutiny of their errors. However, expecting these entities to self-reflect or apologize for their role in perpetuating falsehoods and fueling conflict is perhaps naive. Some may read this article, but genuine engagement in constructive dialogue seems unlikely, exemplified by instances like The Economist’s Tom Gardner blocking dissenting voices on social media rather than engaging in substantive debate. It seems that those who got Ethiopia so wrong are doubling down, revealing their conscious complicity in trying to manipulate public opinion with unfounded tales.

The post The New Lines Institute Report on “Tigray Genocide” is a Replay of Debunked Claims appeared first on Abren.

This is indeed a momentous and historic day for Africa and for all Africans. We stand today on the stage of world affairs before the audience of world opinion. We have come together to assert our role in the direction of world affairs and to discharge our duty to the great continent whose 250 million people we lead. Africa is today at midcourse, in transition from the Africa of Yesterday to the Africa of Tomorrow. Even as we stand here, we move from the past into the future. The task on which we have embarked, the making of Africa, will not wait. We must act, to shape and mould the future and leave our imprint on events as they slip past into history.

We seek, at this meeting, to determine the course of our destiny. It is no less important that we know whence we came. An awareness of our past is essential to the establishment of our identity as Africans.

This world was not created piecemeal. Africa was born no later and no earlier than any other geographical area on this globe. Africans, no more and no less than other men, possess all human attributes, talents and deficiencies, virtues and faults. Thousands of years ago, civilizations flourished in Africa which suffer not at all by comparison with those of other continents. In those centuries, Africans were politically free and economically independent. Their social patterns were their own and their cultures truly indigenous.

The obscurity which enshrouds the centuries which elapsed between those earliest days and the rediscovery of Africa is being gradually dispersed. What is certain is that during those long years Africans were born, lived, and died. Men on other parts of this earth occupied themselves with their own concerns and, in their conceit, proclaimed that the world began and ended at their horizons. All unknown to them, Africa developed in its own pattern, growing in its own life and, in the nineteenth century, finally re-emerged into the world’s consciousness.

The events of the past 150 years require no extended recitation from us. The period of colonialism into which we were plunged culminated with our continent fettered and bound; with our once proud and free peoples reduced to humiliation and slavery; with Africa’s terrain cross-hatched and chequer-boarded by artificial and arbitrary boundaries. Many of us, during those bitter years, were overwhelmed in battle, and those who escaped conquest did so at the cost of desperate resistance and bloodshed. Others were sold into bondage as the price extracted by the colonialists for the ‘protection’ which they extended and the possessions of which they disposed. Africa was a physical resource to be exploited and Africans were chattels to be purchased bodily or, at best, peoples to be reduced to vassalage and lackeyhood. Africa was the market for the produce of other nations and the source of the raw materials with which their factories were fed.

Today, Africa has emerged from this dark passage. Our Armageddon is past. Africa has been reborn as a free continent and Africans have been reborn as free men. The blood that was shed and the sufferings that were endured are today Africa’s advocates for freedom and unity. Those men who refused to accept the judgment passed upon them by the colonisers, who held unswervingly through the darkest hours to a vision of an Africa emancipated from political, economic, and spiritual domination, will be remembered and revered wherever Africans meet. Many of them never set foot on this continent. Others were born and died here. What we may utter today can add little to the heroic struggle of those who, by their example, have shown us how precious are freedom and human dignity and of how little value is life without them. Their deeds are written in history.

Africa’s victory, although proclaimed, is not yet total, and areas of resistance still remain. Today, We name as our first great task the final liberating of those Africans still dominated by foreign exploitation and control. With the goal in sight, and unqualified triumph within our grasp, let us not now falter or lag or relax. We must make one final supreme effort; now, when the struggle grows weary, when so much has been won that the thrilling sense of achievement has brought us near satiation. Our liberty is meaningless unless all Africans are free. Our brothers in the Rhodesias, in Mozambique, in Angola, in South Africa, cry out in anguish for our support and assistance. We must urge on their behalf their peaceful accession to independence. We must align and identify ourselves with all aspects of their struggle. It would be betrayal were we to pay only lip service to the cause of their liberation and fail to back our words with action.

To them we say, your pleas shall not go unheeded. The resources of Africa and of all freedom-loving nations are marshalled in your service. Be of good heart, for your deliverance is at hand.

As we renew our vow that all of Africa shall be free, let us also resolve that old wounds shall be healed and past scars forgotten. It was thus that Ethiopia treated the invader nearly 25 years ago, and Ethiopians found peace with honour in this course. Memories of past injustice should not divert us from the more pressing business at hand. We must live in peace with our former colonisers, shunning recrimination and bitterness and forswearing the luxury of vengeance and retaliation, lest the acid of hatred erode our souls and poison our hearts. Let us act as befits the dignity which we claim for ourselves as Africans, proud of our own special qualities, distinctions, and abilities. Our efforts as free men must be to establish new relationships, devoid of any resentment and hostility, restored to our belief and faith in ourselves as individuals, dealing on a basis of equality with other equally free peoples.

Today, we look to the future calmly, confidently, and courageously. We look to the vision of an Africa not merely free but united. In facing this new challenge, we can take comfort and encouragement from the lessons of the past. We know that there are differences among us. Africans enjoy different cultures, distinctive values, special attributes. But we also know that unity can be and has been attained among men of the most disparate origins, that differences of race, of religion, of culture, of tradition, are no insuperable obstacle to the coming together of peoples. History teaches us that unity is strength, and cautions us to submerge and overcome our differences in the quest for common goals, to strive, with all our combined strength, for the path to true African brotherhood and unity.

There are those who claim that African unity is impossible, that the forces that pull us, some in this direction, others in that, are too strong to be overcome. Around us there is no lack of doubt and pessimism, no absence of critics and criticism. These speak of Africa, of Africa’s future and of her position in the twentieth century in sepulchral tones. They predict dissension and disintegration among Africans and internecine strife and chaos on our continent. Let us confound these and, by our deeds, disperse them in confusion. There are others whose hopes for Africa are bright, who stand with faces upturned in wonder and awe at the creation of a new and happier life, who have dedicated themselves to its realization and are spurred on by the example of their brothers to whom they owe the achievements of Africa’s past. Let us reward their trust and merit their approval.

The road of African unity is already lined with landmarks. The last years are crowded with meetings, with conferences, with declarations and pronouncements. Regional organisations have been established. Local groupings based on common interests, backgrounds, and traditions have been created.

But through all that has been said and written and done in these years, there runs a common theme. Unity is the accepted goal. We argue about means; we discuss alternative paths to the same objective; we engage in debates about techniques and tactics. But when semantics are stripped away, there is little argument among us. We are determined to create a union of Africans. In a very real sense, our continent is unmade; it still awaits its creation and its creators. It is our duty and privilege to rouse the slumbering giant of Africa, not to the nationalism of Europe of the nineteenth century, not to regional consciousness, but to the vision of a single African brotherhood bending its united efforts toward the achievement of a greater and nobler goal.

Above all, we must avoid the pitfalls of tribalism. If we are divided among ourselves on tribal lines, we open our doors to foreign intervention and its potentially harmful consequences. The Congo is clear proof of what we say. We should not be led to complacency because of the present ameliorated situation in that country. The Congolese people have suffered untold misery, and the economic growth of the country has been retarded because of tribal strife.

But while we agree that the ultimate destiny of this continent lies in political union, we must at the same time recognize that the obstacles to be overcome in its achievement are at once numerous and formidable. Africa’s peoples did not emerge into liberty in uniform conditions. Africans maintain different political systems; our economies are diverse; our social orders are rooted in differing cultures and traditions. Furthermore no clear consensus exists on the ‘how’ and the ‘what’ of this union. Is it to be, in form, federal, confederal, or unitary? Is the sovereignty of individual states to be reduced, and if so, by how much, and in what areas? On these and other questions there is no agreement, and if we wait for agreed answers, generations hence matters will be little advanced, while the debate still rages.

We should, therefore, not be concerned that complete union is not attained from one day to the next. The union which we seek can only come gradually, as the day-to-day progress which we achieve carries us slowly but inexorably along this course. We have before us the examples of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. We must remember how long these required to achieve their union. When a solid foundation is laid, if the mason is able and his materials good, a strong house can be built.

Thus, a period of transition is inevitable. Old relations and arrangements may, for a time, linger. Regional organisations may fulfill legitimate functions and needs which cannot yet be otherwise satisfied. But the difference is in this: that we recognise these circumstances for what they are, temporary expedients designed to serve only until we have established the conditions which will bring total African unity within our reach.

There is, nevertheless, much that we can do to speed this transition. There are issues on which we stand united and questions on which there is unanimity of opinion. Let us seize on these areas of agreement and exploit them to the fullest. Let us take action now, action which, while taking account of present realities, none the less constitutes clear and unmistakable progress along the course plotted out for us by destiny. We are all adherents, whatever our internal political systems, of the principles of democratic action. Let us apply these to the unity we seek to create. Let us work out our own programmes in all fields—political, economic, social, and military. The opponents of Africa’s growth, whose interests would be best served by a divided and balkanised continent, would derive much satisfaction from the unhappy spectacle of 30 and more African States so split, so paralysed and immobilised by controversies over long-term goals that they are unable even to join their efforts in short-term measures on which there is no dispute. Let us give neither comfort nor encouragement to these. If we act where we may, in those areas where action is possible, the inner logic of the programmes which we adopt will work for us and inevitably impel us still farther in the direction of ultimate union.

What we still lack, despite the efforts of past years, is the mechanism which will enable us to speak with one voice when we wish to do so and take and implement decisions on African problems when we are so minded. The commentators of 1963 speak, in discussing Africa, of the Monrovia States, the Brazzaville Group, the Casablanca Powers, of these and many more. Let us put an end to these terms.

What we require is a single African organisation through which Africa’s single voice may be heard, within which Africa’s problems may be studied and resolved. We need an organisation which will facilitate acceptable solutions to disputes among Africans and promote the study and adoption of measures for common defence and programmes for co-operation in the economic and social fields. Let us, at this Conference, create a single institution to which we will all belong, based on principles to which we all subscribe, confident that in its councils our voices will carry their proper weight, secure in the knowledge that the decisions there will be dictated by Africans and only by Africans and that they will take full account of all vital African considerations.

We are meeting here today to lay the basis for African unity. Let us, here and now, agree upon the basic instrument which will constitute the foundation for the future growth in peace and harmony and oneness of this continent. Let our meetings henceforth proceed from solid accomplishments. Let us not put off, to later consideration and study, the single act, the one decision, which must emerge from this gathering if it is to have real meaning. This Conference cannot close without adopting a single African Charter. We cannot leave here without having created a single African organisation possessed of the attributes We have described. If we fail in this, we will have shirked our responsibility to Africa and to the peoples we lead. If we succeed, then, and only then, will we have justified our presence here.

The organization of which we speak must possess a well- articulated framework, having a permanent headquarters and an adequate secretariat providing the necessary continuity between meetings of the permanent organs. It must include specialised bodies to work in particular fields of competence assigned to the organisation. Unless the political liberty for which Africans have for so long struggled is complemented and bolstered by a corresponding economic and social growth, the breath of life which sustains our freedom may flicker out. In our efforts to improve the standard of life of our peoples and to flesh out the bones of our independence, we count on the assistance and support of others. But this alone will not suffice, and, alone, would only perpetuate Africa’s dependence on others.

A specialised body to facilitate and co-ordinate continent-wide economic programmes and to provide the mechanism for the provision of economic assistance among African nations is thus required. Prompt measures can be taken to increase trade and commerce among us. Africa’s mineral wealth is great; we should co-operate in its development. An African development programme, which will make provision for the concentration by each nation on those productive activities for which its resources and its geographic and climatic conditions best fit it, is needed. We assume that each African nation has its own national development programme, and it only remains for us to come together and share our experiences for the proper implementation of a continent-wide plan. Today, travel between African nations and telegraphic and telephonic communications among us are circuitous in the extreme. Road communications between two neighbouring States are often difficult or even impossible. It is little wonder that trade among us has remained at a discouragingly low level. These anachronisms are the remnants of a heritage of which we must rid ourselves, the legacy of the century when Africans were isolated one from the other. These are vital areas in which efforts must be concentrated.

An additional project to be implemented without delay is the creation of an African Development Bank, a proposal to which all our Governments have given full support and which has already received intensive study. The meeting of our Finance Ministers to be held within the coming weeks in Khartoum should transform this proposal into fact. This same meeting could appropriately continue studies already undertaken of the impact upon Africa of existing regional economic groupings, and initiate further studies to accelerate the expansion of economic relations among us.

The nations of Africa, as is true of every continent of the world, from time to time dispute among themselves. These quarrels must be confined to this continent and quarantined from the contamination of non-African interference. Permanent arrangements must be agreed upon to assist in the peaceful settlement of these disagreements which, however few they may be, cannot be left to languish and fester. Procedures must be established for the peaceful settlement of disputes, in order that the threat or use of force may no longer endanger the peace of our continent.

Steps must be taken to establish an African defence system. Military planning for the security of this continent must be undertaken in common within a collective framework. The responsibility for protecting this continent from armed attacks from abroad is the primary concern of Africans themselves. Provision must be made for the extension of speedy and effective assistance when any African State is threatened with military aggression. We cannot rely solely on international morality. Africa’s control over her own affairs is dependent on the existence of appropriate military arrangements to assure this continent’s protection against such threats While guarding our own independence.

Africa has come to freedom under the most difficult and trying of circumstances. In no small measure, the handicaps under which we labour derive from the low educational level attained by our peoples and from their lack of knowledge of their fellow Africans. Education abroad is at best an unsatisfactory substitute for education at home. A massive effort must be launched in the educational and cultural field which will not only raise the level of literacy and provide the cadres of skilled and trained technicians requisite to our growth and development but, as well, acquaint us one with another. Ethiopia, several years ago, instituted a programme of scholarships for students coming from other African lands which have proved highly rewarding and fruitful, and We urge others to adopt projects of this sort. Serious consideration should be given to the establishment of an African University, sponsored by all African States, where future leaders of Africa will be trained in an atmosphere of continental brotherhood. In this African institution, the supra-national aspects of African life would be emphasised and study would be directed toward the ultimate goal of complete African unity. Ethiopia stands prepared here and now to decide on the site of the University and to fix the financial contributions to be made to it.

This is but the merest summary of what can be accomplished. Upon these measures we are all agreed, and our agreement should now form the basis for our action.

Africa has become an increasingly influential force in the conduct of world affairs as the combined weight of our collective opinion is brought to focus not only on matters which concern this continent exclusively, but on those pressing problems which occupy the thoughts of all men everywhere. As we have come to know one another better and grown in mutual trust and confidence, it has been possible for us to co-ordinate our policies and actions and contribute to the successful settlement of pressing and critical world issues.

This has not been easy. But co-ordinated action by all African States on common problems is imperative if our opinions are to be accorded their proper weight. We Africans occupy a different—indeed a unique—position among the nations of this century. Having for so long known oppression, tyranny, and subjugation, who with better right can claim for all the opportunity and the right to live and grow as free men? Ourselves for long decades the victims of injustice, whose voices can be better raised in the demand for justice and right for all? We demand an end to colonialism because domination of one people by another is wrong. We demand an end to nuclear testing and the arms race because these activities, which pose such dreadful threats to man’s existence, and waste and squander humanity’s material heritage, are wrong. We demand an end to racial segregation as an affront to man’s dignity which is wrong. We act in these matters in the right, as a matter of high principle. We act out of the integrity and conviction of our most deep-founded beliefs.

If we permit ourselves to be tempted by narrow self-interest and vain ambition, if we barter our beliefs for short-term advantage, who will listen when we claim to speak for conscience, and who will contend that our words deserve to be heeded? We must speak out on major world issues, courageously, openly, and honestly, and in blunt terms of right and wrong. If we yield to blandishments or threats, if we compromise when no honourable compromise is possible, our influence will be sadly diminished and our prestige woefully prejudiced and weakened. Let us not deny our ideals or sacrifice our right to stand as the champions of the poor, the ignorant, the oppressed everywhere. The acts by which we live and the attitudes by which we act must be clear beyond question. Principles alone can endow our deeds with force and meaning. Let us be true to what we believe, that our beliefs may serve and honour us.

We reaffirm today, in the name of principle and right, our opposition to prejudice, wherever and in whatever form it may be found, and particularly do we rededicate ourselves to the eradication of racial discrimination from this continent. We can never rest content with our achievements so long as men, in any part of Africa, assert on racial grounds their superiority over the least of our brothers. Racial discrimination constitutes a negation of the spiritual and psychological equality which we have fought to achieve and a denial of the personality and dignity which we have struggled to establish for ourselves as Africans. Our political and economic liberty will be devoid of meaning for so long as the degrading spectacle of South Africa’s apartheid continues to haunt our waking hours and to trouble our sleep. We must redouble our efforts to banish this evil from our land. If we persevere, discrimination will one day vanish from the earth. If we use the means available to us, South Africa’s apartheid, just like colonialism, will shortly remain only as a memory. If we pool our resources and use them well, this spectre will be banished forever.

In this effort, as in so many others, we stand united with our Asian friends and brothers. Africa shares with Asia a common background of colonialism, of exploitation, of discrimination, of oppression. At Bandung, African and Asian States dedicated themselves to the liberation of their two continents from foreign domination and affirmed the right of all nations to develop in their own way, free of any external interference. The Bandung Declaration and the principles enunciated at that Conference remain today valid for us all. We hope that the leaders of India and China, in the spirit of Bandung, will find the way to the peaceful resolution of the dispute between their two countries.

We must speak, also, of the dangers of the nuclear holocaust which threatens all that we hold dear and precious, including life itself. Forced to live our daily existence with this foreboding and ominous shadow ever at our side, we cannot lose hope or lapse into despair. The consequences of an uncontrolled nuclear conflict are so dreadful that no sane man can countenance them. There must be an end to testing. A programme of progressive disarmament must be agreed upon. Africa must be freed and shielded, as a denuclearised zone, from the consequences of direct albeit involuntary involvement in the nuclear arms race.

The negotiations at Geneva, where Nigeria, the United Arab Republic, and Ethiopia are participating, continue, and painfully and laboriously progress is being achieved. We cannot know what portion of the limited advances already realised can be attributed to the increasingly important role being played by the non-aligned nations in these discussions, but we can, surely, derive some small measure of satisfaction from even the few tentative steps taken toward ultimate agreement among the nuclear powers. We remain persuaded that in our efforts to scatter the clouds which rim the horizon of our future, success must come, if only because failure is unthinkable. Patience and grim determination are required, and faith in the guidance of Almighty God.

We would not close without making mention of the United Nations. We personally, Who have throughout Our lifetime been ever guided and inspired by the principle of collective security, would not now propose measures which depart from or are inconsistent with this ideal or with the declarations of the United Nations Charter. It would be foolhardy indeed to abandon a principle which has withstood the test of time and which has proved its inherent value again and again in the past. It would be worse than folly to weaken the one effective world organisation which exists today and to which each of us owes so much. It would be sheer recklessness for any of us to.

The African Charter of which We have spoken is wholly consistent with that of the United Nations. The African organisation which We envisage is not intended in any way to replace in our national or international life the position which the United Nations has so diligently earned and so rightfully occupies. Rather, the measures which We propose would complement and round out programmes undertaken by the United Nations and its specialised agencies and, hopefully, render both their activities and ours doubly meaningful and effective. What we seek will multiply many times over the contribution which our joined endeavours may make to the assurance of world peace and the promotion of human well-being and understanding.

A century hence, when future generations study the pages of history, seeking to follow and fathom the growth and development of the African continent, what will they find of this Conference? Will it be remembered as an occasion on which the leaders of a liberated Africa, acting boldly and with determination, bent events to their will and shaped the future destinies of the peoples? Will this meeting be memorialised for its solid achievements, for the intelligence and maturity which marked the decisions taken here? Or will it be recalled for its failures, for the inability of Africa’s leaders to transcend local prejudice and individual differences, for the disappointment and disillusionment which followed in its train?

These questions give us all pause. The answers are within our power to dictate. The challenges and opportunities which open before us today are greater than those presented at any time in Africa’s millennia of history. The risks and the dangers which confront us are no less great. The immense responsibilities which history and circumstance have thrust upon us demand balanced and sober reflection. If we succeed in the tasks which lie before us, our names will be remembered and our deeds recalled by those who follow us. If we fail, history will puzzle at our failure and mourn what was lost. We approach the days ahead with the prayer that we who have assembled here may be granted the wisdom, the judgment, and the inspiration which will enable us to maintain our faith with the peoples and the nations which have entrusted their fate to our hands.

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Prime Minister Abiy faced probing inquiries regarding the region’s budget allocation, the repatriation of internally displaced persons (IDPs), and the issue of disputed territories between Tigray and Amhara. He acknowledged existing mistrust between the Tigray regional government and the Federal Government, which he said, ‘was expected as an after effect of the two-year war spanning 2020 to 2022’. Additionally, he noted repeated delays in his planned visit to Tigray due to officials from the region deeming the timing unfavorable.

Implementation of the Pretoria agreement has been sluggish, principally due to deficient disarmament of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). According to the letter of the Peace Agreement, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of TPLF fighters was to take precedence. Authorities in Tigray have resisted this key clause, insisting on the return of IDPs to “West Tigray”, a strategic piece of territory bordering Sudan claimed by Amhara and generally referred to as Welkait. 

Starting in February meetings between leaders of Tigray, Amhara, and Federal authorities discussed modalities for disarmament, IDP returns, and resolution for disputed territories between Amhara and Tigray via referendum. However, DDR and the fate of IDP remain key unresolved preconditions that must be met prior to July, and before any plans for referendum on disputed territories can begin.

Although the sides have largely agreed on a roadmap, as well as a timetable, behind the scenes there continues to be significant mistrust, deception, and shadow wars. Comments by general Tadesse Werede, a senior member of the interim regional administration of Tigray recently announced, “a decision has been reached with the federal government to completely dismantle the Amhara administration in West Tigray”, a statement designed to inflame on-going tensions in Amhara vis-à-vis the federal government. This of course goes against the spirit of the Pretoria Peace Agreement, which precludes all parties from making inflammatory statements or instigating tension.

In both Tigray and Amhara, significant political inertia obstructs the return of IDPs, albeit each region motivated by different factors. The Amhara regional authorities who set the goal of returning Amhara IDPs and refugees they claimed were displaced during the 30-year TPLF occupation of the region have largely been unsuccessful. Many of these people have since established different lives as migrants, whether it be in other parts of Ethiopia, Sudan, Yemen, Israel, Australia, or the United States. Very few are expected to return. 

Behind closed doors, high-ranking officials from the Amhara region rebuked Demeke Zewdu and Ashete Demelew, the current leaders of Welkait, for their failure to adequately organize and facilitate the return of Amhara IDPs displaced during the TPLF’s rule over the past three decades.

However, according to several credible accounts, even if Tigrayan IDPs displaced during the two-year war between 2020-2022 were to return to “West Tigray”, those who identify as Amhara in the region still retain a majority, TPLF leaders privately acknowledge this reality, implicitly recognizing that an impartial referendum would favor the Amhara. Consequently, they exhibit reluctance towards facilitating the repatriation of IDPs, fearing it could confer legitimacy and normalize the existing status quo. For hardliners in Tigray, who still fancy securing an outlet to Sudan to fuel their insurgency and strengthen their negotiating leverage against Addis Ababa, the current situation is unacceptable.

Fighters from Tigray recently probed Alamata, a town in contested Raya zone, currently under discussion to try and resolve peacefully. The move appears to be an expeditionary operation to test the patience of the federal government. It now remains to be seen whether the TPLF would up the ante by moving aggressively towards “West Tigray”, a move senior TPLF commander Abraha Tesfay warned, “would trigger a reaction from the Federal Government”, adding to internal divisions within the group. 

On May 13^th Interpol arrested Dawit Gebregziabiher, a businessman with close links to TPLF’s old guard on suspicions of running money laundering and arms trafficking schemes. He is expected to be transferred over to the Ethiopian Federal Police. His arrest adds to the growing rift between the TPLF and Tigray’s interim administration, which by all accounts provided information necessary for the arrest. Mr. Gebregziabiher is said to have been mediating between the TPLF and Eritrea’s cryptic regime. His detention, a result of international and regional cooperation will have a psychological impact.   

Before the July deadline for DDR and the return of IDPs, some key leaders are preferring to instigate crises, if anything, at the very least to distract from growing internal splits within TPLF. Recent fighting between Amhara Fano rebels and the government has provided fertile ground for these shadow wars and deceptive public announcements. Security services have lately reported intercepting arms and ammunition heading from Tigray region into Amhara supposedly in a bid to foment the Fano militancy. The Pretoria Peace Agreement prohibits such actions explicitly, stating “The TPLF shall refrain from aiding and abetting, supporting or collaborating with any armed or subversive group in any part of the country”. Not much is publicly known as far as any efforts to ease tensions by the African Union monitoring team which is on the ground in northern Ethiopia.

As U.S Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa Mike Hammer heads to the region, these matters will certainly be discussed. According to a statement from the US Department of State, Hammer’s latest visit was prompted by “the urgency of resolving outstanding issues through political dialogue and avoiding a return to conflict.” The press release also indicated that Ambassador Hammer will explore avenues for dialogue to resolve armed conflicts in the Amhara and Oromia regions and address the imperative for investigating human rights abuses in the country. Additionally, the special envoy’s itinerary includes visits to Kenya and Djibouti.

Despite repeated engagement by the State Department since 2020 however, conflicts in northern Ethiopia have not been permanently resolved. As skepticism emerges on the continued viability of the Pretoria Peace Agreement, it remains to be seen whether the conflicting parties and the mediators will take the difficult steps needed to implement the envisaged peace. 

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Seeing America’s reluctance to engage in true-to-life diplomacy in the HoA, regional actors have stepped up their activities. Given its long running disagreement on the construction and operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), Egypt has historically sought to leverage Ethiopia’s neighbors to rival Addis Ababa, which has now effectively completed the GERD and will likely continue to develop its extensive water resources in the Blue Nile basin.

Somalia’s quarrels with Ethiopia have historical roots, but the latest rendition is the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Somaliland and Ethiopia, an agreement that when implemented in full gives Ethiopia maritime access to naval as well as commercial ports on the Gulf of Aden. The MoU also puts Ethiopia on course to recognizing Somaliland’s statehood, a move Somalia views as an affront to its sovereignty. 

While Egypt remains an important ally of the United States in the Arab world, its long running dispute with Ethiopia over the Nile River, and specifically regarding the operation of the GERD remains unresolved. On purely geopolitical grounds, Washington has long prioritized Egypt, a country that has lobbied law makers in Washington. There has even been a corruption case involving Egyptian influence peddlers and Senator Bob Melendez of New Jersey.

However, ignoring Ethiopia’s interests will incur future costs. This nation of 120 million people stands at the cusp of an economic and population boom. While Egypt is a crucial center of Arab politics, Ethiopia will likely expand its influence and position in Africa, a continent America cannot afford to ignore in the years and decades ahead.

The Biden administration recently sought to critique Somaliland, denouncing what it perceived as “democratic backsliding”, even though Somaliland remains comparatively the most democratic and stable in the Horn of Africa. The state department’s “One Somalia” policy is reminiscent of Siad Barre’s 1977 invasion of Ethiopia’s Ogaden, which sought to unify Somalia, Somaliland, parts of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti into a single state—a disastrous approach that defies political common sense and reality. While Somaliland has largely achieved peace and security across its territory, Somalia is now on its fourth decade of civil war.

Underscoring a recurrence of ineffective foreign policy in the Horn of Africa, President Biden’s administration has notably thrown its weight behind the undemocratic and stumbling regime in Mogadishu, rather than supporting the more democratic leadership in Somaliland. Wrongly or rightly, this policy will no doubt be viewed as a planned containment of Ethiopia. 

Moreover, while acknowledging Somaliland’s democratic shortcomings, the U.S. hesitates to forge a traditional economic and diplomatic relationship with Hargeisa, thereby limiting its ability to actively promote human rights and democratic processes in the strategic Horn of Africa.

The situation became even more complicated in March 2024, when Puntland, constituting around 15 percent of Somalia’s claimed territory, declared independence, amid disputes with the Mogadishu government over constitutional amendments. The further disintegration of Somalia is unfortunate and seemingly inexorable, despite the international community’s efforts to prevent it. While stabilizing Somalia is important to regional and global security, it should not come at the cost of denying Somaliland’s future.

Furthermore, the Biden administration seems to be copying its “One China” strategic ambiguity policy vis-à-vis Taiwan and pasting it to Somalia. But this conflating of the two misses key differences. Understanding these nuances should propel a distinct approach to the Horn of Africa. In addition to Ethiopia, Taiwan also has close links to Somaliland, recognizing similarity with its own semiautonomous status. A departure from the “One Somalia” policy is imperative to advance global democracy and prop up functional states amidst numerous international crises. 

In northeastern Africa and the Horn, stretching from Cairo to Mogadishu, geopolitical flashpoints in a region inhabited by over three hundred million people and situated adjacent to one of the world’s busiest maritime trade routes is a concern to U.S interests. Given the humanitarian and economic significance of this region, the United States’ foreign policy approach necessitates more than mere tactical retreat and aspirations for de-escalation. It needs to be engaged to broker a realistic outcome.

Washington should emulate its pivotal role in brokering the Abraham Accords by adopting a proactive strategy that addresses the interests of the region’s major players—Egypt and Ethiopia—while also lending support to the democratic government in Somaliland. One proposition recently made by Oliver McPherson-Smith, a senior research fellow at the Hoover Institute, posits Ethiopian aspirational ascendency on Nile River can been eased by credible support for its sea access ambitions via Somaliland.

Arriving at a long-term bargain on the sharing the Nile between Egypt and Ethiopia by offering the latter unimpeded sea access via Somaliland is innovative. Doing so does not hurt Somalia, which has plenty of other sea outlet options. It also bolsters the burgeoning democratic government of Somaliland that emerged amidst the enduring tumult of Somalia. Lastly, strengthening Somaliland in partnership with Ethiopia could help secure the important Red Sea maritime route. 

On the contrary, leaving the Egypt-Ethiopia rivalry over the Nile unresolved while regressing on Somaliland will have the unintended consequence of increasing regional instability. It will be perceived by Addis Ababa as a policy of containment and by Cairo as a permanent threat on its most important resource, the Nile River. 

The post A call for a realist American policy in The Horn of Africa regarding Ethiopia, Somalia and Egypt appeared first on Abren.

The administrator of the southern zone of Tigray, Habtu Kiros, refuted the report, asserting that there were no major clashes, only a minor incident incited by forces in the Raya-Alamata. He clarified that Tigrayan protesters, advocating for the implementation of the return of IDPs, embarked on a long public demonstration march from Mahoni and Maichew towns to federal forces checkpoints over the weekend of April 13, 2024.

In contrast, Raya Alamata administrator Mola Derbew claimed that Tigray forces had employed heavy weaponry to capture the Addis Berhan and the Garjale zones near by. A few days earlier, in anticipation there were Amhara public demonstrations in and around Alamata, asking for “greater unity against the coming attack”.

Mola Derbew stated that the Tigray regional forces, commonly referred to as the TPLF, orchestrated the attack, which began at 11:00 a.m. on Saturday and continued until late Monday April 15, 2024. But given recent deep divisions between the Interim administration of Tigray and members of the TPLF, it remains doubtful if another round of war has popular support.

This flare up reignites tensions from the two-year long war that ended in late 2022 with the signing of the Pretoria Peace Agreement, which effectively needed the fighting between the Federal government and the TPLF. However, unresolved issues persist, including contested territories, disarmament of ex-combatants, and the repatriation of displaced persons, many from the Tigray region, but also from Afar and Amhara. 

Raya-Alamata, previously administered by Tigray, fell into Amhara hands during the 2020-2022 war. But the issue goes back further, with Amhara claiming the lands as having been unjustly annexed into Tigray by the TPLF in the early 1990s, after the group came to power following a protracted civil war lasting seventeen years.  

The resurgence of hostilities has seen Tigray forces reportedly advancing into some areas of the district. But sources close to the matter provide a more nuance outlook. Senior officials in Amhara say they cannot rule out involvement of some Amhara Fano rebels from North Wollo, who view a tactical cooperation with TPLF as beneficial in their fight against the federal government. 

Certain Fano factions have recently touted the merits of collaborating with the TPLF. This is especially true considering disappointments incurred by the rebels in their disjointed drive to oust the federal government. A renewed government offensive against the Fano in Amhara may have prompted some of them to reconsider their long-held misgivings for TPLF. Chatter on social media outlets closely associated with both Fano and TPLF forces seemed to predict a sort of tactical convergence between them.

Last week Ethiopian Telegram channels indicated Fano fighters operating in North Wollo were receiving arms, ammunition, and logistical support from Tigray, via the town of Sekota. Authorities in Amahara claimed their continued vigilance in confiscating the flow of arms from Tigray into the hands of insurgents in Amhara. 

It was recently revealed Fano commander Mehiret Wodajo received medical treatment at Ayder hospital in Mekelle. TPLF linked media outlets opposed to the Pretoria Peace Agreement have flaunted this as symbol of their renewed war pact to oust the federal government.

There is also plausible speculation to suggest the incursion of gunmen from Tigray into Ofla and Alamata zones is a false-flag operation, involving TPLF’s army 23 and 24, as a way of confounding federal government action. Ofla zone administrator Fisseha Mola said, “the situation is fluid and has the potential to expand into a wider war”.

Given the level of mistrust and recrimination between Fano and TPLF, it remains to be seen how this new alliance would be viewed by the public on both sides. In either case, this latest clash will have the effect of delaying a lasting and peaceful resolution to the question of disputed territories.

Immediately following the incursion on Alamata, Tigray regional interim leader, Getachew Reda, on twitter, denounced the move as instigation by “diehard enemies to the Pretoria Peace Agreement”. However, this was immediately followed by another criptic tweet meant to arouse Tigray nationalism. Observers viewed this as double-speak and contradictory to his earlier point made about “those opposed to peace”. Getachew has to perform a tight rope balancing act. On the one hand he must assuage TPLF hardliners while also maintaining his relationship with the federal government in lieu of the peace agreement.

Speaking to Abren, a senior Amhara official currently on a visit in the United States says, “there is an element of confused blabbering at play, and it seems to be deliberately designed to confuse the public about he true intention of TPLF leaders, who seek to break with the peace agreement, albeit without drawing much in the way of international attention, or condemnation”.

Efforts to resolve divides between Tigray, Amhara and the authorities in Addis Ababa have been accompanied by little reported shadow wars. Authorities in Amhara have sought to entrench their administration in disputed territories, much to the chagrin of Tigray. In response TPLF hardliners have sought inflame the current Fano rebellion in Amhara. Relatedly, little attention has been given to a recently attempted incursion of TPLF affiliated militia from Sudan near the border crossing of Metema. 

External entities have also been inserting themselves as a third-party instigator in ongoing clashes in Gambella between the Nuer and Anuak tribes. Simon Tut, chairman of the opposition Gambella People’s Democratic Movement says, “there is certainly a strategy to provoke tension in the region by outside forces.”  He adds, “these subversive activities must be seen in-light of proxy shadow wars by various actors including the TPLF and others outside of Ethiopia”.  

The latest clashes in Alamata come on the heal of efforts to mediate a lasting solution between Amhara and Tigray. Senior officials from the Amhara region, speaking on condition of antonymy accuse Tigrayan authorities of obfuscating their intentions on resolution of contested territories. “In public, as well as in our meetings with them, they say they want IDPs to return, which is wholly justified, but when we actually begin laying out the groundwork to implement this plan, they turn around and incite another round conflict”, said one official. 

For their part authorities in Tigray accuse the Amhara regional government of orchestrating an ethnic cleansing campaign in the disputed territories. They say there are hundreds of thousands of IDPs that need to go back to their homes in areas currently “occupied by the Amhara region”.

Clandestine activities are elevating mistrust on all sides, endangering the viability of the Pretoria Peace Agreement. So far, the federal government has chosen restraint, perhaps in hopes of avoiding an endless cycle of entanglements with shadow warriors in Ethiopia’s highly fractured and illusive political landscape, which is proving difficult to govern democratically. 

A bit further south, in Kobo, people remain anxious. Residents here are watching to see if in case the TPLF forces that recently entered Alamata decide to expel Amhara residents and perhaps even expand their incursion into other areas. At the time of this writing, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported the number of people displaced from Raya-Alamata spiked in just the last few days.

In the meantime, the diplomatic missions of seven Western nations, among them the US and the UK, have included their apprehension over the reported unrest in Alamata in their general collective statement issued last week. They emphasize the need for de-escalation, disarmament and demobilization efforts for all armed combatants.

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Complicated nature of ethnic politics in Africa

Ethnicity encompasses more than just physical attributes or language and traditions. It represents a people’s values, institutions, and way of life, reflecting their history, aspirations, and worldview. When ethnicity and culture are taken away from a group, their sense of purpose and direction is also lost.

In the past, dating back to the time of antiquity, African societies and states functioned through a complex system that revolved around family, lineage, clan, tribe, and larger groups sharing common ethnic, cultural, and linguistic traits. These social units formed the basis for economic, political, and social interactions between communities. These grouping were also quite fluid in many places, and so were the physical boundaries separating groups.

However, during the colonial era, groups were often divided or forced together without consideration for their shared characteristics or unique identities. They were placed under new administrative systems that operated on different values, institutions, and principles. The authority governing these systems was held by outsiders, foreign rulers, who relied on centralization of power enforced by police and military forces, leading to authoritarian rule. To give this externally imposed system a sense of legitimacy, traditional leaders were sometimes utilized as intermediaries between the state and local communities. The state also provided limited social services and development opportunities to certain privileged sectors, creating an illusion of legitimacy. Meanwhile, the country’s natural resources were exploited and exported as raw materials to support the industries of the colonial powers.

Most African states, which succumbed to colonial rule were subjected to artificial forms of government imposed by Europeans. The one nation that somehow or another escaped the European scramble for Africa was Ethiopia. Through a series of engagements, diplomatic as well as military, its leaders were able to keep colonial powers at bay. Ethiopian leaders such as Tewodros I, Yohannes I, and Menelik II pragmatically pivoted, pushed, expanded territory, and at times conceded to keep foreign powers at bay. This despite ever-present internal wars among elites, conflicts which often took on ethnic, as well as religious overtones. Colonial powers were never shy to leverage these internal squabbles to gain territory. In the end however, Ethiopia was spared direct colonization, but is did not escape the entanglements of colonialism on the continent, which it grapples with to this today.

The introduction of the new colonial state structure undermined existing indigenous system of the people, which provided them with the means to pursue modest yet sustainable life goals. Instead, they were subjected to centrally controlled resources that were scarce and fiercely competed for. Development was redefined as receiving basic services from the state, rather than a process of collective wealth accumulation and growth. The localized, inclusive, and low-risk subsistence activities were replaced by high-risk competition for power and limited resources, leading to conflicts based on tribalism or ethnicity. While independence removed the colonial oppressor, it intensified the struggle for centralized power and control over national resources.

Presently, nearly every conflict in Africa has some ethno-regional aspect to it. Even seemingly unrelated conflicts involve factions and alliances formed around ethnic loyalties. Analysts have held differing views on the role of ethnicity in these conflicts. Some view ethnicity as a root cause of conflict, while others see it as a tool used by ambitious politicians. It is both. Ethnicity, particularly when combined with territorial identity, is an inherent social reality that exists independently of political manipulation. To argue that ethnic groups are merely pawns in political games underestimates this fundamental social reality. However, it is evident that ethnicity can be exploited and manipulated by political entrepreneurs for their own gain.

Response of African states

After gaining independence, Africans were eager to reject tribalism as something that divides people. They aimed for unity, imagining a unified identity despite their diverse backgrounds. For example, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana made it illegal to form political parties based on tribe or ethnicity. Houphouet-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire strategically included ethnic groups by giving them positions in government, civil service jobs, social services, and development projects. Julius Nyerere, who came from a tribal leadership background, promoted national pride in Tanganyika and later in Tanzania, which was formed through a union with Zanzibar. Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya formed a delicate alliance of ethnic groups under the dominance of his Kenyan African National Union party.

In South Africa, apartheid policies categorized races and ethnicities in a way that was unsustainable. Although post-apartheid South Africa now strives for a racially, ethnically, and tribally blind democratic system, there is still a tension between this approach and a proud expression of ethnic identity, particularly among Zulu nationalists.

In Africa, the aim of maintaining unity within the borders established during colonial times has led to stability but has also caused ethnic tensions and violence within those borders. Sudan provides an extreme example of this. The dominant North region, which is a mix of Arab and African racial, cultural, and religious elements, is trying to address its identity crisis by emphasizing its Arab and Islamic characteristics even more than its predecessors. This distorted self-perception, fueled by the agendas of political elites, is promoted as the framework for unifying and integrating the country. Unfortunately, this approach has resulted in a destructive conflict between the Arab-Muslim North and the predominantly Christian South, which identifies more with its indigenous African roots.

In the end, founders of the African Union made a significant decision to respect colonial borders, and this principle has been remarkably successful in practice. Thus, the AU strongly opposes secession movements. For example, Katanga attempted to separate from the Congo (which later became Zaire and now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), but it was unsuccessful. The secessionist Biafran war in Nigeria also failed. Somalia’s endeavor to take control of the Ogden region from Ethiopia was decisively stopped. Southern Sudan endured a 17-year struggle to break away from the North and eventually settled for autonomy in 1972. When fighting resumed in 1983, their goal remained the creation of a new Sudan that would eliminate any form of discrimination based on race, ethnicity, culture, or religion. The African Union largely thwarted South Sudan, which eventually achieved independence in 2011.

Eritrea’s separation from Ethiopia is perceived not as a breach of colonial borders, but rather as its preservation, given that Eritrea was formerly an Italian colony, despite it having very close linkages to the Ethiopian state going back centuries. Similarly, the unofficial separation of Northern Somalia is viewed as the restoration of colonial borders, as the North had been under separate British governance. Even in Sudan, which is often suggested as a potential candidate for division, if the country were to be split, the division could be justified as an extension of the British colonial policy that governed Sudan as two distinct entities—one Arab-Islamic and the other indigenous African with elements of Christian Western influences.

In many of the newly independent African states, the commitment to maintain national unity after gaining independence led to the establishment of of authoritarianism, excessive concentration of power, and aborted democracies. These actions, in turn, provoked a response characterized by increased tension and a call for a second phase of liberation movements. Some of these liberation movements were successful in co-opting power, but their actions thereafter did not evolve politics or make governance democratic. Most remained client states for external powers and embezzled developmental funds, which were offshored in financial capitals around the globe.

For instance, Ethiopia, following the separation of Eritrea in 1993 tried to actively address the issue of tribalism and ethnicity by acknowledging territorial-based ethnic groups. These groups were purported to have a significant degree of autonomy and even the constitutional right to self-determination, including the possibility of secession. The country’s constitution firmly declared the principle of self-determination, regardless of its outcome.

Considering Ethiopia’s recent tumult however, we can say the experiment has been a failure. Warnings that the seemingly lofty goal of Ethiopia’s constitution was largely a gimmick used to divide and rule a large and restive nation under the tutelage of a small minority-led government were indeed prescient. Under this system, the very concept of self-determination deteriorated into ethnic patronage and hyper identity politics, making governance and security evermore difficult.

Effectively managing the diversity of ethnic groups within the confines of colonial borders presents a formidable challenge that African countries are hesitant to confront, yet it is an issue they cannot continue ignore, partly because of population growth and largely due to climate change, which will increase tensions and competition for resources.

The key to sustainable unity lies in mutual understanding and agreement. Unfortunately, in modern Africa, the framework for national unity is not based on consensus. Except for post-apartheid South Africa, African nations gained independence without negotiating an internal social contract that would establish and maintain national consensus. The constitutions adopted during independence were influenced by idealistic principles from outside the continent. The resulting regimes lacked legitimacy and were often overthrown without public remorse or regret. These upheavals merely led to a rotation of like-minded elites or, in some cases, military dictators who aimed to seize power after the departure of colonial rulers. Eventually, these leaders became replicas of their former colonizers.

Currently, the quest for unity in most African countries highlights the extent of disunity. If Africans avoid addressing the issue of ethnicity and fail to develop institutional norms for managing diversity within the framework of unity, peace and stability will continue to elude. For this, many African states need a deep dive into national dialogue and reconciliation that go beyond superficial politics, to give birth to a common shared framework. Only then can African states move forward and thrive in peace. This is especially true for large states like Nigeria and Ethiopia.

Managing ethnic politics.

As briefly mentioned, African governments have approached the challenge of ethnic diversity in different ways, ranging from pragmatic management to neglect and disastrous mismanagement. The specific ethnic policies adopted by a country often depend on its unique identity configuration.

Some African states exhibit a high degree of homogeneity or, at least, relatively insignificant diversity. Botswana, for instance, stands as an exemplary model of cohesiveness, democracy, stability, and sustained growth.

Most African countries, especially those in West Africa (excluding Nigeria), Kenya, and southern African countries (excluding South Africa), fall into a second category. These countries face significant ethnic diversity, but they have established effective systems of distribution that uphold the integrity and legitimacy of the state. The self-perception of these nations aligns with the self-perceptions of their constituent groups.

There is a third group of countries, including Zimbabwe, Namibia, and modern-day South Africa, which grapple with racial, ethnic, religious, or cultural divisions that necessitate special arrangements to achieve a mutually accommodating form of unity in diversity. Burundi, Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Sudan are potential candidates for this category, although they also exhibit aspects of the fourth and final category.

The fourth category comprises states embroiled in acute crises characterized by a lack of collective identification, shared values, and a common national vision. The nation-state framework is perceived as an imposition by colonial powers, perpetuated by the dominant group that defines the nation’s character. This definition can be explicit, such as in apartheid South Africa, where race and ethnicity influenced the allocation or denial of citizenship rights, or in Sudan, where Arab and Islamic identity inherently leads to racial, ethnic, and religious stratification and discrimination. Managing conflicts within the unity framework becomes exceptionally challenging in these cases, often necessitating fundamental restructuring and, in some instances, partitioning.

Policy implications for nation building

Currently, most African countries are approaching the challenges of racial and ethnic identities through a pragmatic system of distribution and allocation, focusing on pacification rather than adopting a strategic approach. What makes the issue of identity particularly crucial for the continent is that it not only affects politics but also has implications for economics and the capacity to generate sustainable development from within.

There are policy options available for managing pluralistic identities. One option is to establish a national framework that allows everyone to identify without any distinction based on race, ethnicity, tribe, or religion. This option is most suitable for highly homogeneous countries. Another option is to create a pluralistic framework that accommodates racially, ethnically, culturally, or religiously diverse nations. This approach, potentially through a federal arrangement, encourages groups to coexist based on the principle of live and let live, while still maintaining a shared commitment to national identification.

In yet another scenario, for countries facing more significant divisions, a combination of power-sharing and decentralization may be the answer, with identities being geographically defined. In zero-sum conflict situations, federalism could evolve into confederacies, paradoxically seeking to reconcile unity with separation. In cases where even this level of accommodation is unfeasible, and where territorial configurations allow, partition may be considered as a viable option.

These options are however generalizations. They don’t take into consideration the many nuances and circumstances of each nation state in Africa. Some countries like Ethiopia and Nigeria have deep divisions and surprisingly a historical sense of unity and greatness, one that sometimes trumps the divisions. And so there are many similar cases like this. The aim of generalizing here is to simply, and not merely to pontificate.

The role of the African Union

How can these options be implemented? The decision on which option to adopt primarily rests with the sovereign right of each country and people. However, regional, and continental actors also bear a responsibility that cannot be relinquished in the name of national sovereignty. Sovereignty inherently involves a tension between the demand for internal solutions and the need for external corrective measures. In other words, the responsibilities of sovereignty necessitate both internal and external accountability, which can be conflicting, particularly when external involvement becomes necessary due to internal system failures.

Given the African Union’s ambivalence and lack of critical agency for intervention, the responsibility is increasingly falling on regional and subregional actors. The sheer size of the continent demands the coming together of regional bodies, such as the East Africa Union (EAU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This is not to say the African Union is less relevant. The recent Cessations of Hostilities (CoH) between the Government of Ethiopia and the northern Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) is a good example of African Union initiatives for peace. Despite its many shortcomings, it the the AU remains a pragmatic mechanisms for resolving continental issues in Africa.

The interconnectivity of conflicts in neighboring countries should lead to the recognition that preventing, managing, or resolving conflicts is not only a concern for the countries directly involved, but also for the entire region. For example, currently ongoing fighting between the national army of Sudan and the country’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is an area where regional bodies like IGAD have at the very least dissuaded regional countries from involving themselves. A positive outcome. Therefore, regional awareness of shared threats posed by internal conflicts is growing. The importance of addressing common challenges is increasingly being realized. This handling of matters regionally allows for the African Union to keep more powerful non-continental states, who have historically played a deleterious role at bay. Most African states agree with this stance.

Reconciling two conflicting paths

The ultimate responsibility for upholding sovereignty lies with the international community, specifically the United Nations, which African states have sought to reform. African states also support reforming international multilateral financial and development institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. Concerns regarding governance, including democracy and respect for human rights, are also recognized at the international level, but have increasingly become politicized tools for intervention by more powerful states like the U.S and U.K. Apart from the longstanding issue of protecting minorities, the politics and conflicts related to identity and their impact on peace, stability, development, and nation-building must be acknowledged as crucial matters that demand responsible and accountable sovereignty.

Considering that the modern African states emerged through European conquest, the restructuring of the continent, its integration into the international system, and the reimagining and reconstruction of the state will require collaboration with Africa’s global partners. However, history has repeatedly demonstrated external actors have not been able to provide an objective and impartial perspective, which is essential for balancing the concerns of internal stakeholders in Africa. On the contrary external powers have tended to dump fuel on identity politics on the continent. This argument was recently presented by Dr. Lonzen Rugira, in his paper entitled, “How West promotes destructive politics in Africa“. International partners have not been objective. Hence one reason why the mantra “African Solutions to African Problems” is gaining traction.

On this eve of the new scramble for Africa between Western and Eastern powers, Africa finds itself at a crossroads between rediscovering its indigenous values, institutions, and experiences and pursuing the logic of the colonial state within the framework of a globalized modernity largely influenced by Western experiences. Resolving the resulting tensions is no easy task. However, an inclusive process that allows diverse groups to play a constructive role in the modern and more united African state can significantly alleviate tension, foster cooperation, and facilitate the nation-building process.

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Ethiopia’s controversial constitution, with its system of ethnic federalism has been a boon for demagogues and conflict merchants seeking power using identity-based propaganda. Even outside powers with interest in Ethiopia have long figured out how to exploit Ethiopia’s ethnic divisions, exacerbated by this system of governance. For instance, the State Department regularly confers with diaspora groups and organizations carefully selected by their ethnic affiliation, while regularly shunning or avoiding multi-cultural and multi-ethnic Ethiopian national organizations. Historically the collective West has promoted destructive identity politics in Africa. Leveraging the growing African diaspora in the West for this purpose is thus a natural extension of this policy. Regional powers in the Middle East have used a similar approach. In a bid to slow the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Egypt has long supported ethnic based insurgencies in Ethiopia.

It was hoped Ethiopia’s constitution adopted in 1994, would bring equity to its many nations and nationalities, whose culture and language was suppressed by successive regimes seeking centralism for fear of losing power to ungovernable separate entities. Ethiopia had been a more centralized state for a century before. Proponents argued the new constitution would bring unity and stability to a nation beset with separatist liberation movements. In hindsight, after three decades, fundamental questions of nationhood, culture, language, identity, boundaries, and equity remain unanswered, and arguably worst off. In practice, federalism in Ethiopia has led to fragmentation, not equality or democratization.

Many had argued freeing up political and civil liberties too quickly would be unsustainable, given the country’s divisive identity politics, as well as its underdeveloped economy. In light of this argument, democracy was not compatible with Ethiopia’s socio-political circumstance. In retrospect this argument seems to have been vindicated by the insurrections that followed. The way to keep a lid on Ethiopia’s discordant ethnic political discourse, encouraged by the country’s constitution seems to have been by repression. But that only buys more time, without resolving the underlying issue. Sooner or later, Ethiopia will need structural political reform, one that can accommodate and nurture unity, democracy and civility.

This trend towards ethnic balkanization in Ethiopia enshrined in the constitution has become particularly stark ever since 2018, when Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s new administration introduced a relatively more open political discourse in this country of 120 million. Previously, Ethiopia had been a security state, whereby free speech and political organization was heavily curtailed, but the country enjoyed relative peace, stability and economic development. During this period, the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) espoused a “developmental statist” approach akin to East Asia, whereby fast economic growth was given priority, as human rights deteriorated.

In the early months of Abiy Ahmed’s administration Ethiopians aspired for a truly reformist new regime. At the time, it was hoped keeping the pressure valve slightly open, while making significant reforms to the system of governance could prove to be a successful strategy. Nonetheless, political reforms were delayed by conflict, particularly by the crisis in northern Ethiopia, and the war with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), an entity that had every intention of maintaining the existing status quo. A precipitous loss of grace for its leaders does not seem to have changed minds so far, but increasing numbers of people in Ethiopia are realizing the futility of a perpetually divided nation.

TPLF is not alone is trying to derail the reform agenda in Ethiopia. Support for maintaining the current constitution and governance can also be found among members of the ruling party, although it is difficult to determine the exact extent of this support. A generation of ethnic elites have emerged in Ethiopia. These heirs of the system have a tangible interest in forestalling change. Although small in number, they provide the inertia for keeping things as they are, thanks to their key positions within the establishment as either political cadres or business persons in regular collision with them. Ethiopia has been on a path dependency towards more fragmentation, one that is beset with strife and even wars. Only a determined and unashamedly reformist political leadership can reverse course on this trend.

Most people inherently understood the challenges. Despite the setbacks and delays, the public largely wanted to see the reformists succeed, and even voted overwhelmingly in favor of the ruling Prosperity Party on that base. The Pretoria Peace Agreement, which effectively ended the conflict in northern Ethiopia, as well as relative calm in other parts of the country offered renewed belief. Yet, notwithstanding what the New York Times called “a full military victory” by the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF), Addis Ababa was unable, or as some have argued unwilling to implement a key clause of the peace deal, namely the “full disarmament of the TPLF rebels in 30 days” after its signing.

A bid to avoid another war, outstanding financial and budgetary strains, and an attempt to carry favor with the United States, a key donor with leverage on international financial institutions has come at significant political costs for the GoE. All of this is made worst by a glaring public relations and communications failure. The ruling party has waned in popularity. The prime minister has eroded his mass base of support. Key allies in Amhara, Afar, and in the diaspora, who fought alongside the national army to repel the TPLF insurgency as recently as October 2022 feel betrayed, particularly by the GoE’s failure to fully disarm the TPLF in the allotted time period, as called for by the peace agreement.

However, after months of slow moving progress, the African Union monitoring team responsible for Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration(DDR) recently stated, “85 to 90 percent of heavy weapons used by the rebels has been handed over to their team”. The statement further noted, the next phase will encompass demobilization and re-integration of forces, whose exact size is not exactly known, given many had already deserted their post. Yet the AU’s Major General Ridan remained hopeful in the process.

Costly political blunders of the ruling party go beyond recent attempted disarmament in Amhara region. They include its mismanagement of the crisis in the Ethiopian Orthodox Church in February 2023. Parishioners were incensed by the government’s response not to immediately denounce the breakaway synod, which they correctly viewed as breaking with thousands of years of church cannon. Having sensed the political fallout, the Prime Minister quickly reversed course, and admonished the breakaway synod on television. This did not instill public confidence. On the contrary it was viewed as political expediency.

Nonetheless, its noteworthy, that amidst conflict, mishaps and unforced errors, the Abiy government has made some structural changes. This was particularly the case in its early days. These changes include reforming the loosely organized EPRDF coalition, to the more inclusive and united Prosperity Party, encompassing hitherto underrepresented regions such as Somali, Afar, Gumuz, and Gambella. This was a step towards a more united and less ethnically fragmented organization. In addition, law was passed for a new digitally integrated national ID system, whereby ethnicity or place of birth is not featured.

On the economy, GoE has started some key reforms. They include the rollback of outdated fuel subsidies that were a drain on reserve currency, and encouraged a black-market export of refined fuel to neighboring countries, where prices are higher. Banks which had previously been instructed to direct their lending towards state owned enterprises have since shifted gear towards the private sector. State-owned Commercial Bank of Ethiopia recently quadrupled its share of loans to the private sector. Digital of payments is also something that is being implemented quickly, as Ethiopia tries to catch up. Digital payments will make financial transparency easier, reduce friction, as well as help by broadening Ethiopia’s tax base.

An important step has been recent policy studies and discussions looking at systemic challenges. The House of People’s Representatives will soon review a research document by the Policy Studies Institute of Ethiopia that explores possible ways of amending the constitution. The question remains whether the GoE’s reformist camp can still muster the political capital needed to embark on an ambitious plan to make structural changes to a country at war with itself. In parallel with the National Dialogue, it could be the only offramp for a government that will likely struggle to win enough support in the coming remedial elections set for 2024. These elections will take place where the 2021 general election was not conducted due to conflict.

In light of the recent past, there is no question reformists have lost the political momentum they once had. A confluence of foreign pressure, political mishaps, and a lack of clear and consistent directional leadership, as well as a reactionary war has taken a toll on ambitious plans. Nonetheless, changes to the country’s basic political structure and the constitution is an idea that still garners significant public support, one that is likely to grow.

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Conflict has increased the number of Internally Displaced Persons(IDPs) in Ethiopia. According the U.N’s humanitarian response plan, since mid-2020 the number has more than doubled from 1.8 million to 4.6 million 2023. This number does not include displaced persons from rural areas made homeless in cities and towns or crisis-affected communities and returning migrants from abroad. When including all of the above, some estimates put the number as high as 5.5 million, or approximately 4.5% of the entire population. The number of refugees or externally displaced Ethiopians as a direct result of conflict is comparatively much less. For perspective, a UNHCR report indicates more than 8.1 million have been displaced due to the ongoing war in Ukraine.

Two years of conflict (2020-2022) between the Government of Ethiopia(GoE) and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) has created high humanitarian needs across Afar, Amhara and Tigray regions, which is just recently being addressed thanks to a return to normalcy, following the Pretoria Peace Agreement. After a surprise attack of Ethiopia’s northern command by the TPLF, approximately 2.6 million were displaced across all regions of Northern Ethiopia as conflict spread. Nonetheless, if current trends towards normalization continue, almost all of these IDPs have a high chance of returning to their place of origin.

Conflict driven displacement in Ethiopia eased from its peak in the 1980s, and started to spike again in 2018, when political turmoil increased, due to a rocky regime transition. Before the Tigray crisis, in 2018 a major escalation of fighting in the Somali region had displaced over 1 million persons from both Oromia as well as Somali, according to a report. This flareup was quickly resolved and most of the displaced were re-settled. This is perhaps a test case of how to normalize tensions and return fairly quickly.

Sporadic and yet repeated episodes of conflict in western Oromia is also cause for displacement. The main armed group the area, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) has repeatedly targeted civilians, mainly Amhara as well as others. Based on a report from 2022, approximately thirty seven thousand IDPs from this region can be found concentrated in the of town of Debre Berhan. A similar number of IDPs from west Oromia, Dessie and Kombolcha are also camped near the city of Bahir Dar. If the GoE, along with the regional administration in Oromia is able to gaurantee peace, the chances of these IDPs, most of whom were previously farmers, would prefer returning.

Amidst conflict, the GoE has worked alongside international aid agencies to support IDPs to begin returning them to their place of origin. Efforts to help IDPs has been fruitful of late. According to data from Reliefweb, the number of IDPs due to conflict across Ethiopia seems to have stabilized. Historically, Ethiopia has a good track record of hosting external refugees with the help of international aid agencies. This experience will help in terms of re-instating IDPs. As recently as March, 2023 over one hundred thousand refugees from Somalia arrived in Ethiopia, according to a UNHCR report. If peace is sustained, the work of returning IDPs and resettling refuges from neighboring countries will likely succeed. But more needs to be done to address continued gaps in resettlement.

Less noticeable is displacement due to natural disaster, particularly drought displacing persons from parts of southern Somali and Oromia, the area commonly referred to as Borena. in February, 2023, with the fifth consecutive rainy season failing and livestock dying daily, increasing numbers of people from Borena started moving into internally displaced people (IDP) camps in southern Ethiopia. According to a report by ReliefWeb, “Close to 150,000 people have already moved into the 20 IDP camps. More than 867,000 people are expected to arrive in the next month and are seeking immediate food assistance”.

As relative peace in northern Ethiopia continues to hold, hope for a lasting settlement is evermore likely. This of course bodes well for IDPs in the region. Other conflict hot spots in the west as well as the south are relatively more calm today then at any point in the past four years. The near complete cessation of fighting in Ben Shangul region is a good example of how to leverage community dialogue alongside law enforcement to bring back normalcy. Similar work is currently being done in East and West Wellega. Recent visit to the by Prime Minister Abiy is a promising sign, that armed fighting in the region may finally end. Overall, the rate of returning IDPs in Ethiopia is promising. An assessment made by the U.N Migration Head Office indicates, there were an estimated 1.88 million returning IDPs (437,077 households) across 1,554 villages in Ethiopia as of September, 2022.

Sustained work is needed to grow dividends of peace and move the country forward. Easing of post war tensions, in addition to calming Ethiopia’s hyper identity based politics, which some have argued is linked to the country’s ethnic based administrative structure is crucial. The system rewards an “us versus them” political ideology, particularly among competing political elites, who have taken advantage of the comparatively open political discourse since 2018. The atmosphere among Ethiopia’s elites continues to pit communities against one another. This manifests itself in many ways, one of which is the proliferation of extremism, that has found a natural breeding ground, and is increasingly exacerbated by social media. In this environment, politicization of IDPs is an unavoidable and harmful consequence of post conflict, one that will take time and dialogue to resolve.

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On April 6, 2023, the government of Ethiopia (GoE) announced its decision to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate (DDR) the country’s regional special forces, locally known as Liyu Hail, in favor of a more traditional police force and law enforcement organization. The plan was to integrate all regional forces either into the army, federal police or regional police, a move which diminishes the autonomy of regional governments .

Official statement said, “the government has set direction to build one strong and centralized army…. it has started practical steps that will allow special forces of every region to be integrated into different security structures.”

According to Reuters News, “hours before the announcement was made public, local media from the Amhara region, Ethiopia’s second largest, reported clashes between national and regional forces brought about by a refusal among Amhara Special Forces’ units to surrender weapons as part of the integration process.” It would later be revealed the DDR plan was leaked, seemingly with the aim of sabotaging the process. Regional vice chairman, Girma Yeshitila further corroborates this point of view in his most recent interview.

Ethiopia’s sprawling regional special forces had their genesis in the year 2007 in the eastern Somali region, where they were initially intended to be an agile counter terrorism force to combat insurgents of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). Then Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi had the political impetuous to organize the special force in the Somali region to help mask accusations of ethnic cleansing by international human rights organizations. The idea was if Somalis are seen to be policing Somalis, then accusations of ethnic cleansing and atrocities against the federal government would be a mute point.

Until Prime Minister Abiy came to power in 2018, the Liyu Hail of Somali region continued to operate with impunity during their counter insurgency operations. The new government in Addis Ababa naturally wanted to reign-in the region’s autonomous security apparatus. Having sensed the coming changes however, it did not take long for the Liyu Hail of the Somali region to turn into an ethnic based premilitary force of the region’s corrupt leader, Abdi Mohamoud Omar, known by his nickname ‘Abdi Iley’.

In April of that year, with tacit support of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the Liyu Hail in the Somali region staged an armed insurrection, and attempted to cede the region from Ethiopia, a move that was quickly reversed by the the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF). Over one million civilians were displaced as a result of this conflict.

With this history behind, the new central government in Addis Ababa viewed the Liyu Hail as a dangerous and balkanizing force that would need to be reformed in time. However, Ethiopia’s continued political and security crisis did not allow for such an undertaking at the time. For one, the Liyu Hail were by now spreading to other regions, including in the rebellious Tigray, which by 2020 boasted a force numbering in the hundreds of thousands.

The TPLF, which long dominated politics in Ethiopia (1991-2018) had deep roots inside the national army. It also built an extensive parallel force disguised as Liyu Hail to secure its home base of Tigray. It felt confident it would win any military contest with the federal government. On November 4, 2020, mutinous commanders of ENDF who had allegiances to the TPLF, along with the Liyu Hail of Tigray, attacked army bases of Ethiopia’s Northern command. Ethiopia’s Tigray crisis, which followed this initial attack was accompanied by many atrocities as well as a media campaign of disinformation. As war raged, the Tigray Liyu Hail became widely referred to as “Tigray Defense Force” (TDF) by their supporters. This further complicated reforms planned not only for the Liyu Hail, but the whole of Ethiopia.

Having failed to usurp power militarily, the TPLF were forced to sign a peace agreement brokered by the African Union in Pretoria. By this point, the group was a shadow of its former self. It not only lost men and equipment, but also suffered the setback of losing the contested “Western Tigray”, a region which the Amhara consider part of “Northern Gonder”. This geographical flashpoint, along with other thorny issues continue to be a matter of serious contention between the two regions.

The Amhara region was a relative late comer to the Liyu Hail security structure. It boasted a limited special forces up until 2020, when it rapidly increased recruitment and training. Having sensed itself outgunned and outflanked by the TPLF, it sought to balance the threat posed. When Ethiopia’s northern command came under attack, the Amhara region’s Liyu Hail was underprepared, but performed surprisingly well under the circumstances. Its forces quickly came to the aid of ENDF, particularly in the region of Welkait and Humera, where they enjoy significant public support.

Since the signing of the Pretoria Peace Agreement, there has been growing anxiety by the Amhara that the long contested Welkait would be surreptitiously returned back to Tigray. In a recent interview, Getachew Reda, new interim head of the Tigray region stated, “It is not possible for us to make preparations for the next election while leaving our people of Western Tigray [out of it],”. Getachew, in his inaugural speech, he also insisted that Amhara-occupied lands are integral parts of Tigray and pledged to prioritize their return. “In the Pretoria Agreement, it was clearly stated that the territorial integrity of Tigray should be resolved in accordance with the constitution,” he stated.

For Amhara regional leaders these statements raise concern. They insist these lands were annexed by TPLF and incorporated into Tigray before the ratification of the constitution, a document in which they were largely excluded from formulating. To them the question of “Welkait” is one of Amhara identity that had previously been denied. Accordingly, they view TPLF’s reign from 1991 to 2018 as an era of great suffering and displacement of the Amhara population of Welkait, Tsegede and Humera. In their view, TPLF went the distance to uproot the demography of the region in favor of Tigray. Thus maintaining the presence of the Amhara Liyu Hail in the region is needed to protect their own. Nonetheless, Tigray regional leaders accuse the Amhara of territorial irredentism, and using their newly established control of the region, to expel people that identify with Tigray. All of this complicates peace efforts, which the federal government needs to maintain.

Not far from controversy has been special forces of the Oromia region, which have been accused of atrocities committed while combating Oromo Liberation Army (OLA). The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission(EHRC) documented these occurrences in a report written in the Amharic language. The group has also been accused of harassing minority groups within the vast territory, particularly Amhara civilians, who have also been consistently targeted by the OLA, as shown by yet another EHRC report. In February of 2023, when a rift within the Ethiopian Orthodox Synod became public, the Liyu Hail of Oromia, alongside members of the regional administration were providing support for the breakaway synod, by granting them access to church facilities they were legally not entitled to.

Given this complicated history, GoE’s decision to reform the Liyu Hail was always going to be fraught with difficulty. There would never be a good time to regularize paramilitary forces in times of deteriorating public trust and polarization. The pattern of political crises in Ethiopia has been one that festers into a negative feedback loop cycle, which impedes reform. In addition, one cannot fully discount the hand of agitators, supported by foreign agents, who seek more public unrest for color revolution styled regime change.

Nonetheless, GoE’s shortcomings in getting significant consensus on the matter from the main actors on the ground threatened to jeopardize what otherwise would be good policy, particularly in the Amhara region, where the public feels it is the only region being targeted for DDR reform of the Liyu Hail. However, the government would have done well to communicate via inside channels, that Ethiopia’s security system reorganization is aimed at preemptively averting another worst-case scenario and is equally being carried out at all regions.

Paramilitary regional forces that are semi autonomous are not unique to Ethiopia. They have become widespread in the Horn of Africa. Besides Eritrea, which boasts a significant centrally controlled army relative to its population size, all other countries of the Horn are plagued by irregular forces that are not fully beholden to central governments. For instance, Sudan’s Janjaweed militia have long been used to control the restive region of Darfur, committing countless atrocities in the process. Yet the Janjaweed have by now morphed into what is known as the Rapid support Force(RSF), led by General Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, commonly referred to as Hemeti. The RSF is currently in confrontation with Sudan’s national army, led by General Burhan. Fears of this continued strife are impeding transition towards planned elections.

Behind the scenes of armed conflict in Sudan are foreign actors, tacitly backing one side against the other. With the UAE reportedly behind the RSF forces, while Egypt is said to be behind the national army. The potential for a false flag operation in the contested Al Fashga by any of the warring parties in Sudan to get Ethiopia involved on their behalf cannot be discounted. Also, on April 16, 2023 RSF fighters arrested Egyptian airmen and soldiers stationed at Marowi Airport. This raises the possibility for Egypt to intervene directly in support of General Burhan, a development that would certainly raise concern in Addis Ababa.

The trajectory of semi-autonomous irregular forces which were initially setup for counter insurgencies has been towards more balkanization and eventually insurrection. This has been demonstrated in the case of Ethiopia, and now Sudan. These forces clearly add more volatility and instability in the long run, despite their short term advantages. Some countries in the Horn of Africa are better placed than others at reforming paramilitaries by integrating them into their regular security systems. The case of Ethiopia, if carried out successfully, would provide important lessons for the region at large. 

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The Pretoria Peace agreement is an important milestone towards lasting peace in Ethiopia. It paves the way for much needed national dialogue and reconciliation. Having ended the hot war, the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) began the more difficult job of winning the peace and rebuilding. However, this undertaking is proving to be more difficult, in a nation with entrenched challenges and recent systemic shocks.

In January of this year, the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) began a campaign to clean up corruption, made worse by a messy transition, two years of war, and the pandemic. These efforts spooked entrenched interests within the ruling party who felt threatened. Areas most affected by corruption ,including urban land and housing administration, where land rights are outright stolen and transferred for payment or for political favor have resisted investigation by federal authorities.

Residents of Addis Ababa decry the network of patronage within city government. Corruption in the city outdates the current regime, but most agree it got worse, not better. Scramble for the city’s land resources is palpable and one of the most glaring examples of corruption in the country, but it extends well beyond. More recently, several ministers, including the Minister of Mining and Petroleum, were forced to resign for what many suspect to be corrupt practices. The government refrained from publicly accusing the ministers. Other cabinet positions were re-shuffled, in keeping with Ethiopia’s ever more tense ethnic balance of power.

Stumbling attempts to purge corruption exposed the weak underbelly of a system undergirded by ethnic elites in regular collusion as well as competition. Having survived the onslaught of an armed insurrection by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the reform now faces its most difficult challenge from within his own Prosperity Party(PP), an uneasy coalition of ethnic parties Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed tried to mold into a formidable unit. The aim of morphing the party into a more united organization was met with resistance early on, particularly among some key leaders of the Oromo Regional Administration (ORA), who feel their turn to usurp power is now. This sense of entitlement is partly driven by perceived past disenfranchisement of the Oromo, given their relative size.

These tensions are cause for anxiety among the Amhara, who increasingly feel alienated, and threatened. Continued bouts of violence in Oromia have resulted in the deaths and displacement of Amhara civilians, thousands of whom have fled to the Amhara region as IDPs, adding an extra financial burden to an already stretched region, sections of which recently suffered damage due to invasion by the TPLF rebels. In a recent official statement, the Amhara Regional Administration (ARA) made reference to “existence of a harmful, and mistaken political narrative that continues to accuse the Amhara people for past oppressive regimes”. According to officials, this narrative is cause for ethnically targeted violence against the Amhara today.

Moreover, the northwestern contested districts of Humera and Welkait have not been allocated budget support by the federal government. The area is currently led by the ARA, with meager financial support. TPLF reneging on a key clause of the Pretoria peace agreement, namely the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) adds to the mistrust. While rebuilding in war torn areas continues to slowly inch forward in both Tigray and Amhara, tensions remain high. The possibility of another spark that triggers a shooting war cannot be ruled out.

Ethiopia’s ruling party is not new to factionalism. In 2018 the predecessor to the PP, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) succumbed to internal power struggles accelerated by popular unrest, a history with which the Prime Minister and his officials are keenly familiar with. Many Ethiopians still hope these tensions are resolved amicably within the party, as anything less than that would mostly likely mean more bloodshed. It behooves the GoE to double down on work being done to build a shock absorbent institutional capacity to manage and resolve conflicts, which will inevitably arise.

In February, divisions within the Ethiopian Orthodox Church Synod quickly became political and boiled over onto the public sphere, causing several clashes that resulted in dozens killed and several hundreds arrested. Parishioners of the church were incensed by the government’s response not to immediately denounce the breakaway synod, which they rightly viewed as breaking with thousands of years of church cannon. The matter exploded onto street demonstrations when evidence emerged certain members of the political class within ORA were providing support for the breakaway synod, by granting them access to church facilities they were legally not entitled to. Having sensed the political fallout, the Prime Minister quickly reversed course, and admonished the breakaway synod on television. This did not instill public confidence. On the contrary it was viewed as political expediency.

Political rivals of the sitting government have shown their willingness to take advantage of civil unrest or any other institutional instability, like that of the synod. In an environment where identity politics has reached its maximum, any wedge issue could easily become a source of public protest. Managing it is a bit like walking a tightrope. Institutions to help ease these tensions are still weak, and of little help. In particular the legal system has shown itself to be inept, requiring other means of conflict resolution outside the courts. This of course means accountability is lax. There is a general sense among the public that justice is too little, too late.

A decade ago Ethiopia was essentially a security state where the slightest deviation warranted the harshest penalty. Such tactics were fraught with gross human rights violations, but people generally felt secure from criminal gangs or armed insurgents. It is also a fact that the state bureaucracy functioned more efficiently. This was not because the pay was higher or because bureaucrats were happier. It was mainly because serious consequence followed if directives from the top were not implemented by lower officials. As a result, the state’s ability to deliver security and services was more effective.

Following the reforms led by Prime Minister Abiy, we seem to have swung in the other extreme. The federal government is less feared and regional elites more defiant. Popular social media activists regularly threaten violence against groups or individuals they dislike. Interest groups, which are usually ethnic, regularly preach hate and incite violence. and are rarely held accountable. Ruling Party discipline has waned, and with that so has the efficiency of the state itself.

In a country with weak institutions, such a laissez-faire approach presents tremendous disadvantages for maintaining order. Reforming a complex country and large country like Ethiopia requires a lot of patience and tact, and is fraught with setbacks, but recent trends seem to be counter reform. Some argue, until institutions mature, this is a necessary evil of democratization and opening up.

But leniency on the part of the state is coming at a heavy cost to safety, especially in an environment where key pillars, such as the judicial branch are failing. Public frustration is growing because people feel less protected and exposed to harm. They are now less likely to view the government as a guarantor of their safety. One notices a sort of rule-less anomie.

Then there is an economy battered with several shocks. Recent global rise in prices were compounded and made worse in Ethiopia due to conflict. A shortfall in available hard currency meant essential imports such as energy, pharmaceuticals have doubled or tripled in price. Reports indicate, the country’s dollar reserves are only enough to cover a few months of key imports. To ameliorate the exchange rate position, GoE removed long standing subsidies for fuel, removed export barriers and discouraged non-essential imports. Support from international partners in debt restructuring would greatly help cash strapped Ethiopia, but political preconditions are slowing progress.

Recent visit to Ethiopia by U.S secretary of state, Anthony Blinken could help ease Ethiopia’s debt repayment, but comes with preconditions. The United States may want parliament to remove the TPLF from the terrorist entities list before facilitating IMF loans. It also seems keen on dangling AGOA re-instatement on transitional justice for victims of war. With many unresolved sticking points abound, the process will take time and likely delay AGOA. For one, investigations on human rights violations led by the UNHCR are unlikely to be accepted by Ethiopian authorities who have pushed back against such a mandate on grounds of judicial sovereignty. Most African states support this position.

Despite these challenges, Ethiopia’s resilience must also be appreciated. There are not that many states around that could withstand similar consecutive shocks and survive. This is testament to Ethiopia’s ancient homegrown state building tradition. Despite serious disadvantages presented, Ethiopia continues to show promising signs in areas such as agriculture, infrastructure, and education. However, big gaps remain in law enforcement, judiciary and peace building. More importantly, Ethiopia is missing a clear roadmap and the kind of leadership above political expediency displayed by Prime Minister Abiy in his heyday.

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